This was, in fact, Locke's idea of the origin of our knowledge, according to the French interpretation of his "Essay."

Maupertuis' speculations on an intelligent First Cause, are contained in a communication he sent to the Academy, on the laws of motion.*

The doctrines and opinions of Spinoza, which had gained, in the middle of the eighteenth century, a considerable footing in Germany, became subjects of controversy and debate in the Berlin Academy. Two authors took a conspicuous lead in their refutation-these were JARIGES and ACHARD.

DAVIES.-Davies was a great favourite with Frederic, and communicated many philosophical papers to the Academy. He was a Professor at Jena, and a man of great talent and industry. His work "Via ad Veritatem," was published in that city in 1755.

Davies wrote many articles on Ontology, Psychology, Cosmology, and Natural Theology, in all of which he displayed great scientific knowledge, an intimate acquaintance with the history of speculative opinions, and a correctness and elegance of style not surpassed by any writer of his day.

Knowledge, according to Davies, is the seizing of the chain which binds truths together. All philosophy has for its aim to unravel the intricate and apparently perplexing maze of things around us. Truth is that which is possible; and to recognise

* See Mémoires de l'Académie de Berlin, Années 1746, 1752, 1757.

a truth, is to have an object present to the thought; but then it must be in conformity with the truth of things, as we see them established in objects around us. This knowledge constitutes certainty, when we can show a sufficient reason for its being what it is.*

Davies maintained the existence of images, as the medium through which the mind obtained a knowledge of the external world. "I perceive a thing," says he, "and I have an image of it. This becomes a notion, if conceived under a universal aspect."+

J. B. BOYER, MARQUIS D'ARGENS.-This writer was one of the savans who was connected with the Berlin Academy, and its royal patron, Frederic II. D'Argens had led a roving and adventurous life, but finally settled down at the Prussian court, where he assiduously laboured to stand high in the estimation of the philosophical monarch, but succeeded indifferently in the object of his ambition. D'Argens published at the Hague, in 1755, a work in three volumes, entitled, "La Philosophie du Bon Sens." The author endeavours to prove that our ordinary conclusions on the science of metaphysics, and also on logic, and on natural philosophy, do not rest on any solid foundation. A sceptical spirit predominates throughout the whole * Via ad Veritatem, § 6. 9. 44. 52. 54. 58.

† Ibid., c. 1. § 69; c. 2. § 71.

"I imagine D'Argens is mad. Do not tell him so, however; but take good care not to stir the bile of our philosopher, who appears to me to have more of that merchandise than of good sense."-(Letter of Frederic II. to M. Jordan.)

work. Its appearance created great dissatisfaction among the French Clergy. The author complains bitterly to Frederic of the contemptuous and vindictive spirit which was displayed against his philosophy throughout the whole of France. "The further to vex me," says he, "the king's people have denounced my Philosophie du Bon Sens' to the Parliament of Paris as an impious book, and it has been burnt by the hands of the hangman."*

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* D'Argens' Letter to the King of Prussia.

CHAPTER XIII.

DR. REID.

THE writings of Dr. Reid form an important epoch in the history of mental philosophy. He was the first writer of any distinction who reared the standard of rebellion against the leading foundations of Locke's system; and who laid down those maxims and principles, relative to the philosophy of mind, which have subsequently been denominated the Scotch or Common-sense school of metaphysics.

There are three publications of Reid's, on which his philosophy, as a whole, is founded; namely, his "Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense," published in 1764; his

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Essays on the Intellectual Powers," 1785; and his "Essay on the Active Powers," 1788. The first treatise is the most systematic and important.

Much has been written within the last fifty years, relative to Reid's system, both in England and on

the Continent; little therefore that is new can be said upon it. But its nature and merits lie within comparatively narrow limits; we shall, therefore, endeavour to furnish the reader with a bird's-eye view of the leading points connected with his mental speculations. To give something like method to our observations, we shall notice Reid's doctrines under four points of view; 1st, His ideas of the representational hypothesis connected with perception; 2nd, His ideas of, and combat with the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume; 3rd, His own opinions of the nature and operations of mind; and 4th, Objections which have commonly been urged against his theory as a whole. Our notice of the Doctor's system, as a body, must necessarily be limited here; as we shall have to refer to several phases of it, when we come to the works of some of his most voluminous and distinguished disciples.

We have already noticed that Locke's meaning as to the word idea has been generally misconceived by Dr. Reid and his followers. Locke tells us that he means it to "stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks ;" and as being "synonymous with phantasm, NOTION, or species; or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." And throughout his whole "Essay," there is not a single passage, when fairly and candidly interpreted, in which he does not use the term idea to mean simply a thought or notion.

Dr. Reid, however, puts a different construction on his language. "It is a fundamental principle,"