living-Coke's opinion-R. v. Topham-Lord Kenyon's
judgment—Mr. Justice Stephen in R. v. Ensor—the dead
have no rights
Slander as distinguished from libel-general distinguishing
marks: nature of words spoken; causing a person to be
shunned or exposing him to contempt, ridicule or preju-
dice, or affecting his character or credit-cases on these
points damages in oral defamation
a repeater of the
slander-Archbold's account of verbal slander where action
lies distinction between slander and libel-four cases of
slander-mere abuse not actionable if free of these excep-
tions-cases on privilege—the dividing line running far back
-old cases-Mr. Justice Best on injury to a man's reputa-
tion-another distinction between libel and slander-latter
only actionable by civil action, not by prosecution, unless
words are seditious, blasphemous, or spoken of a magis-
trate-other kinds of libel but mere writing-the descrip-
tion of defamation in Indian Code-carriers of a story
liable as originator-Lord Coleridge's opinion of society
scandal and slander-actions for libel for certain words not
actionable as slander if not written-cases of specific slander
-a further distinction as to damage implied-what must
be proved-cases of slander in connection with a man's
trade, profession, etc., or imputing to him a contagious
disease-case of a man robbing his wife not an indictable
offence-Married Woman's Property Act affecting the
charge-Mr. Justice Maule's opinion as to man and wife
being one where the honour and feelings of either are injured
-publication to a wife not held to be sufficient-an
American case on the point-mere slanderous allegations
not actionable unless in themselves so and supported by
special damage unless imputing a crime-words must have
some connection with the damage-non-fulfilment of a
contract gave a right to special damage-where a woman
living apart brings an action for words affecting her rela-