condition that he shall retain the same so long only as he shall pay the rent, failing which it shall be in the power of the lessors to take possession of the pew, he fails to make payment of the stipulated rent, the Defendants, as they are authorized to do under the contract, take possession, and I think they are right. Upon what pretence can the Plaintiff feel himself authorized to retain possession of the pew if he fails to pay the rent? If he took possession of the pew and went into it without having paid the rent, he would be the trespasser committing the voie de fait. (1)

MEREDITH, Justice: According to the Jurisprudence which existed in France before the Code Civile, the Courts would, I think, have held the resolutive clause, clause résolutive, in the case before us, to be comminatory, and would not have allowed it to have the effect of annulling the lease, without the aid of judicial authority.

Toullier describes the old french Jurisprudence on this subject in the following words:

"Les clauses par lesquelles il était convenu qu'un acte "demeurerait nul et résolu, dans le cas où l'une des parties "n'aurait pas rempli ses obligations, étaient considérées "comme simplement comminatoires; elles ne s'exécutaient "point à la rigueur, et la convention n'était pas résolue par "le seul accomplissement de la condition dans le temps fixé 66 par la convention, quand même il eut été expressément "stipulé que la résolution serait encourue de plein droit, 66 par la seule échéance du terme, sans qu'il fût besoin d'acte "ni de sommation, etc. Quelles que fussent les expressions "dont les contractants s'étaient servis, leur volonté la mieux marquée était impuissante pour opérer la résolution de "plein droit. Les tribunaux s'obstinaient à juger que ces

(1) 11 Toullier, pp 178, 179, Nos. 135, 136, 137, Voie de Fait :-1 Argou, p 302-Instructions sur les Conventions, p. 75-Rep. de Jurisp., vbo. Voie de Fait.

"clauses n'avaient d'effet qu'à l'arbitrage des juges, selon la qualité du fait et des circonstances." (1)

The condition for the prepayment of the pew rent, under pain of the lease becoming absolutely void, would, it seems, have been held comminatory under the Jurisprudence above described.

This Jurisprudence has been condemned as arbitrary and unjust by our most eminent jurists; (2) and I have no hesitation in saying that I think it was so.

It appears to me that when parties have entered into a contract, not opposed to law or good morals, and which can be carried into execution without injustice, that a competent tribunal refusing to give effect to such a contract, is guilty of a denial of justice; applying this principle to the present case, I am of opinion that we would not be justified in refusing to give effect to the clause which makes the pre payment of the pew rent, the condition of the continuance of the lease. That clause not only has no immoral or illegal tendency, but on the contrary, tends to promote the public good.

The prepayment of the pew rents enables those who have to meet obligations contracted for the building or repairs of the church, to know that at a given time they may count upon a certain fund; and it obviates the delay, expenses, litigation, losses and other désagréments, incident to the collection of arrears. It is established that the system of causing pew rents to be paid in advance has been universally followed in the church in question since it was built in 1849, and also in the Church in the St. Roch suburb of this

(1) 6 Toullier, p 581, No. 550:-Rep. vbo. Clause Comminatoire :-Pothier, Vente No. 459:-Brodeau sur Louel, lettre P. No. 50.

(2) The language of Toullier on this subject is very forcible-same number 550.-"Nous avons observé supra que cette jurisprudence était marquée au coin "de l'erreur la plus manifeste, destructive des conditions, sans lesquelles les con“ trats n'auraient point eu lieu; qu'elle était attentatoire à la foi publique, et qu'elle attaquait ses conventions jusque dans leurs bases les plus sacrées,'

city for a considerable number of years, and that it has been productive of great advantages; as to the Plaintiff, it is not contended that he has suffered any actual loss or damage by the resale of his pew. That proceeding will merely cause him to sit in another part of the church, which is not a grievance that calls for the interference of this tribunal. For these reasons it appears to me, that, as the agreement under review is not only in all respects perfectly unobjectionable, but is moreover a very judicious arrangement, we ought to let it have its full effect, according to the clearly expressed intentions of the parties; and, consequently, to hold that the resale of the Plaintiff's pew by the Defendants, was legal and perfectly effectual.

A case decided by me in the Circuit Court has been cited by the Plaintiff. In that case the Plaintiff sued for arrears of pew rent, and at the same time prayed that the lease might be declared null, in consequence of the non payment of the pew rent at the time agreed upon. The Defendant having offered to pay the arrears, I allowed him to do so, and refused to cause him to be ejected from the pew. I do not know whether the conditions of the lease in that case were exactly the same as those in the lease now before us, but even if they were, the fact of arrears having been allowed to accumulate would seem to shew that both parties had treated the clause for the resale of the pew as comminatory, and if so, the Court might well do so likewise.

In that case also, there was no proof, such as we have in the present case, as to the importance or utility of the stipulations for prepayment, nor have I any recollection of the case having been argued as involving any important general principle. It certainly did not occur to me then that I ought to deviate from the Jurisprudence to which I have already alluded; and it will at once be seen, that if there is to be any change in the Jurisprudence, as to the effect of resolutive

clauses, it is more fitting that such change should be made by the Court having the highest original civil jurisdiction, and from the judgments of which there is an appeal, rather than by a Judge deciding non appealable cases in a summary Court.

I will merely add that as to the Defendant's costs, I do not think there ought to be a judgment against the Plaintiff; according to the old Jurisprudence, the Plaintiff would, I think, have been entitled to a judgment in his favour. It is true that that Jurisprudence which is not founded on any positive law, is in our opinion so unreasonable and unjust, that we cannot regard it as binding upon us; but still the Plaintiff can hardly be blamed if he relied upon it. Moreover, this case involves an important question, in the settlement of which the Defendants are deeply interested, I therefore would not think we subjected them to any injustice, were we to dismiss the action without awarding costs to either party.

Jugement pour les Défendeurs, le 19 Avril, 1854, comme suit :

"La cour, etc. Considérant que par le bail consenti au "Demandeur par la Fabrique de Québec, il est stipulé que "le prix ou loyer du banc mentionné au dit bail, pour chaque "année, sera payé en deux payements égaux de la somme "de une livre, dix chelins, sept deniers et demi, courant, chaque, dont le premier payement a été fait à l'instant, et que les autres se feront, respectivement, le ou avant le quinze "Décembre, ou le quinze Juin, chaque année, et ainsi de six "mois en six mois pendant la durée du dit bail; qu'à défaut "du paiement du dit loyer aux dits termes et époques, dès "lors et aussitôt après l'expiration de chacun des dits termes "le dit bail sera et demeurera nul et résolu de plein droit, et "la dite Fabrique rentrera en possession du dit banc, et pourra procéder à une nouvelle adjudication d'icelui, sans

" être tenue de donner aucun avis ou assignation au dit pre"neur : Et vu que par la preuve il est constaté que le De"mandeur n'a point payé le loyer du dit banc aux termes stipulés par le dit bail, et qu'en conséquence de tel défaut "de payement, la dite Fabrique a pris possession du dit banc, et l'a vendu et adjugé le deuxième jour de Juin, mil "huit cent cinquante-trois, au nommé Anaclet Vézina, étant "le plus haut et dernier enchérisseur, déboute le Deman"deur de son action, avec depens auquel jugement son "honneur, M. le Juge Meredith, a déclaré être d'une opinion "contraire, quant aux frais seulement."

De ce jugement le Demandeur interjetta appel.

TASCHEREAU, J. T. pour l'Appelant.

La question qui s'élève en cette cause, et la seule suivant moi, est de savoir si les Intimés, en vertu de la clause citée, avaient le droit de déposséder l'Appelant du banc qui lui était loué, et d'en prendre possession de plano, et sans aucune autorité de justice. Dans notre système, cette clause est toujours réputée comminatoire, et les Intimés n'avaient pas le droit, de leur propre chef, de se mettre en possession du banc, et d'en expulser l'Appelant, ils devaient faire prononcer la déchéance par les tribunaux, qui, en pareil cas, prononce tel déchéancé, tout en accordant un délai pour l'exécution de la convention. (1)

Si la proposition que je viens d'énoncer, savoir, que les Défendeurs n'avaient pas le droit, de leur propre autorité, de se mettre en possession du banc de l'Appelant, et de l'en expulser, est vraie, ils se sont par leur conduite rendus coupables d'une voie de fait, et la cour inférieure eut dû condamner les Intimés à des dommages exemplaires.

(1) Pothier, Obligations, No. 672 :-Pothier, Vente Nos 458, 459, 472, 474, 475 : -Nou. Den., vbo. Clause Comminatoire:-2 Argou, liv. 3, sec. 12, art. 2 et 12:Rep. de Guyot, bo. Clause Resolutoire :-Loyseau, des Seigneuries, ch. 2, Nos. 73 et 74-1 Maréchal p. 269.