NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A.-Page 45.

THE following considerations may perhaps be of use, as materials of thought, in the consideration of the intricate doctrines of Liberty and Necessity.

There may be two different powers which influence human action; the one voluntary, and the other mechanical. The power of the will always remains the same, and does not, as some necessitarians affirm, assume the character of automatic motion. This is a distinction necessary to be kept in view in all speculations on this subject. There is also a unity of nature in mechanical power; it never assumes a voluntary character.

That man is subject to the influence of a double power, is almost a matter of demonstration. We find some parts of our bodily frames under the control of the will; but this voluntary power is only observable to a certain extent. It seems to cease, and certain functions are carried on to their farther progress by purely mechanical action. Many of the secretory organs of the body exhibit the influence of this dual power. And we may state, for example, that when a person is trembling with cold, if it be not very severe he has it in his power, by an exercise of his will, to lessen it, or make it cease altogether; but when it arrives at a certain point of intensity, the influence of the will is superseded, the trembling continues, and mechanical action takes the place of voluntary power.

In the passions and affections of the mind, we find the influence of this double action; voluntary and mechanical power. Some passions assume the appearance of blind impulses, and are little, if at all, under the control of the will. We again find others that are more manageable. The mode and degree in which these two

separate powers are blended with or incorporated into human nature, may give rise to that endless variety of character and temper which we observe among the mass of mankind.

There is no more difficulty in supposing the existence of two independent powers of action, than in maintaining one. Archbishop King remarks, "But to confess the truth, it is no less difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another than itself; but as we are accustomed to material agents, all which are passive in their operations, we are certain of the fact, and not at all solicitous about the manner of it; whereas if we consider the thing thoroughly, we shall find ourselves as far from apprehending how motion is communicated from one body to another, as how the will can move itself; but there seems nothing wonderful in the one, because it is observed to happen at all times, and in every action-; whereas the other is looked upon as incredible, since it is seldom performed by the will alone."-(King's Origin of Evil, p. 100.)

There are some sensible and ingenious remarks in a small work published by Mr. Pickering (1845), entitled "Philosophical Theories and Philosophical Experience," which have a direct bearing on the great influence which the will exercises over the intellectual faculties. We have room only for one short extract :—“Spiritual or unchanging functions.-These appear to be two: i. e. the intelligent will, and that species of memory which forms the consciousness of identity; and which-however ordinary recollections may be impaired by the injury or disease of the brain-never suffers any change from infancy to death, and even in sleep remains unaltered.

"We have as yet considered man as an animal only, and have seen all parts of his frame acting harmoniously together; the appetites, and the involuntary or instinctive emotions, by turns stimulating the faculties to provide for the needs of the body; these faculties being operations of the brain, and therefore coming within reach of the mechanical action of the system. But another power now enters upon the scene, and, for good or for evil, not unfrequently thwarts and disorders the whole. The instinctive emotions, which in themselves are evanescent, are wrought up by this untiring energy into permanent affections. The faculties, which naturally only act under the stimulus of bodily wants, that is to say, under the impulses mechanically conveyed to the brain,—are now seized upon by this restless inquisitive power, and compelled, in

spite of fatigue, and even utter derangement of health in consequence, to minister to its requisitions, and supply it with the information it wants; untired, unchanging, it drags on its weary slave with immitigable determination, till at last it scornfully casts it into the grave as no longer fit for its purpose, and asks for other worlds, and ages yet to come, to satisfy its impatient longings for wisdom or for enjoyment. But though, when speaking of functions, I have divided them into two, as manifesting themselves differently, it is clear that they proceed from one principle; it is the conscious individual essence which pours itself forth in this energetic and unwearied activity, and is able, when it knows its powers, to appropriate to its own purposes the whole of the unrivalled machinery placed within its reach.

"But though this nice mechanism be capable of responding to the touch of that power within, which makes man so godlike when his nature has its full play, it is too frequently left at the mercy of outward impressions, and remains the mere animal to the last; for we have already seen that the exertion of the intelligent will over the bodily functions, is not requisite to their performance so as to preserve life. Man may exist as an animal, or at least very little removed from that state, and when the brain has never been exercised in those nicer operations which the individual essence can at its choice require from it, it becomes as unfit for use as the hands of a Hindoo devotee when he has resolutely kept them shut for ten years together. Active use is the necessary condition for keeping any bodily fibre in a healthy and serviceable state; and we see that this active use is stimulated by the sensations from without, which at our first entrance into the world are so abundant in all directions. The first impulse of the child is a restless curiosity, and at the same time to endeavour to combine and arrange ideas from what he sees and hears. Sensation has done its work; the brain has perceived; the individual is beginning to discover the organ he has at his command, and he is already directing it to the inquiries; he gets weary of useless question, or is reproved for it; the brain consequently becomes inactive as to all its higher functions, and no further progress is made. The will is either not exerted at all,— for the mere action of nerves of voluntary motion, stimulated by sensation, must not be confounded with the ruling individual will, — or if it be exerted, having no longer power over the faculties to

acquire useful information, its whole energy is devoted to the giving force and permanence to the instinctive emotions, which being involuntary, never can slumber as the faculties are wont to do. The man becomes thus the creature of passion, and that immaterial essence which should have been the guide to all that is excellent and noble in knowledge and in feeling, panders only to the impulses of the body, and degrades itself from its high dignity merely to sink both below the level of the brute; for the brute, when the appetite is satisfied, goes no further; but bring the intelligent will once to aid, and the jaded appetite is pampered and stimulated; fresh excitement is sought, and the body is at last worn out by the endeavours of its unwearied ally to minister to its gratification."

NOTE B.-Page 59.

"Le scepticisme relatif de Bayle avait, sous quelques rapports, un but et une tendance utiles. Il contraignait à justifier ses affirmations ou à les modifier. Non-seulement il dissipait un grand nombre d'erreurs, et par cela seul ouvrait déjà un accès plus libre à un grand nombre de vérités; mais il prévenait pour l'avenir de nombreux écarts, commandait plus de défiance et de réserve. Il tourmentait la raison, mais pour la redresser. Il devait même contribuer à faire acquérir à la philosophie de nouvelles richesses, tout en paraissant la dépouiller; à affermir définitivement, après l'avoir momentanément ébranlée; car les lacunes qu'il découvrait dans la science étaient autant de problèmes proposés. Montrer l'insuffisance des idées reçues, c'était exciter à pénétrer plus avant, et provoquer des investigations plus profondes. Les convictions obtenues à la suite d'une épreuve aussi sévère seraient devenues plus solides. Toutefois, un tel service ne pouvait guère être pleinement accepté que par des esprits distingués. Il fallait, pour en profiter dans toute son étendue, un degré d'énergie qui semblait avoir manqué à Bayle lui-même. Mais les esprits vulgaires ne comprirent pas l'appel que le scepticisme de Bayle faisait à la raison; les esprits lâches et énervés ne songèrent pas à y répondre ; pour les uns et les autres, ce scepticisme ne fut pas un passage, mais le terme des efforts, ou plutôt un abîme. Pendant que les dog

matistes, qu'il avait tant harcelés, fatigués, contrariés, le poursui, vaient, suivant leur usage, d'inculpations injustes; de vrais sceptiques se prévalaient de son autorité, s'emparaient des armes qu'il avait fournies.

"Le scepticisme de Bayle fut contagieux, séduisant, plus funeste peut-être qu'aucun autre, précisément parce que, dépourvu de tout appareil didactique, il se présentait sous des formes agréables, piquantes, variées. Le penchant au doute, nous dirons presque le besoin du doute, naissait en partie, chez Bayle, d'une disposition d'esprit à voir les choses sous une face détachée, à parcourir une foule d'objets sans en approfondir aucun; disposition qu'il favorise chez son lecteur. Bayle manquait de cette énergie intellectuelle qui rassemble, rapproche et résume pour conclure; il manquait aussi, il faut le dire, de ce profond sentiment moral si nécessaire pour alimenter l'énergie intellectuelle. Il ne saississait que des prémisses; il n'apercevait que des détails; il touchait à tout, mais sans ordre; il semblait se rire de la science humaine.

"On ne saurait reconnaître dans Bayle, lorsqu'il traite des questions métaphysiques, cette profondeur que lui ont attribuée quelques historiens de la philosophie; mais on ne peut lui refuser en même temps une rare pénétration, une lucidité singulière, et un talent extraordinaire pour la dialectique. Il a offert des modèles d'une discussion méthodique, lumineuse, sincère, pleine de modération et d'urbanité, exempte de toute prévention, de toute amertume; exemples jusqu'alors presque inconnus, et qu'il était si nécessaire de donner. Le premier il a plaidé ouvertement la cause de la tolérance; il l'a plaidée avec un courage, une constance, qui, à l'époque où il écrivait, étaient fort méritoires; il a dévoué sa vie entière à cette cause, sans que son siècle lui en ait pu savoir assez de gré. Enfin, et c'est un dernier service, un service considérable dont lui sont redevables les sciences philosophiques, il est un de ceux qui ont le plus contribué à transporter la science au milieu de la société, à la populariser, à la ramener sous l'empire du sens commun. En foudant, par la publication de ses Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, la première application de la presse périodique à la littérature, il a donné une rapidité et une activité toute nouvelles au commerce des idées; par là, il a concouru essentiellement à former cette opinion publique qui accueille, encourage, récompense et juge quelquefois les travaux des penseurs. Sous tous ces rapports divers