may be transitory and passing. Now it is from contemplating two or more of these instants under one view, together with that interval of continuity which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the idea of time."*

Mr. Harris differs entirely from Mr. Locke's theory as to the origin of our knowledge. Sensation and reflection are not adequate, he conceives, to account for it. There must be innate forms of thought. Harris says, "Had we not better reason thus, upon such an abstruse subject? Either all minds have their ideas derived, or all have them original; or some have them original, and some derived. If all minds have them derived, they must be derived from something which is itself not mind, and thus we insensibly fall into a kind of atheism. If all have them original, then are all minds divine, an hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one mind (at least) have original ideas, and the rest have them derived. Now supposing this last, whence are those minds, whose ideas are derived, most likely to derive them? From mind, or from body? From mind, a thing homogeneous, or from body, a thing heterogeneous? From mind such as (from the hypothesis) has original ideas, or from body, which we cannot discover to have any ideas at all? An examination of this kind, pursued with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts."+

Works, Vol. 1. p.

274.

† Ibid., Vol. 1. p. 429.

In that part of Mr. Harris's work called " Philosophical Arrangements," in the second volume, the reader will find a great number of ingenious remarks on metaphysical subjects. Indeed this division of his treatise is more interesting than his "Hermes." We cannot however enter into its nature or merits.

ABRAHAM TUCKER.

Tucker's "Light of Nature Pursued," published in 1763, has been considered by many as an interesting book. It is written in a peculiar style; desultory, unconnected, and rambling; much upon the same plan as Montaigne's Essays.

The treatise is in four volumes; but the author's metaphysical speculations on the origin of our knowledge, are chiefly confined to the first. Body and mind, he sets out with affirming, are two distinct objects.

Tucker uses the word idea in a loose and undetermined sense. He says, "Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images; but image being appropriated by common use to visible objects, could not well be extended to other things without confusion ; wherefore, learned men have imported the Greek word idea, signifying image or appearance; towhich, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a signification as they pleased. For the image of a sound or of goodness would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down

glibly; therefore, idea is the same with respect to things in general, as image with respect to objects of vision."*

The faculties of the mind are treated of at considerable length, but there is not anything of novelty in the arrangement or illustration of them. Tucker has done little more here than merely to copy Locke.

On the nature of reflection, the author remarks, "But those ideas before mentioned having gained admittance through the avenues of sensation, do, by their mutual action upon one another, and by their operation on the mind, or of the mind upon them, generate new ideas, which the senses were not capable of conveying; such as willing, discerning, remembering, comparison, relation, power, and innumerable others."+

Tucker has been accused, and justly, of taking many of his views of the mind from Dr. Hartley; and merely changing some of the leading technical terms. Instead of the Doctor's Association of Ideas, we have Translation. Sir James Mackintosh observes, relative to this plagiarism, that in the part of his work, (Tucker's,) which relates to the intellect, he has adopted much from Hartley; hiding, and thereby aggravating the offence by a change of technical terms; and he was ungrateful enough to countenance the vulgar sneer which involves the mental analysis of that philosopher in the ridicule to which his physiological hypothesis is liable."

* Light of Nature Pursued, vol. 1, p. 38. + Ibid. vol. 1, Dissertation, p. 371.

of

p. 132.

Tucker was a zealous disciple of Locke, of whom he speaks with the greatest deference and respect. "Mr. Locke," says he, “in particular, has contributed not a little to facilitate the increase of knowledge, by pointing out the sources and channels from whence it must be derived, and clearing away that incumbrance of innate ideas, real essences, and such like rubbish, that obstructed the searches of the studious formerly; so that the reasonings of men are become more accurate, more solid, and if one may say so, more reasonable than they were before. I cannot expect to run to such lengths as he has done; for if I may advance one step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved by some abler hand for the real benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have laboured in vain, nor lived in vain. Whatever I may be able to do, I stand much indebted to Mr. Locke, for having learned from him which way to direct my observation, and how to make use of what I observe."

JOHN HORNE TOOKE.

This author, so well known in political and literary history, is commonly considered as a metaphysician of the pure nominalist or material school. His famous "Eπɛа Птερоɛνта, or Diversions of Purley," contains his opinions of the nature of language as an instrument of thought.

Tooke conceived that there were no general or abstract ideas; but only general terms of language.

His views may be embodied in two or three short quotations from the above work. "And amongst many other things, I think he (Locke) would not have talked of the composition of ideas; but would have seen that it was merely a contrivance of language; and consequently that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star; and that they are not ideas, but merely terms, which are general and abstract......I only desire you to read the Essay on the Human Understanding' again with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded, will not hold equally true and clear, if you substitute the composition, &c., of terms, wherever he has supposed a composition, &c., of ideas. And if that shall, upon consideration, appear to you to be the case, you will need no other argument against the composition of ideas. It being exactly similar to that unanswerable one, which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient against their being innate. For the supposition is unnecessary. Every purpose for which the composition of ideas was imagined, being more easily and naturally answered by the composition of terms; whilst at the same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties, in which the supposed composition of ideas necessarily involves us.

*

* Diversions, pp. 21. 22. See also the Author's Letter to Mr. Dunning.