counterbalance any, even the smallest likelihood that His will for us lies in a particular direction? Scripture, surely, gives no warrant for such a theory; nor the sense of Christian tradition; nor the worthier schools of heathen philosophy. Is it not hard to reconcile the bare statement of it with the common sense of duty and of honesty, as it belongs to our race at large? And more. Is it possible to go thus far, without going much further? It is granted and taught, not indeed that where there is an overwhelming, yet where there is a sensible and appreciable superiority of likelihood in favour of one alternative against another, there, on account and in virtue of our inclination for that which has the weaker evidence, we may choose the latter with a safe conscience. That is to say, eliminating, or excluding from the case, that portion of likelihood which is common to both alternatives, there remains behind on the one side not a great but an appreciable probability: on the other a simple predilection; and shall the latter be declared by a system of Christian ethics to outweigh the former? How is it possible, either, firstly, to establish the right of mere will to be set against presumptions of duty? or, secondly, when once that right has been arrogated, to limit, by any other than an arbitrary rule, the quantity of such presumptions of duty, which may be thus outweighed? If an ordinary inclination may outweigh so much of adverse presumption of duty, may not a bias tenfold and twentyfold stronger outweigh a little, or a good deal, more? And then, where is this slippery process to terminate? Where is the clue to this labyrinth? What will be the rights, and what the assumptions, of inclination in this matter, when it has been stimulated by the countenance of authority, and when through indulgence it has become ungovernable? But, as our sense of the obligations of human relationship, though lower, is also less impaired than that of our duty towards God, let us illustrate the case by reference to this region. Will a license to follow the less probable alternative bear examination, when it is applied to the relative obligations which unite man with man? An enemy brings me tidings that an aged parent is in prison and at the point of death, without solace or support. The same person has before deceived and injured me. It is probable that he may be doing so again so probable that if he had communicated any piece of mere intelligence, not involving a question of conduct, it would, upon the whole, have appeared most safe not to believe the statement. Let it then even be more likely that he now speaks falsehood than truth. Will that warrant me in remaining where I am, or is it possible to treat with neglect a call which may reveal the want and extremity of a parent, without an evident, gross, and most culpable breach of filial obligation? The answer would be No; and it would be immediate and universal. And yet the case here put has been one not of greater but of inferior likelihood. How then, we may ask, by the argument à fortiori, is it possible to apply to the regulation of our relations towards God a theory which explodes at the first instant when it is tested by perhaps the deepest among all the original instincts of our nature? It is indeed true that the doctrine of Probabilism is guarded by two conditions. The first is, that it is to apply only to questions of right, not to those, as I find it expressed, where both fact and right are involved. The question of the validity of a sacrament is not to be tried by it; and 'de même, un médecin est tenu de donner les remèdes les plus éprouvés, et un juge les décisions les plus sûres.' 19 But this reservation appears rather to weaken, than to strengthen, the case. Is it not sometimes difficult to decide on the validity of a sacred rite? Do the judge and the physician never doubt? Why are the rules for the investigation of truth which bind them, otherwise than obligatory on other personal conduct? Is not the foundation of duty to others strictly and immutably one with the foundation of duty to our own selves? Again, obligation to a fellow-creature cannot be stronger than obligation to our Father in heaven; therefore, if the liberty of a man is a good plea against a doubtful command of God, why may it not equally warrant a doubtful wrong to a patient or a suitor? if it be good in that part of our relations to God, which embraces the immediate communion of the soul with Him, why not also in that other part, when the intercourse is through the medium of holy rites? It is not difficult to see that neither the Church, nor civil society, could bear without derangement the application of Probabilism to the relations between them and the individual. But then it is more than ever difficult to conceive how such a relaxation of the moral law is to be justified, and that, moreover, in the department of conduct which is inward, in which we are our own judges, and in which therefore we may even have need to be aided against temptation by a peculiar strictness of rule. The other limitation of the doctrine is, that the probability we are to follow, though inferior to that of the competing alternative, must be intrinsically a solid one: and must not be glaringly, though it may be sensibly, inferior to the opposing argument. Quoique, comparativement à la probabilité contraire, la vôtre soit inférieure, il faut qu'elle soit, absolument parlant, grave, et solide, et digne d'un homme prudent; comme une montagne relativement à une autre peut être plus petite, mais néanmoins être en soi, et absolument, une assez grande masse pour mériter le nom de montagne.' 20 And this doctrine is supported by the very strange reason,21 that it is more easy to determine whether the probability in favour of a given alternative belong to the class of solid or of faint and inadmissible probabilities, than whether it be greater or less than the probability in favour of some other alternative. This proposition is one which 19 Manuel des Confesseurs, p. 74. 20 Ibid. p. 75. 21 Ibid. p. 86. requires to borrow support, rather than one which can afford to lend it. To me it has the sound of egregious paradox. However difficult it may sometimes be to compare the reasons adducible in support of opposite alternatives, the line between them, it is evident, can rarely be finer and more hair-drawn than that which is to distinguish, in the technical order, the general traits of a faint from those of a solid probability. But upon the doctrine itself let me record, in concluding, these three remarks. In the first place, the cases are innumerable in which there is evidence in favour of a given alternative, which would amount to a solid, aye a very solid probability, if it stood alone: if it were not overthrown by evidence on the opposite side. But if we are to regard it absolutely, and not relatively, we must on this account fall into constant error. Secondly to know that our duty is to follow the safest and best alternative, is at least to possess a determinate rule, and one eminently acceptable to a sound conscience; one which gives us a single and intelligible end for our efforts, though the path of duty is not always, even for the single eye, easy to discern. It becomes a tangled path indeed, with the aid of Probabilism, which requires the decision of at least two questions: first, whether the alternative which it is meant to follow has a solid, not a feeble, probability in its favour; secondly, whether the alternative to be discarded has a notable and conspicuous, or only a limited and moderate, superiority over it. For the step cannot, by hypothesis, be taken until both these questions have been determined. In the third place, it is painful to recollect that when we are dealing with the most difficult parts of duty, those which we transact within ourselves, the appetite for self-indulgence should be pampered by encouragement from without. We are already apt enough to conjure into solid probabilities the veriest phantasms of the mind, provided only they present an agreeable appearance. Here is a premium set upon this process alike dangerous and alluring. The known subtlety of those mental introspections excuses many failures in those who do not create their own embarrassments; but for those who do, such a system appears capable of colouring error, which might have been blameless, with the darker hues of wilfulness and guilt. W. E. GLADSTONE. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. No. XXVIII.-JUNE 1879. HOW SHALL WE RETAIN THE COLONIES? IN a former article in this Review I remarked that the practical abdication of authority over the colonies by the Imperial Government and Parliament had produced evils in more than one branch of their administration, and especially in their commercial legislation. I propose now to enter somewhat more fully into this subject, and I shall endeavour to show that there was no good reason for relinquishing the control which till of late the Imperial Parliament had always maintained over the commercial policy of the colonies, and that its ceasing to exercise that control has proved injurious to the colonies themselves as well as to the mother country. No one doubts that the interests of both have suffered from the restrictions imposed upon trade by almost all commercial nations under the name of protective duties. The injury they inflict upon us by excluding British produce from what would otherwise be profitable markets is what attracts most notice, but they are in reality even more hurtful to us by diminishing the power of the nations which impose such duties to supply us with various articles we might purchase from them with advantage. Great complaints are made of these duties by our merchants and manufacturers, but little notice has been taken of the fact that the commercial policy our colonies have of late been allowed to pursue unchecked has had much influence in encouraging other nations in adhering to the vicious system of what is called protection. Yet a little consideration VOL. V.-No. 28. 3 Q must, I think, convince us that this influence has not been slight. Rather more than thirty years ago this country, after an arduous struggle, at length decided that its commercial policy should be reformed by applying in practice those principles of free trade which had long been recognised as sound in theory by the most eminent writers and thinkers on such subjects. Parliament resolved that for the future industry should be relieved from all the fetters which had hitherto been imposed upon it under the name of protecting duties, and that customs duties should be levied solely for the purpose of raising the revenue required for the public service. Full effect was given to this determination by the Acts which were passed for repealing the duties upon corn, the differential duties on sugar, wine, and timber, and the old navigation laws. When the first shock of so great a change had passed away, it was not long before its success was so decisively proved by the fast increasing prosperity of the country, as to produce a manifest effect on opinion in other nations, and after a time they began to show some disposition to follow our example, though little was actually done in that direction. But a few years ago a change took place in the current of opinion, and there has been a strong and general reaction in favour of the old policy of protection. Even in this country there have been symptoms that the controversy which was supposed to have been finally settled so long ago may be revived, and that some of the fundamental principles of our freetrade policy may again be called in question. Elsewhere the reaction has been more powerful. In Europe and in America not only has every attempt to introduce the policy of free trade signally failed, but in many nations the opposite policy has obtained a greater ascendency than ever; already, in some cases, new protecting duties have been imposed, or old ones made heavier than before, and further In bringchanges in the same direction are announced as intended. ing about this change in the opinion and feeling of the world (which I regard as most unfortunate for the welfare of mankind), the illiberal commercial policy adopted by our colonies has had no small influence. To those who have paid any attention to the progress of discussion on this subject it must be well known that when the question has been raised in foreign countries as to the expediency of their following our example in commercial policy, the opponents of such a change have been accustomed to urge that it is very well for England now to throw over the system of protection because it is no longer wanted by her, but that it was by the aid of this system that she attained the commercial and manufacturing predominance over foreign countries which has become so great as to raise her above any danger from their competition, so that she can now safely admit their productions to her market; and it is asserted that, in recommending free trade to other nations, our object is to persuade them to abstain from attempting to build up great manufacturing trades as rivals to |