general idea of the nature of the motion he meant to bring forward. of Lansdowne seeing the noble earl in his place, was anxious to take that opportunity of putting a question to him on the subject of a publication by the American government, of certain documents relative to the negociation now going on at Ghent, and the pretensions urged by the British government. This was a matter of very great importance, whether regarded with a view to the effect which such a publica The Earl of Donoughmore said, that certain statements had been made in anoother place, by one who might be supposed best conversant with the subject, in the correctness of which he could not agree. The sources from which the information given in those statements had been derived, were mentioned. His object, therefore, was to have the documents in question was calculated to produce in America, tion laid before their lordships; he himself intending to collect all the information he possibly could procure from other quarters, before the Bill should pass their lordships, that the subject might be treated with that intelligence respecting it, which its magnitude demanded. He moved, that the House be summoned for Thursday, which was ordered. or with a view to its effects upon the opinions of the European sovereigns, and the state of affairs in Europe. His question was, whether, in consequence of the publication to which he alluded, it was the intention of the noble earl to make any communication to parliament ? The Earl of Liverpool said, it was true that a partial publication of the sub. ject matter of the negociations now going NAVAL ADMINISTRATION.] Viscount Melon at Ghent had been made by the Ameville moved to discharge the order of the day for the second reading of the Seamen and Royal Marines Pension Bill, with a view to its being brought forward that day se'ennight, when certain documents relative to the subject would be before the House. The order was discharged accordingly. rican government, and he was aware of the effect which it was calculated to produce. He never knew of such a proceeding before on the part of any civilized government.* At all events, it was the invariable *The following are Copies of the Papers relative to the Negociations at Ghent, published by the American government, and referred to in the above debate: MESSAGE sent by the President to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, Oct. 10, 1814. The Earl of Donoughmore wished to inquire of the noble viscount, whether, in the information intended to be laid before the House relative to the conduct of the Naval Administration, it was meant to include certain petitions or representations made from Glasgow, the port of Liverpool, I lay before Congress communications and certain other places, with respect to just received from the plenipotentiaries of the nature of the protection afforded to the the United States, charged with negocia trade of the country, to the board of Ad-ting peace with Great Britain, shewing miralty. Viscount Melville observed, that the information alluded to by the noble earl was not among that ordered to be produced by their lordships; it could not therefore regularly be brought forward. If the noble earl, however, chose to move for these documents, he had no objection to their being produced. the conditions on which alone that govern. "JAMES MADISON." The Earl of Donoughmore then said, he Mr. Monroe to the American plenipoten should now take the liberty of moving that there be laid before the House copies of The Earl of Liverpool begged to remind the noble earl, the regular way was by a a motion for an Address; upon which, The Earl of Donoughmore then said, that he would defer the motion till Thursday. NEGOCIATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA AT GHENT.] The Marquis tiaries at Gottenburgh. Dispatch of State, 28th Jan. 1814. [The letter begins by acceding to the proposal of the British government, to treat directly with the American United States. Mr. Monroe then calls the attention of the plenipotentiaries to the grounds of the war with Great Britain.] "On impressment, as to the right of practice of the government here not to lay | any papers before parliament on the subject of a negociation which was still pending; and, therefore, it certainly was not the inten the United States to be exempted from it, I have nothing new to add. The sentiments of the president have undergone no change on that important subject. This degrading practice must cease; our flag must protect the crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves an independent nation. To settle this difference amicably, the president is willing, as you are already informed by the former instructions, to remove all pretexts for it to the British government, by excluding all British seamen from our vessels, and even to extend the exclusion to all British subjects, if necessary, excepting only the few already naturalized; and to stipulate likewise the surrender of all British seamen deserting in our ports, in future, from British vessels, public or private. It was presumed, by ail dispassionate persons, that the late law of Congress relative to seamen, would effectually accomplish the object. But the president is willing, as you find, to prevent a possibility of failure, to go further. "Should a treaty be made, it is proper, and would have a conciliatory effect, that all our impressed seamen who may be discharged under it, should be paid for their services by the British government, for the time of their detention, the wages which they might have obtained in the merchant service of their own country. "Blockade is the subject next in point of importance, which you will have to arrange. In the instructions, bearing date on the 15th of April, 1813, it was remarked, that as the British government had revoked its orders in council, and agreed, that no blockade could be legal, which was not supported by an adequate force; and that such adequate force should be applied to any blockade which it might hereafter institute, this cause of controversy seemed to be removed. Further reflection, however, has added great force to the expediency and importance of a precise definition of the public law on this subject. There is much cause to presume, that if the repeal of the orders in council had taken place in time to have been known here before the declaration of war, and had had the effect of preventing the declaration, not only that no provision would have been obtained against im(VOL. XXIX.) tion of ministers to lay any part of that negociation before parliament. The proper time would be, when the whole should be concluded, and then ministers would be pressment, but that, under the name of blockade, the same extent of coast would have been covered by proclamation, as had been covered by the orders in council. The war which these abuses and impressments contributed so much to produce, might possibly prevent that consequence : but it would be more satisfactory, if not more safe, to guard against it by a formal definition in the treaty. It is true, should the British government violate again the legitimate principles of blockade, in whatever terms, or under whatever pretext it might be done, the United States would have in their hands a correspondent resort: but a principal object in making peace, is to prevent, by the justice and reciprocity of the conditions, a recurrence again to war, for the same cause. If the British government sincerely wishes to make a durable peace with the United States, it can have no reasonable objection a just definition of blockade, especially as the two governments have agreed in their correspondence, in all its essential features. The instructions of the 15th April 1813, have stated in what manner the president is willing to arrange this. difference. to "On the other neutral rights, enumerated in the former instructions, I shall remark only, that the catalogue is limited in a manner to evince a spirit of accommodation; that the arrangement proposed in each instance is just in itself; that it corresponds with the general spirit of treaties between commercial powers; and that Great Britain has sanctioned it in many treaties, and gone beyond it in some. "On the claim to indemnity for spoliations, I have only to refer you to what was said in the former instructions. I have to add, that should a treaty be formed, it is just in itself, and would have a happy effect on the future relations of the two countries, if indemnity should be stipulated on each side, for the destruction of all unfortified towns, and other property, contrary to the laws and uses of war. is equally proper, that the negroes taken from the southern states, should be returned to their owners, or paid for at their full value. It is known, that a shameful traffic has been carried on in the West Indies by the sale of these persons there, (2 B) It ready to justify their conduct in the face of their country, of Europe, and the whole world. In the mean time, the negociation had not concluded at the stage to which it by those who professed to be their deliverers. Of this fact, the proof that has reached this department shall be furnished you. If these slaves are considered as non-combatants, they ought to be restored; if as property, they ought to be paid for. The treaty of peace contains an article which recognizes this principle. [After some further arguments relative to the Russian mediation, which the president laments was not accepted, the letter concludes.] "JAMES MONROE." Copy of a LETTER from Messrs. Adams, Bayard, Clay, and Russel, to Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, dated Ghent, August 12, 1814. "Sir; we have the honour to inform you, that the British commissioners, lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, esq. and Wm. Adams, esq. arrived in this city on Saturday evening the 6th inst. The day after their arrival, Mr. Baker, their secretary, called upon us to give us notice of the fact, and to propose a meeting at a certain hour on the ensuing day. The place having been agreed upon, we accordingly met at one o'clock on Monday the 8th inst. We enclose herewith a copy of the full powers exhibited by the British commissioners at that conference; which was opened on their part by an expression of the sincere and earnest desire of their government, that the negociation might result in a solid peace, honourable to both parties. They, at the same time, declared, that no events which had occurred since the first proposal for this negociation, had altered the pacific dispositions of their government, or varied its views as to the terms upon which it was willing to conclude the peace. "We answered, that we heard these declarations with great satisfaction, and that our government had acceded to the proposal of negociation, with the most sincere desire to put an end to the differences which divided the two countries, and to lay, upon just and liberal grounds, the foundation of a peace, which, securing the rights and interests of both nations, should unite them by lasting bonds of amity. "The British commissioners then stated the following subjects, as those upon had been brought by the documents published by the American government: it had proceeded since without interruption, and was still pending; and, under these which it appeared to them that the discussions would be likely to turn, and on which they were instructed: "1. The forcible seizure of mariners on board of merchant vessels, and in connection with it, the claim of his Britannic Majesty to the allegiance of all the native subjects of Great Britain. "We understood them to intimate, that the British government did not propose this point as one which they were particularly desirous of discussing; but that in the disputes between the two countries, as it had occupied so prominent a place it necessarily attracted notice, and was considered as a subject which would come under discussion. "2. The Indian allies of Great Britain to be included in the pacification, and a definite boundary to be settled for their territory. "The British commissioners stated, that an arrangement upon this point was a sine qua non; that they were not authorized to conclude a treaty of peace which did not embrace the Indians as allies of his Britannic Majesty; and that the establishment of a definitive boundary of the Indian territory was necessary to secure a permanent peace, not only with the Indians, but also between the United States and Great Britain. "3. A revision of the boundary line between the United States and the adjacent British colonies. "With respect to this point, they expressly disclaimed an intention on the part of their government to acquire an increase of territory, and represented the proposed revision as intended merely for the purpose of preventing uncertainty and dispute. "After having stated these three points as subjects of discussion, the British commissioners added, that before they desired any answer from us, they felt it incumbent upon them to declare, that the British government did not deny the right of the Americans to the fisheries generally, or in the open seas; but that the privileges formerly granted by treaty to the United States, of fishing within the limits of the British jurisdiction, and of landing and drying fish on the shores of the British territories, would not be renewed without circumstances, nothing could be more mischievous, than coming forward with a partial and garbled view of the proceedings. He trusted the noble marquis him an equivalent. The extent of what was considered by them as waters peculiarly British, was not stated. From the manner in which they brought this subject into view, they seemed to wish us to understand that they were not anxious that it should be discussed, and that they only intended to give us notice that these privileges had ceased to exist, and would not be again granted without an equivalent, nor unless we thought proper to provide expressly in the treaty of peace for their renewal. "The British commissioners having stated, that these were all the subjects which they intended to bring forward or to suggest, requested to be informed, whether we were instructed to enter into negociation on these several points? whether there was any amongst these which we thought it necessary to bring into the negociation? and they desired us to state, on our part, such other subjects as we might intend to propose for discussion in the course of the negociation. The meeting was then adjourned to the next day, in order to afford us the opportunity of consultation among ourselves, before we gave an answer. "In the course of the evening of the same day, we received your letters of the 25th and 27th of June. self would be satisfied, that, under the circumstances which he had stated, it would be quite irregular to produce any portion of the documents relative to the of instructions on two of them, and holding out no expectation of the probability of our agreeing to any article respecting them. "At our meeting on the ensuing day (9th August), we informed the British commissioners, that, upon the first and third points proposed by them, we were provided with instructions; and we presented as further subjects considered by our government as suitable for discussion: "1st. A definition of blockade: and, as far as might be mutually agreed, of other neutral and belligerent rights. "2d. Claims of indemnity, in certain cases of capture and seizure. "We then stated, that the two subjects, 1st. of Indian pacification and boundary, and 2d. of fisheries, were not embraced by our instructions. "We observe, that as these points had not been heretofore the grounds of any controversy between the government of Great Britain and that of the United States, and had not been alluded to by lord Castlereagh in his letter proposing the nego, ciation, it could not be expected that they should have been anticipated and made the subject of instructions by our govern ment: that it was natural to be supposed that our instructions were confiued to those subjects upon which differences between the two countries were known to exist; and that the proposition to define, in a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, the boundary of the Indian possessions within our territories, was new and without example. No such provisions had been inserted in the treaty of peace in 1783, nor any other treaty made by Great Britain, or in any other European power, in relation to the same description of people, existing under like circum "There could be no hesitation, on our part, in informing the British commissioners, that we were not instructed on the subjects of Indian pacification or boundary, and of fisheries: nor did it seem probable, although neither of these points had been stated with sufficient precision in that first verbal conference, that they could be admitted in any shape. We did not wish, however, to prejudge the result, or by any hasty proceeding abruptly to break off the negociation. It was not im-stances. possible that, on the subject of the Indians, "We would say, however, that it would the British government had received erro- not be doubted, that peace with the Inneous impressions from the traders in dians would certainly follow a peace with Canada, which our representations might Great Britain; that we had information remove and it appeared, at all events, that commissioners had already been ap. important to ascertain distinctly the pre-pointed to treat with them; that a treaty cise intentions of Great Britain on both points. We therefore thought it advisable to invite the British commissioners to a general conversation on all the points; stating to them at the same time our want to that effect might, perhaps, have been already concluded; and that the United States having no interest, nor any motive, to continue a separate war against the Indians, there could never be a moment negociation. The only proper course was, to make no communication till the matter should be brought to a conclusion one way or other when that took place,, the when our government would not be disposed to make peace with them. "We then expressed our wish to receive from the British commissioners a statement of the views and objects of Great Britain upon all the points, and our. willingness to discuss them all, in order that, even if no arrangement should be agreed on, upon the points not included in our instructions, the government of the United States might be possessed of the entire and precise intentions of that of Great Britain respecting these points, and that the British government might be fully informed of the objections on the part of the United States to any such arrangement. In answer to our remark, that these points had not been alluded to by lord Castlereagh, in his letter proposing the negociation, it was said, that it could not be expected that, in a letter merely intended to invite a negociation, he should enumerate the topics of discussion, or state the pretensions of his government, since these would depend upon ulterior events, and might arise out of a subsequent state of things. whole would be laid before parliament in the usual manner. The Marquis of Lansdowne said, he had to return his thanks to the noble earl for were distinctly understood, and the objects in view more precisely disclosed, we could not decide whether it would be possible to form any satisfactory article on the subject, nor pledge ourselves as to the exercise of a discretion under our power, even with respect to a provisional agreement. We added, that as we should deeply deplore a rupture of the negociations on any point, it was our anxious desire to employ all possible means to avert an event so serious in consequences; and that we had not been without hopes that a discussion might correct the effect of any erroneous information which the British government might have received on the subject, which they had proposed as a preliminary basis. "We took this opportunity to remark, that no nation observed a policy more liberal and humane towards the Indian, than that pursued by the United States; that our object had been, by all practicable means, to introduce civilization amongst them; that their possessions were secured to them by well-defined boundaries that their persons, lands, and other property, were now more effectually protected against violence or frauds from any quarter, than they had been under any former government; that even our citi "In reply to our observation, that the proposed stipulation of an Indian boundary was without example in the practice of European nations, it was asserted, that the Indians must in some sort be consi-zens were not allowed to purchase their dered as an independent people, since treaties were made with them, both by Great Britain and by the United States: upon which we pointed out the obvious and important difference between the treaties we might make with Indians living in our territory, and such a treaty as was proposed to be made, respecting them, with a foreign power, who had solemnly acknowledged the territory on which they resided to be part of the United States. "We were then asked by the British commissioners whether, in case they should enter further upon the discussion of the several points which had been stated, we could expect that it would terminate by some provisional arrangement on the points on which we had no instructions, particularly on that respecting the Indians, which arrangement would be subject to the ratification of our government? "We answered, that before the subjects lands; that when they gave up their title to any portion of their country to the United States, it was by voluntary treaty with our government, who gave them a satisfactory equivalent; and that, through these means, the United States had succeeded in preserving, since the treaty of Grenville of 1788, an uninterrupted peace of 16 years with all the Indian tribes-a period of tranquillity much longer than they were known to have enjoyed hitherto. "It was then expressly stated on our part, that the proposition respecting the Indians was not distinctly understood. We asked whether the pacification, and the settlement of a boundary for them, were both made a sine qua non? Which was answered in the affirmative. The question was then asked the British_commissioners, whether the proposed Indian boundary was intended to preclude the United States from the right of purchasing |