duty, therefore, devolves on me, and, upon my hos nour, it shall be fulfilled. I will employ no artifices of speech. I claim only the strictest protection of the law for the unhappy man before you. I should, indeed, be ashamed if I were to say any thing of the rule in the abstract by which he is to be judged, which I did not honestly feel; and I am sorry, therefore, that the subject is so difficult to handle with brevity and precision. Indeed, if it could be brought to a clear and simple criterion, which could admit of a dry admission or contradiction, there might be very little difference, perhaps none at all, between the Attorney-General and myself, upon the principles which ought to govern your verdict; but this is not possible, and I am, therefore, under the necessity of submitting to you, and to the Judges, for their direction (and at greater length than I wish), how I understand this difficult and momentous subject.

The law, as it regards this most unfortunate infirmity of the human mind, like the law in all its branches, aims at the utmost degree of precision; but there are some subjects, as I have just observed you, and the present is one of them, upon which it is extremely difficult to be precise. The general principle is clear, but the application is most difficult.

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It is agreed by all jurists, and is established by the law of this and every other country, that it is the REASON OF MAN which makes him accountable for

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his actions; and that the deprivation of reason acquits him of crime.-This principle is indisputable; yet so fearfully and wonderfully are we made, so infinitely subtle is the spiritual part of our being, so difficult is it to trace with accuracy the effect of diseased intellect upon human action, that I may appeal to all who hear me, whether there are any causes more difficult, or which, indeed, so often confound the learning of the Judges themselves, as when insanity, or the effects and consequences of insanity, become the subjects of legal consideration and judg ment. I shall pursue the subject as the AttorneyGeneral has properly discussed it. I shall consider insanity, as it annuls a man's dominion over property; as it dissolves his contracts, and other acts, which otherwise would be binding; and as it takes away his responsibility for crimes. If I could draw - the line in a moment between these two views of the subject, I am sure the Judges will do me the justice to believe, that I would fairly and candidly do so; but great difficulties press upon my mind, which oblige me to take a different course.

I agree with the Attorney-General, that the law, in neither civil nor criminal cases, will measure the degrees of men's understandings; and that a weak man, however much below the ordinary standard of human intellect, is not only responsible for crimes, but is bound by his contracts, and may exercise dominion over his property. Sir Joseph Jekyll, in the Duchess of Cleveland's case, took the clear legal

distinction, when he said, "The law will not mea"sure the sizes of men's capacities, so as they be 66 COMPOS MENTIS."

Lord Coke, in speaking of the expression NON COMPOS MENTIS, says, "Many times, as here, the "Latin word expresses the true sense, and calleth "him not amens, demens, furiosus, lunaticus, fatuus,

stultus, or the like, for non compos mentis is the "most sure and legal." He then says, "Non "compos mentis is of four sorts: first, ideota, which, 'from his nativity, by a perpetuul infirmity, is NON "COMPOS MENTIS; secondly, he that by sickness,

grief, or other accident, wholly loses his memory "and understanding; third, a lunatic that hath "sometimes his understanding, and sometimes not; "aliquando gaudet lucidis intervallis; and therefore "he is called non compos mentis so long as he hath "not understanding."

But notwithstanding the precision with which this great author points out the different kinds of this unhappy malady, the nature of his work, in this part of it, did not open to any illustration which it can now be useful to consider. In his Fourth Institute he is more particular; but the admirable work of Lord Chief Justice Hale, in which he refers to Lord Coke's Pleas of the Crown, renders all other authorities unnecessary.

Lord Hale says, "There is a partial insanity of mind, and a total insanity. The former is either in respect to things, quoad hoc vel illud insanire.

"Some persons, that have a competent use of rea son in respect of some subjects, are yet under a "particular dementia in respect of some particular "discourses, subjects, or applications: or else it is "partial in respect of degrees; and this is the con"dition of very many, especially melancholy per86 sons, who for the most part discover their defect "in excessive fears and griefs, and yet are not "wholly destitute of the use of reason; and this "partial insanity seems not to excuse them in the "committing of any offence for its matter capital; "for doubtless most persons, that are felons of themselves and others, are under a degree of par"tial insanity, when they commit these offences. "It is very difficult to define the invisible line that "divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must "rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and "considered both by Judge and Jury, lest on the "one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the "defects of human nature; or, on the other side, "too great an indulgence given to great crimes."

Nothing, Gentlemen, can be more accurately nor more humanely expressed; but the application of the rule is often most difficult. I am bound, be sides, to admit that there is a wide distinction between civil and criminal cases.-If, in the former, a man appears, upon the evidence, to be non compos mentis, the law avoids his act, though it cannot be traced or connected with the morbid imagination which constitutes his disease, and which may be ex

tremely partial in its influence upon conduct; but to deliver a man from responsibility for crimes, above all, for crimes of great atrocity and wickedness, I am by no means prepared to apply this rule, however well established, when property only is concerned.

In the very recent instance of Mr. Greenwood (which must be fresh in his Lordship's recollection), the rule in civil cases was considered to be settled. That gentleman, whilst insane, took up an idea that a most affectionate brother had administered poison to him. Indeed, it was the prominent feature of his insanity.-In a few months he recovered his senses. He returned to his profession as an advocate; was sound and eminent in his practice, and in all respects a most intelligent and useful member of society; but he could never dislodge from his mind the morbid delusion which disturbed it; and under the pressure, no doubt, of that diseased prepossession, he disinherited his brother. The cause to avoid this will was tried here.-We are not now upon the evidence, but upon the principle adopted as the law. The Noble and Learned Judge, whọ presides upon this trial, and who presided upon that, told the Jury, that if they believed Mr. Greenwood, when he made the will, to have been insane, the will could not be supported, whether it had disinherited his brother, or not; that the act, no doubt, strongly confirmed the existence of the false idea which, if believed by the Jury to amount to