talent than to understand them. But this is running into wide extremes; nor ought these parts of science to be abandoned by the wise, because some writers of former ages have played the fool with them. True Logic teaches us to use our reason well, and brings a light into the understanding. True Metaphysics, or Ontology, casts a light upon all the objects of thought and meditation. We do not, it may be said, want our boys to be metaphysicians. A wise parent would wish, however, to have his boy armed at all points against the imposing sophistry, and "oppositions of science "falsely so called," which assume the shape of metaphysical reasoning. When it is considered how many a youth has been entangled by the cobweb subtilties of infidel casuists, and how many a full-grown novice in such studies has been deceived by some specious generalities, how Metaphysics have been mixed up with every subject of practical interest,-with the dogmas of the Socinian, the philippics of the Anti-Calvinist, the speculations of the Politician, the theories of the Physiologist, with even dry Philology, and perpetually with Ethics,-the attempt to depreciate the importance and utility of such studies, must appear strangely weak or short-sighted. The indirect advantages resulting from them are so considerable, that, were the knowLedge actually to be obtained by the pursuit, far less important in its nature or less useful its application, they would still amply repay the attention they demand. They belong to a region of thought,' as Mr. Taylor remarks, where the mind best acquires force, accuracy, and comprehension.' But, in fact, the topics which they embrace, are so intimately allied to others of a more practical nature, that no education can be justly deemed liberal or complete, which has not introduced the mind to at least the Elements' of philosophical thinking, and laid the foundation, in clear ideas of the principal terms employed, for a competent exercise of the faculties on such subjects in after-life.

A work of the present description was much wanted;, and the desideratum could not have been more efficiently supplied. It is pre-eminently adapted to convey clear ideas on points which are the last to admit of them. We allude not merely to terms, but to things; and, among other things, to the true design of intellectual philosophy itself. The Author will have rendered an important service to Society, should his volume succeed in making that design better understood, and in lessening the prevailing prejudice against all that is included under

"Improvement of the Mind." C. xx. §. 15.

the sweeping name of Metaphysics, by shewing that, at least in its elements, the science is neither unintelligible nor mysterious. In Part I. it has been his object to explain those operations of the mind which are involved in philosophical reasoning. The following are the chief topics: On the three different modes of expression, the colloquial, the figurative, and the philosophical; on the advantage of cultivating the art or power of thinking; on the property peculiar to man of originating his own thoughts; on the formation of general notions; meaning of the words, genus, species, and generalization; origin and nature of abstract notions; difference between simple abstract, and complex abstract notions; on analysis, classification, and arrangement; on different efforts of abstraction. Part II. contains, in alphabetical order, brief and familiar explanations of the principal terms employed in philosophical inquiries; and in this division of the work are given some brief hints relating to the practical employment of the intellectual powers.' A Summary is subjoined, in which are exhibited the connexion and mutual relation of the terms explained in the Vocabulary.

In shewing how we arrive at different kinds of abstract notions, the Author remarks, that the simplest sort are those which we form of the qualities of objects known to us by the senses. The following familiar explanation is given as an example of a complex abstract notion.

When we think of a watch, a plant, an animal, do we not perceive that there is some circumstance in which they are alike? Let us then inquire what it is in which a plant, an animal, and a watch agree. We may take any one of these three things, and endeavour to form such a description of it, as shall suit the other two with equal correctness. Let us then take the last of them and describe it thus. A watch is a machine, so constructed as to measure time by the regulation of a pendulum. This, however, is a description of the watch which will suit neither the plant nor the animal. We take, then, the plant. A plant is a thing which grows from the ground, gradually increases in size, lasts a certain time, and then decays. This description will suit neither the watch nor the animal. Let us try then to describe the animal. An animal is a being which grows, and which moves by its own will; and which, after it has for some time preserved its state, decays or is destroyed. But this description of an animal will not suit the plant or the watch. We have not, therefore, yet described that abstract notion which may cause us to think of these three things as having some resemblance.

Let us then describe a watch thus: It is a body, consisting of various parts, so related to each other as to produce certain constant movements and changes, with a view to some end or design. Now any thing to which this description may be applied, is called an organized body; and the name of this abstract notion, formed in the mind by comparing such bodies, is organization. Organization is that in which a

plant, and an animal, and a watch agree; for we may say of one of them with as much propriety as of another, that it is a body consisting of various parts, so adjusted as to produce certain changes and movements, all having a tendency to some end or design.

There is, however, another abstract notion in which the plant and the animal agree; but which does not belong to the watch. This is Life, We cannot tell in what life consists, but we see that it is something more than man is able to communicate to any machine. We can only describe it by the effects which we observe. These effects are, a constant movement among the parts of the body; a gradual increase in size, for a certain time; and a regular succession of changes ending in the dissolution of the whole. This principle of life may be compared to the action of the spring of a watch: but it would be a foolish misapplication of words to call the spring, the life of a watch; as though the elasticity of the spring, and the principle of life in a plant or an animal, were nearly the same things. Life is something which we do not understand; but the effects of life which we observe, are joined together by the mind, and form an abstract notion: and whenever we see these effects, we remember the notion, and the name of it, and we say, such a thing has life; either vegetable life, or animal life.

6 It appears then, that the mind not only forms abstract notions of simple qualities, such as redness, sweetness, roughness, but also, that it has abstract notions in which a number of circumstances or qualities are joined together; such as those signified by the words ductility, fluidity, virtue, organization.

The articles argument, belief, demonstration, cause, doubt, judgement, necessity, sophistry, testimony, in the Vocabulary, are particularly valuable. They are admirable specimens of clear and sound thinking on points of fundamental importance. Cause and Effect are thus explained:

'CAUSE. We are conscious of being able to change the thoughts in our own minds as we will; and also to change the position or state of our bodies, and, in some degree, the position or state of things about us, as we will. This feeling of being able to change the state of things, according to our will, gives us a notion which we call PowER. Now any thing which has really, or which seems to have power to change the state of other things, is called a CAUSE: the change that takes place is called an EFFECT.

When we have observed that one event constantly takes place immediately or soon after some other event, we cannot avoid believing that the first event has produced that which follows: therefore we commonly call the first event a cause, and the second, an effect. For example: when we see that, soon after the rising of the Sun, the hoar-frost dissolves, or that the petals of flowers expand, we say that the Sun is the Cause, and that the melting of the frost, or the opening of the flowers, is the Effect of this Cause.

If we were to observe that a clock had stopped at sun-set, we should take no particular notice of the circumstance. But if it were constantly

to stop at sun-set, we should suppose that the setting of the sun was the cause of the stopping of the clock. And if all clocks stopped at sumi set, we should not be able to doubt that the light of the sun was, in some way, the cause of the motion of clocks, although we could not find out how the sun acted upon the wheels, so as to produce this effect.

We see, therefore, that it is natural to us, whenever we see any change take place in the state of things, to believe that there is something which has the power to produce this change, and which we call the cause of it. It is also equally natural to us to believe that, when two events constantly take place, one immediately after another, the first of them is the cause of the second."

Under the word Power, occur the following additional remarks on Cause and Effect.

POWER. It has already been said, (see CAUSE.) that the notion of Power is a simple abstraction, derived from our consciousness, when, by an act of the will, we produce a change, either in the mind itself, or in the position of the body by the action of the muscles. The mind natu rally and involuntarily connects this notion of Power with whatever seems to produce an effect. Hence it is common to say, that every cause has in it the power to produce its proper effect. We speak of the Powers of nature, generally; or, in particular instances, of the Power of the Sun to produce the evaporation of fluids, and the ripening of fruits; of the elastic Power of the Atmosphere; the expansive Power of Steam, &c.

This mode of speaking ought to be understood simply as expressing the antecedence of one event, and the uniform sequence of another event; the first called a Cause, the second an Effect. Our inquiries into the laws of Nature, carry us no further than to ascertain what events are uniformly consequent, the one on the other. We know of no Power but that which belongs to the Mind. It is an old definition of Mind' and Matter, agreeable to this definition of Power,-Mind is that which moves; Matter is that which is moved.'

The natural persuasion here alluded to, that every effect has cause, and that the connexion of certain causes with certain effects is constant, is further illustrated under the article: Inference. In these few paragraphs, we have compressed the sum and substance of many wire-drawn pages of philosophizing. The articles Contingent, Necessity, and Probability pursue the subject.

L CONTINGENT, from contingo, to touch; to hit; to happen.

When any event takes place which seems to us to have no cause why it should happen in one way rather than another, it is called a contingent event: as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a certain spot; or the turning up of any particular number, when the dice are thrown. In reality, nothing happens by chance: or, to speak more properly, chance is aword which has no real meaning, except it be taken as a convenient

name for our ignorance of the cause of some effect. If we see a leaden bullet fall to the ground, we know beforehand that it will fall on the spot perpendicularly under it; because we know it to be influenced only by the attraction of gravity; and therefore, when it actually falls where we had expected it to fall, we do not say that it fell there by chance, for we think that it could not have fallen any where else. But when we see a leaf fall, we cannot tell beforehand where it will alight upon the ground, because it is influenced by changing currents of air, as well as by the attraction of gravity; therefore we imagine that it falls where it does by chance: and its falling on one spot, or on another, is called a contingent event. But this way of speaking only means that we cannot tell beforehand how the thing will happen. Nothing comes to pass without a

cause.

The rising of the Sun to-morrow is not called a contingent event; because we consider it as certain. The fineness of the day we think contingent, because we cannot foretel the state of the weather; but if we knew all the causes which influence the state of the atmosphere, and how they follow each other, so as to produce rain, or drought, then, we should no longer speak of a fine day as an accidental or contingent event, because it would take place according to our expectation. See NECESSITY?

NECESSITY is opposed to contingency. Future events of which wè do not know the causes that may influence them, are called contin gent; but events of which we know the causes, so that we are able" certainly to foretel what will happen, are called necessary. The only difference between what we call contingent and what we call necessary, exists in our own minds, and depends upon different degrees of knowledge. Every event has a cause; and every cause produces its effects certainly in connexion with other causes.

The very same event may be considered as contingent by one man, and as coming to pass necessarily by another. A bowing wall is observed by two persons: if the first is asked whether it will stand a year longer, he replies, It may fall, probably; but it is possible that it may stand a year its falling is a contingent event.' The other person, who is a builder, has examined the state of the wall; he perceives that it is constantly declining from the perpendicular; he sees that it must fall in a few days: he, therefore, considers the event, not as contingent, but as necessary. The difference in the opinion of these two persons, results from their different degrees of knowledge. Whoever knows perfectly all the causes which will influence an event, views that event, not as contingent, but as necessary.

Necessity is often opposed to Liberty, when the actings of the mind are spoken of. A being who has liberty, or who, as it is termed, is a free agent, is one who wills, and who does what he wills. We speak of the future actions of men as contingent, because we cannot know the motives or circumstances which will be the causes of the actions. But we do not so often speak of our own future actions as contingent; because. we commonly suppose ourselves to know the motives by which our actions will be determined. Yet it is plain that one man's actions are