Crossley's (T.) Flowers of Ebor; poems, 12mo., 6s. Edwards (T. C.) on the Bladud Spa Waters, 8vo., 3s. Fairland's Studies of the Human Figure, 2 vols. royal 4to., 24s. Home's (Dr. G. A.) Guide for Invalids to the Continent, 18mo., 3s. 6d. Jardine and Selby's Ornithology, 3 vol. 4to., 101. 10s., 1. p. 151. 15s. Muskau's (Prince) Semilasso in Africa, &c., 3 vol. small 8vo., 31s. 6d. Transactions of the Statistical Society of London, part 1, 4to., 7s. 6d. Weatherhead's (G. H.) Treatise on Diseases of the Lungs, 8vo., 75. 6d. METEOROLOGICAL REPORT. THE influenza, which, since my last report, has so universally prevailed among the high and low, rich and poor, first made its appearance in Malvern about the 15th of January-a week or ten days later than in London-and prevailed extensively among all classes, children excepted. The disease seemed to be similar in every respect to that which appeared in 1803, to which it was allied also by its general diffusion throughout the whole kingdom; in 1831, and again in 1833, the same disorder appeared in a minor degree. This is not the place to enter into any detail as to symptoms, treatment, mortality, &c.; I may, however, remark that it appears extremely difficult to trace its origin to any of those atmospheric phenomena indicated either by the barometer, thermometer, or hygrometer. The vicissitudes of temperature in December and January were considerable, but not peculiar ; whilst the pressure and hygrometric conditions of the air were by no means remarkable in any respect. That extraneous impregnations exist, hitherto undetected by chemical analysis, and to which epidemic diseases such as that which has just visited us-owe their origin and progress, there can be no doubt; the atmosphere, even when very dry, is very often extremely misty and hazy, and this mist or haze cannot, under such circumstances, be attributed to vapour-it must be something else; and we have only to collect a sufficient quantity of it, and to examine minutely into its nature, in order to become acquainted with its effects upon the human frame. To do this an immensely larger quantity of air must be searched than any yet sub jected to examination; a bottle full, a room full, or a house full, would contain too small a quantity for such a purpose. I think means might easily be devised for thus searching a much larger quantity of air than any yet attempted, and I hope on some future occasion to shew how this may be done. The disease disappeared rather suddenly on the 14th or 15th of February, having continued just one month. 66 February 18th, at 6 p. m.-1 -Barom. 28.960; clouds and rain. At 63 p. m. -Very heavy rain indeed; wind veering from S. W. to W. N. W. At 9 p. m.-Barom. 29.045; brilliant, clear, moon-light night; fresh breeze from the westward, and an extensive and varied Aurora; a large, reddish-looking arch extending from N. W. to N. E., with streamers up to the zenith; the effect greatly diminished by the bright moon: the Aurora did not continue long. 10 p. m.-Went out about half an hour ago to see the occultation of Mars by the moon, when my attention was arrested by a most brilliant, broad, light-red, or almost carmine-coloured, arch, stretching across the heavens. It was much broader and more deeply coloured at either extremity than in the centre: to the eastward it passed between the tail of the Great Bear and Arcturus. The middle of the arch, which was very faint, passed through the two principal stars in Gemini, and the western extremity crossed the two largest stars in the shoulders of Orion, viz., a and 2. In a little while the western extremity of the arch shifted over Aldebaran, and ultimately over Capella, throwing out now and then very vivid streamers. I never saw a luminous arch of such a peculiar colour-so beautiful and, notwithstanding the clear moon-light, so brilliant! Now and then several delicate pencilings of the same hue appeared near the zenith. The eastern end of this arch passed at length over Arcturus towards the south, while the western end moved towards the north, disappearing between Capella and Cassiopdia. On the 19th, boisterous S. W. gale and heavy rain.”—W. A. Malvern, March 20th, 1837. 177 ESSAY ON THE RATIONALE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. BY WILLIAM WILLS, ESQ. Of the various kinds of moral evidence, that of testimony is the most important and comprehensive in its relation to human concerns; and, considering how many of our daily determinations are grounded upon that kind of evidence, even where we least suppose that we are pursuing a logical process, and how important it is that our judgments should be correctly formed, the subject is one of deep curiosity and interest. To enter upon the subject of testimony at large, would be to treat of the conduct of the human understanding in relation to the greater portion of the affairs of life. A due regard to unity of plan requires that I abstain from even glancing at many kindred and interesting topics, and that I restrict my observations as much as possible to that specific portion of moral evidence which I propose to consider. It would be erroneous and unjust, because the subject is best capable of illustration by forensic occurrences, to conclude that it more especially concerns the pursuits or the members of a particular profession. Such events are amongst the most deeply touching and dramatic incidents of social life; and throw a fearful light upon the darker parts of human nature, as earthquakes and volcanoes disclose the layers which compose the deeper parts of our planet, beneath a fertile and flowery surface.”* The subject is of universal concernment, and relates to an intellectual process applicable to every branch of human speculation. 66 It is desirable to clear the subject of ambiguity from the inaccurate use of language. The word proof is often applied to that which is merely the medium of proof. The judgment in relation to any alleged fact is always founded upon evidence, and when the result is that state of opinion which we distinguish by the term belief, we correctly say that the subject-matter of our inquiry is proved. Proof, then, is that quantity of evidence which produces belief, and they severally differ as cause and effect. The epithets direct, or indirect, or circumstantial, as applied to moral evidence, have been sanctioned by such long and general use that it might seem presumptuous to question their accuracy, as it Mackintosh, Ethical Dissertation, p. 228. VOL. VI.NO. XX. Ꮓ would be needless and perhaps impracticable to substitute others; but their distinctive propriety is certainly not evident, and the misuse of them has occasionally been the cause of lamentable errors. On a superficial view it might be thought that the terms direct and circumstantial denote distinct kinds of evidence, whereas in reality they denote only the different probative nature of evidentiary facts themselves. The actual distinction is, that by direct evidence is intended proof of the fact which is the subject of inquiry-the factum probandum. Circumstantial evidence is equally direct in its nature, but it is direct evidence of a minor fact or collection of facts more or less usually connected with some other fact, and from which it is usually inferred. A fact of this latter kind is called factum probans. The term presumptive is frequently used as synonymous with circumstantial evidence, but it is never so applied with accuracy. A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from proved facts, as to the truth of a fact alleged, but of which there is no direct proof. The word presumption, therefore, inherently imports a conclusion of the judgment, based upon circumstantial evidence; and it is more accurate to apply it only to conclusions from facts or moral phenomena. A wounded and bleeding body is discovered; it has been plundered; wide and deep footmarks are found proceeding in a direction from the body. These circumstances induce the conclusion that a crime has been committed, and that conclusion is properly termed a presumption. The Judgment of Solomon is a memorable instance of a presumption afforded by moral phenomena. Direct and circumstantial evidence are essentially distinguished by the manner in which they produce belief. So rapid are our intellectual processes, that it is frequently impossible to trace the connection between an act of the judgment and the train of reasoning of which it is the consequence; and the one appears to succeed the other by a kind of necessity, as the thunder follows the flash. But the case is widely different when we have to determine upon circumstantial evidence, the judgment in respect of which is essentially deductive and inferential; the facts may be true and the deduction false, and it is only by long experience that we acquire confidence in the accuracy of our conclusions. It is essential in all investigations founded upon moral evidence, and especially upon circumstantial evidence, that we correctly estimate the kind and degree of assurance of which the subject admits. The end of all intellectual research is the discovery of truth, or the conformity or disagreement of ideas. Abstract truth concerns ne |