CT. OF APP.]

ferred. They all exist in this case, that is the case of a testator declaring the contents of his will. Of course, as in the case of pedigree, the courts must be careful and cautious in admitting such evidence. From its very nature it is evidence not open to the test of cross-examination, it is very often produced at second or third hand, and is therefore particularly liable to lose something of its colour in the course of transmission. It is so easily and so frequently fabricated that all courts which dispose of such cases must be especially on their guard. But that only goes to the question as to the weight to be attributed to the evidence when admitted; it does not go to the question of admitting the evidence itself, and I must say it appears to me that, having regard to the reasons principles which have induced the tribunals of and this country to admit exceptions in the other cases to which I have referred, we should be equally justified and equally bound to admit it in this case; when I say equally, perhaps I state the case a little too low, because if there is any case in the world in which it is incumbent upon a tribunal not to grant a premium for fraud or wrong-not to hold out to the world that any man who is able to get hold of the will of a testator which may disappoint him of his expectations, just or unjust, shall be able if he once destroys it to acquire the property either for himself or for those whom he wishes to benefit-I say if ever there was such a case, it is the case of a lost will, and it is in that case that the court should be anxious, not narrowly to restrict rules of evidence which were made for the purpose of furthering truth and justice, but to be guided by those great principles which have guided other tribunals in other countries in admitting this evidence generally, and at all events to admit it in the special case which we have under consideration. I should, therefore, entirely concur with the Lord Chief Justice's conclusion that this evidence would be admissible, not only as regards that portion which was anterior to the execution of the will, but also as regards that portion of it which is posterior to its execution. As regards the portion of it anterior to the execution, it has been admitted, where it has been admitted at all, on a somewhat different ground. It is not strictly evidence of the contents of the instrument, because it is simply evidence of the intention of the person who afterwards executes the instrument. It is, therefore, simply evidence of probability-no doubt of a high degree of probability in some cases, and of a low degree of probability in others. The cogency of the evidence depends very much on the nearness in point of time of the declaration of intention to the period of the execution of the instrument. Now, in this case we have that link supplied in the most satisfactory manner as regards the two important documents J. & K. We have the evidence of the witness that they were, to use her words, jotted down at the time when the will was being written, and therefore immediately before the execution, and in that case it is not to be presumed for a moment that there was any change in the intention of the testator from the time of jotting down his legacies to the time he signed the will. As regards the earlier document, no doubt that relates to a prior will, the will of 1867, but we have the evidence of Miss Sugden that that was incorporated in the second will, and therefore to that extent it brings it down to the time of the execution of the

[CT. OF APP.

second will. We must also remember that these documents were carefully preserved by the testator, that they were tied up with other documents in the same box which contained his will and codicils, and that it is not likely that he would so carefully have preserved the documents if he had changed his intention between making them and signing his will. If they had no longer represented his final intention he would probably have destroyed them and thrown them away as waste paper. That confirms, to my mind, the value of the documents, and that, although evidence of intention, they are also evidence of intention not changed at the time of the execution of the will. Upon those documents, I think, whatever view may be taken as regards the latter document, full reliance ought to be placed. Then I come to the question as to whether, irrespective of the post-testamentary declarations, as I may call them, there would be any ground for saying that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the proof of this will. Now, I am clearly of opinion that there would be no such ground. It happens fortunately in this case that these post-testamentary declarations are of comparatively little value. In the only instance in which confirmation is required they are very vague and general. That instance is the share of the residue given to Miss Sugden. Now, in considering the last head as to the sufficiency of the evidence, I will consider the case, first irrespective of these post-testamentary declarations which the learned judge in the court below considered himself bound, as I think he was bound, by the decision in the case of Quick v. Quick (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 619; 3 Sw. & Tr. 442) to disregard, and I must say I should entirely concur with the learned judge in his conclusion, assuming that I had been bound, as he was bound, by the decision in the case of Quick v. Quick, to disregard that evidence. But how does the matter stand? The will was read frequently, and under peculiar circumstances of interest, by Miss Sugden. She had not only an opportunity of becoming familiar with its contents, but she had the strongest motive for becoming so familiar. The will interested not only herself, but those who were nearest and dearest to her. It would be no idle curiosity which would induce her to read it and re-read it with attention, and to remember its contents with accuracy and fidelity. Therefore, we have the evidence of a witness to be trusted beyond the average of witnesses, more to be trusted even in this respect, supposing there were no question of interest, than an ordinary solicitor who testifies to the contents of a will. He has other affairs to attend to, he has many wills to read, and he has no special or particular interest in the disposition of the property of the testator. Therefore, we have a witness peculiarly likely to know what the contents of the will were. Besides that, we have a witness of unimpeached and unimpeachable integrity. We have the gratification of knowing, in deciding this case, that no question has been raised as to the credibility of Miss Sugden, and this appears to be an answer to that assumed danger which might apply to other cases in allowing such proof as this to establish wills. It has, in my opinion, nothing to do with the admissibility of the evidence. Where the credibility of a witness is contested, it does not make the witness's testimony less admissible, but it does add enormously to the weight of it, when

CT. OF APP.]

you find that the opponent does not dispute the honesty and truthfulness, and the entire integrity and veracity of the witness. This case is singular in that respect, and I should think it is very likely to remain singular, and without a parallel in subsequent cases. Therefore, there is no danger in granting probate in this particular case; and I see no reason why we should refuse to do justice because it may induce other persons, not credible witnesses, to attempt to substantiate fictitious wills. But no doubt there is this observation, that Miss Sugden is an interested witness. Here again it is not alleged that the interest was such as to impair her credibility. If it had, I could have understood the objection; but as it is admitted that she is a veracious person, the objection as to interest fails of itself. The law at one time considered it impossible that a person biassed by the smallest interest could tell the truth, but that law was found so utterly opposed to human experience, that it was abrogated by the Legislature, and interested witnesses daily give evidence in our tribunals, and, subject to the observation that they may be biassed by their interest so as to some extent to affect the weight of their testimony, their evidence is received without doubt or question. No doubt, in the case even of a credible witness, even in the case of a witness without interest, it is desirable, if possible, to procure confirmation to show the accuracy of the memory of the witness, and for that purpose only. But the moment you admit a witness to be credible, the desirability of the confirmation appears to me to apply just as much to the portion of the evidence as to which she is not interested as to that in which she is interested. Now as regards Miss Sugden's evidence, she is confirmed in every material respect, except as to that important portion of the property which comprises the residue of the personal estate. I am not going to repeat the elaborate judgment which has already been given as regards the nature of the evidence, but I will take that to be sufficiently established. As regards the residue, if we exclude the post-testamentary declarations, there is no actual confirmation of Miss Sugden's testimony except one, that is the confirmation of probability. Now, I must say that that has had considerable weight with me. In testing the unsupported testimony of a person, especially of an interested person, the position of the testator, and the probability of the disposition he is said to have made, appear to me to be important elements. And how stands the matter as far as they are concerned? I am not in a position to give accurate figures, although I have done my best to ascertain the value; and, therefore, what I am saying must not be considered to be quite precise; but, from the statement made to us, and which was made in the court below, I should imagine that the testator died possessed of property worth about 300,000l., probably more, but not less. He is said to have had between 7000l. and 80001. a year in freehold estates, and about 60,0001. personalty, or thereabouts. The state of his family was this: he had had a great number of children, and all his daughters were married except one, and all his sons were dead except one, although two of the sons had left a child or children. Of all his children that one single daughter remained with him, and one might say she was the prop and solace of his life; that he entertained a great, and one might say deserved affection for her, is clear

,

[CT. OF APP.

She

from all the testimony we have before us; that he had a moral duty to provide for her, and to place her in a situation of life such as not greatly to diminish her habits of comfort, or even of luxury, is plain and beyond controversy. Whether he had promised to do so or not, does not appear to me to be material; but it is clear that he had promised to do so, even before the making of his last will. Under those circumstances, what does she take out of this interest, or out of this combination of interests? There, again, my figures are probably not accurate, although they are as nearly accurate as I can make them. She takes a portion of 6000l., which, although more than some of her sisters seem to have taken, appears to have been calculated with the view of making her equal in that respect with the most favoured, although not beyond. Of course it is perfectly natural that the testator should desire that the unmarried daughter should be at least as well provided for as the married daughters had been on the occasion of their marriages; and upon this there is confirmation. She takes a life interest in a farm which is stated to be worth 3501. a year. I am not acquainted with the exact age of Miss Sugden, but she can be no longer very young; and I take the value of her life interest in that farm to be considerably less than 3000l. takes a house which appears to have cost 15007., and some meadows, the exact value of which does not appear, but which, again I say, 30007. may very fairly represent. That makes 12,000l. And she takes, besides, one-third of the residue, the exact amount of which again does not appear. Of course there are large legacies to be deducted from it, and I should think 10,000l. or thereabouts would fairly represent it. But assuming it to be 13,000l., which is a very large figure, considering the deductions to be made, then you have not more than 25,000l. as the provision made for this lady, who stood in the relation I have mentioned to a testator possessed of this considerable fortune. I think it is not only reasonable to presume that he would have made this, which appears to be by no means an immoderate provision for her, but he would, as I say, have sinned in his grave if he had done otherwise than make such a provision for the child who had devoted to him her whole life. I think, therefore, she is amply confirmed in my mind, and that the extent of the benefit which he intended for her has not been exaggerated by her in her testimony, and the point as to her share in the residue is the only point on which there was no other confirmation. Therefore, if I excluded these testamentary declarations, I should have arrived at the same conclusion. But if we admit them they point still more strongly to the same conclusion. The testator is proved to have told one person that his daughter would be a rich woman, and be able to receive in the same manner as she had done in his lifetime. He told another person that she would be a wealthy woman after his death; he has told her in terms which are affecting, no doubt, and even pathetic, in speaking of her devotion to him, that she was blessed, and ought to be blessed by him as regards the disposition of his property. Can we say that these expressions of the testator have been more than fulfilled by what I may call the modest provision he has made for her by the testamentary instruments which have been admitted to probate, and which, in all probability, if there had not been a

CT. OF APP.]

title in the family, would have been very much larger? On the whole I express my entire concurrence in the judgment which my lord has given, and I agree with him also that after the careful and elaborate investigation which this case has undergone in the court below, after the clear, luminous, careful, and elaborate judgment which has been given by the distinguished judge who pronounced his decree in that court, the heir-atlaw and next of kin would have done well and wisely in abstaining from pressing the appeal to this court. I think that, as they have chosen to do that, they ought to bear the penalty to which all unsuccessful litigants are liable, and that in dismissing this appeal we ought to dismiss it with costs.

66

JAMES, L.J.-I agree so entirely with the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice, both in the conclusions at which he has arrived and in the reasons which he has given for those conclusions, that I shall not think it necessary to make more than one or two short remarks. First, I would corroborate what he has said with regard to the admission of part of an instrument where the rest is not forthcoming, by referring to the case of Dickinson v. Stidolph (11 C. B., N. S., 341) decided by a court consisting of the Lord Chief Justice Erle, Mr. Justice Williams, Mr. Justice Byles, and Mr. Justice Willes. The judgment of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Williams, probably the most eminent authority in our time on matters connected with wills. In the judgment there are (11 C. B., N. S., at page 357) the following expressions : Secondly, it was objected that the testatrix refers to two memorandums, and only one is found. But if she intended to adopt two instruments, and only one is found, the law requires that effect should be given to that which is found; for, either the ordinary presumption must prevail, that the missing paper was destroyed by the testatrix animo revocandi, or the principle must be applied that the apparent testamentary intentions of a testator are not to be disappointed merely because she made other dispositions of her property which are unknown by reason of the testamentary paper which contained them not being forthcoming. It is on this principle that a subsequent will is no revocation of a former one, if the contents of a subsequent will are unknown. And the law is the same even if the latter will be expressly found to be different from the former, provided it be unknown in what the difference consists." That is upon the point as to whether we can grant probate of a will of which only a part is known. With regard to the testamentary declarations of the testator, I desire to say that I entirely concur in the conclusion at which the Lord Chief Justice has arrived, that those testamentary declarations are admissible and ought to be admitted, put in this case it is conceded that every one of these declarations was admissible and was properly admitted for some purpose in the cause, and thereby those declarations of the testator have become legitimately known to me. I believe them to have been made by him, and I believe them to be true, and, having those declarations before me and so believing them, it would be in me a judicial lie if I were to pretend that I did not act upon them in coming to the conclusion that the evidence of the witness and the sworn depositions of the witness as to the actual contents of the will are true.

[CT. OF APP.

MELLISH, L.J.-I am also entirely of the same opinion, and I think it is quite unnecessary that I should make any lengthened observations in this case. The really material questions are, of course, the two questions of fact as to what are the contents of the will, and whether that will has been proved, and upon those two main important questions I am perfectly satisfied with the judg ment of the judge in the court below; and I am also entirely satisfied with the reasons which have been given by the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls here, and I say nothing more about them. I am also entirely satisfied with the reasons which have been already given upon the questions of law as to whether probate of the whole will ought to be refused, or probate of that portion of the will of which we have evidence ought to be refused, because there may be some other portions upon which we have not sufficient evidence. But even that question, to my mind, does not very seriously arise in this case; because, with regard to the parts that are omitted, it seems to me that we have satisfactory evidence that they do not at all substantially alter the provisions of which we have evidence. With reference to the personal estate there is no reason at all to suppose that any of the missing legacies, if there are any, of which we have no evidence, were given to the next of kin, that is, to the relatives of the testator. He had put down on the paper of which we have evidence the legacies that he intended to give to the different members of his family. The next of kin were all represented by counsel, and no one asked Miss Sugden whether she was confident that there were no legacies given to them, and I think I can clearly come to the conclusion, as a matter of fact, that whatever the small legacies may have been, of which we have no evidence, they were not legacies to any members of his family, and therefore no one can possibly be prejudiced, except those persons, whoever they may be, of whom we have no evidence, and who get no benefit whatever. No one can be prejudiced by our granting probate of this will. I do not at all mean, in making that observation, to throw out any doubt respecting the judgment which has been given by the Master of the Rolls, and as to the reasons he has given why probate of a gift of the residue ought to be granted, even although we might not know to whom, or of what amount, or what was the nature of the legacies of personal estate contained in the part of the will of which there is no evidence. And also with reference to the real estate, it is perfectly plain that whatever omissions there may be in the ultimate limitations, those omissions cannot possibly be of any prejudice to the heir-at-law. The only part of the case upon which I have any doubt, and at all differ from what has been already said, is a part of the case which, it appears to me, is not before us, and which it is not really necessary to deeide; because at the time of the argument, not having read the judgment of the President of the Probate Division, I was under the impression that he might have relied to some extent upon the evidence of the statements of Lord St. Leonards respecting his will, made after the execution of the will with reference to its contents; but having now carefully read through his judgment, I find that he did not rely upon that evidence at all, but that he considered, first, what were the contents of the will, and, in determining what were the contents

of the will, did not rely upon and carefully avoided mentioning any of the statements of Lord St. Leonards respecting the contents of his will; and I wish to say for myself that I am entirely satisfied with the conclusion to which he came upon that ground. I do not think it necessary for us to consider whether those subsequent declarations were admissible. I wish also to say that I am not myself prepared to say that the decision in Quick v. Quick (10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 619; 3 Sw. & Tr. 442) was bad law. If I was asked what I think it would be desirable should be evidence, I have not the least doubt in saying that I think it would be a highly desirable improvement in the law if the rule was made that all statements made by persons who are dead respecting matters of which they had a personal knowledge, and made ante litem motam, should always be admissible. There is no doubt that, by rejecting such evidence, we do reject a most valuable source of evidence; but the difficulty I have in this case is that I cannot really and satisfactorily to my own mind find any distinction between the statement of a testator as to what the contents of his will were, and any other statement of a person of any fact which was peculiarly within his knowledge, which, beyond all question, as the law now stands, we are not entitled to receive. The Master of the Rolls has referred to the several exceptions which have been made, and they do not appear to me, any one of them, to be applicable to this case. I think there is a most material distinction, as pointed out by Lord Campbell in Doe v. Palmer (16 Q.B. 747), between a declaration made before the making of a will and declarations which are made subsequently. The declarations which are made before the will is made, I do not apprehend, are to be taken as evidence of what are the contents of a will which is subsequently made; they obviously do not prove it, and wherever it is material to prove what was the state of a person's mind, or what was passing in it, and what were his intentions, there you may prove what he said, because that is the only means by which you can find out what his intentions were. When a doubt is thrown on the correctness of evidence which has been given as to the contents of a will, the testator's declarations as to what he intended to put in his will, made either contemporaneously with or prior to the making of his will, are obviously evidence which corroborates the testimony as to what is contained in his will. But to my mind they do not of themselves prove what were the contents of the will; they corroborate the other evidence which has been given of the contents of the will, because it makes it more probable that he has made a particular devise, or a particular bequest, does the fact that he told a person previously that he intended to make it, showing that he had it in his mind to make such a will at the time he made that declaration. But a declaration after he has made his will, in which he states what the contents of his will are, is not a statement of anything which is passing in his mind at the time, but it is simply a statement of a fact which took place, no doubt within his knowledge, and therefore you cannot admit it unless you bring it within some of the exceptions to the general rule, that hearsay evidence is not admissible to prove a fact which is stated in the declaration. It does not come within any of the rules which have hitherto been established, and I doubt whether it is an advisable

[CHAN. DIV.

thing to establish new exceptions in a case which has never happened before, and may never happen again, a case very exceptional in itself, for you then establish an exception which more or less throws a doubt on the law. It appears to me that it would be better to leave it to the Legislature to make the improvement, which in my opinion ought to be made, respecting our present rules with regard to the admissibility of evidence of that description. In all other respects I entirely agree with the judgments which have been given.

BAGGALLAY, J.A.-The judgment which has been pronounced by the Lord Chief Justice has so completely expressed the opinions which I have formed on the several questions which have been raised in the course of the argument on this appeal, that I shall abstain from saying more than that I entirely assent to that judgment, not only as regards its general conclusions, but as regards its details, and I particularly desire to express my concurrence in that portion of the judgment which has reference to the admissibility, as evidence, of the declarations made by the testator in this case, and in the views expressed by the Lord Chief Justice as to the unsoundness of the decision in Quick v. Quick (ubi sup.)

COCKBURN, C.J.-The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants, Barlow, Bowling, and Williams; IV. W. Gabriel; Taylor and Sons. Solicitors for the respondents, Trollope and Winckworth.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before the MASTER OF THE ROLLS.) Reported by G. WELBY KING and J. E. THOMPSON, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Dec. 18, 1875.

JONES v. DANGERFIELD. Sequestration-Sequestrator's liability for dilapi dations-Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict., c. 43.)

A benefice was under sequestration at the incumbent's death. During the vacancy the buildings were inspected by the diocesan surveyor, and the archbishop made an order under s. 34 of 34 & 35 Vic., c. 43., stating the cost of the necessary repairs, and that the personal representatives of the late incumbent were liable.

Held, under s. 53 of the Act, that the sequestrator was not liable, and was not entitled to deduct the amount due for repairs from the proceeds of the benefice in his hands. Adjourned summons.

THE Rev. James Brothers, at the time of his death, in October, 1872, was incumbent of the living of Brabourne, in Kent. The benefice was under sequestration. A deed of assignment had been executed by Mr. Brothers in December 1851, of which Mr. Abraham Dangerfield, the sequestrator, was trustee. An order was made in the cause on the 27th June, 1863, which declared which of the creditors were entitled to the deed of assignment. Soon after the living became vacant, the buildings were inspected and reported on by the diocesan surveyor, and, in pursuance of the Ecclesiastical

CHAN. DIV.]

Dilapidations Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 43), the Archbishop of Canterbury made an order respecting the necessary repairs, the cost of which was estimated at 1741. 188., for which the personal representatives of the late incumbent were declared liable. Mr. Dangerfield collected the tithes which had accrued due in Mr. Brothers' lifetime, and under an order of the court dated 31st March 1875, paid £650 into court on account thereof, having been advised that he was liable to pay the cost of repairs out of moneys coming into his hands as sequestrator. The court was now asked to make an order that Dangerfield should pay into court 1397. 158. 3d., the amount certified to be due by him on paying the final amount as sequestrator, in order to decide the question of his liability for dilapidations. Mr. Brothers, who had taken the benefit of the Insolvent Act in 1853, died intestate, and it was stated that there were no assets to administer.

Davey, Q.C. and Rigby for the plaintiff, in support of the summons.

Chitty, Q.C. and W. W. Karslake for the sequestrator and for Mr. Perry, the new incumbent. The condition on which sequestrations are granted is that the sequestrator keeps the buildings in repair, and is liable for dilapidations. Sect. 20 of the Act of 1871 enacts that the dilapidations are to be charged to the sequestrator in respect of the profits of the benefice. They referred to:

Hubbard v. Beckford, 1 Hagg. Cons. 307;
Whinfield v. Watkins, 2 Phill. 1;

Cripp's Laws of Church and Clergy, 322.
Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Law, 1390.

Langley, for the official assignee of Mr. Brothers, claimed the balance of the fund after payment of the persons entitled under the deed of assign

ment.

The

Sir GEORGE JESSEL,-The question I have to decide concerns the liability of the sequestrator in respect of the balance in his hands from the profits of a sequestered benefice for dilapidations reported after the incumbent's death. sequestration issued many years ago, and remained in force to the incumbent's death, in Oct. 1873. The avoidance occurred subsequently to the commencement of the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act 1871, and that Act, therefore, applies to this case. The law, whatever it was previously to that Act, is remodelled by it. By sect. 53 it is declared that no sum shall be recoverable for dilapidations in respect of any benefice becoming vacant after the commencement of the Act and to which the Act shall apply, unless the claim for such sum be founded on an order made under the provisions of the Act. Now the Act contains two distinct sets of provisions: the one, comprising ss. 12 to 24, provides for the inspection of buildings at times when a benefice is not vacant; the other, ss. 29 to 53, for the inspection of buildings on a vacancy. No inspection seems to have taken place of the buildings of this benefice in Mr. Brothers' lifetime; but after his death, that is, on the vacancy, an inspection took place, and the archbishop, according to sect. 34, made an order stating the repairs required to be done, and their cost, for which the late incumbent's executors and administrators were declared to be liable. It appears to me that the provisions of sect. 20, and the other sections of that Act, have no bearing on the present case, but that it falls under sect.

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36, which casts the liability on the executors or administrators of the late incumbent. The result is that the sequestrator is under no liability for repairs. I must make an order in the terms of the summons, as I am of opinion that the sequestrator is not liable for the dilapidations, and is not entitled to have the amount deducted from the profits of the benefice collected by him.

Solicitors, Kingsford and Dorman for Hallett, Curry, and Furley, Ashford; Dangerfield and Blythe; A. S. Twyford.

Saturday, Feb. 26.

Re ARTHUR ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION. Mutual Insurance Association-Unregistered body Winding-up Rights of creditors Official liquidator-Costs.

The association was formed for the mutual insur ance of ships, and consisted of eighty members, but was not registered. A winding-up order was obtained. Special rate policies had been issued, but not in the form required by law. Great ex• pense was incurred in ascertaining the amount payable to the policy-holders, but it was subsequently decided by the Master of the Rolls, and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, that the winding-up order ought not to have been made, and that the policy-holders could claim nothing. The official liquidator applied to the court for a call to be made on the contributories for the payment of debts and of costs of liquidation. The applica tion was opposed on the ground that the individuals by whom each debt was incurred, and not the association, as such, were liable.

Held, that as the association had been wound-up as one association, the official liquidator was only the ministerial officer of the court he was entitled to his costs, and the call must be paid. Remarks on Re London Marine Insurance Associa tion (20 L. T. Rep. N.S. 943; L. Rep. 8 Eq. 176). THIS was a summons taken out by the official liquidator to obtain the sanction of the court to a call of 1351. upon each of the contributories of the association. By the affidavit of the official liquidator, in which the liabilities and assets of the association were fully scheduled, it appeared that about 80007. would be required to satisfy the cer tified debts and costs of the winding-up, and that for that purpose, having regard to the fact that some of the contributories would partly or wholly fail to pay the amount of call, it would be neces sary to make such call upon the eighty members of the association.

The association was formed in 1867 for the purpose of mutual insurance of ships. It was never incorporated, though it consisted of eighty mem bers, but was nevertheless wound-up by an order made in Feb. 1870. Special rate policies were issued, in which the chief clerk's certificate found that 17,000l. was due, and great trouble and expense was incurred in calculating what was owing to each such policy-holder. A summons was taken out to review the certificates, and was heard by the Master of the Rolls, who decided that the associa tion, being unregistered, was illegal, and no winding-up order ought to have been made, and that the policies were void owing to non-compliance with the statute 30 Vict. c. 23 (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 525). The decision of the Master of the Rolls was