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Q. B. 113; 33 W. R. 328). As a matter of practice, the case may be mentioned where particulars were required to be given of the persons who may have heard the slanderous words in a public room; and where an order was made that the plaintiff must supply the "best particulars he can give of those present on the occasion (Williams v. Ramsdale, 36 W. R. 125). Order xix. r. 4, deals with this matter of pleading (Rosselle v. Buchanan, 16 Q. B. D. 537). As to a discovery of particulars in libel actions Gouraud v. Fitzgerald (37 W. R. 55), and Hennessy v. Wright may be profitably consulted.

The Supreme Court of the United States in a most important judgment in the case of Pollard v. Lyons (3 Central Law Journal, 107) defined the law as affecting slander, and which cases of oral slander are to be held actionable. The Suprme Court held, and all English decisions justify and agree in holding the following cases of slanderous utterance to be actionable :

:

Firstly-Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offence involving moral turpitude for which the party if the charge be tried may be indicted. (This was presumably framed in accord with the decision in Odger v. Turner, 6 Mod. 104).

Secondly-Words falsely spoken of a party which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, whereof the charge, if true, would exclude the party from society.

Thirdly-Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment.

Fourthly-Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party, which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade.

Fifthly-Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, may occasion special damage (Clement v. Chois, 9 B. & C. 174).

Defamatory statements made on a privileged occasion in the honest belief that they are true are protected whether such belief be reasonable or not. It was even held in the case of Clark v. Molyneux (10 Cox's C. C. 14) by the Court of Appeal that the burden of proof was on plaintiff, and that the reasonableness or not of the belief was immaterial.

As a matter of practice it may be here added that great care is necessary to prove all that is set out in the pleadings. Thus where defendant was alleged to have spoken words of a person as treasurer and collector of a society he was held bound to prove that he was such treasurer and collector. Slanderous denunciations from the pulpit carrying with them loss of custom, situation or employment, are actionable if the truth of the statements cannot be proved (Galpin v. Fowler, 9 Ex. 615; Barnabas v. Traunter, 1 Vin. Abr. 396). In Bloodworthy v. Gray (7 M. & Gr. 334) a contagious disease was attributed to a man and held actionable. Charges against a person in an office of trust as well as of emolument are offences, and if special damage result from the utterance of the slanderous words redress will lie (Payne v. Beaumorris, 1 Lev. 218; Davies v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112).

Seditious Slander. It has been decided in R. v. Burns (16 Cox's C. C. 355, per Cave, J.) that an intention to excite ill will between different classes of Her

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Majesty's subjects may be a seditious intention. Whether or not it is so in any particular case must be decided by the jury after taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. "Sedition embraces everything, whether by word, deed, or writing, which is calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the Government and laws of the empire." Where in a prosecution for uttering seditious words with an intent to incite a riot it is proved that previously to the happening of a riot seditious words were spoken, it is for the jury to decide whether such rioting directly or indirectly was attributable to the seditious words proved to have been spoken. A meeting lawfully convened may become an unlawful meeting if during its course seditious words are spoken of such a nature as to produce a breach of the peace. And those who do anything to assist the speakers in producing upon the audience the natural effect of the words will be guilty of uttering seditious words as well as those who spoke the words. Seditious libels as contradistinguished from seditious slander, are publications tending to disturb the public peace by vilifying the Government or otherwise inciting the subjects to revolt or discontent.

Slander of Title. A kind of slander which has to be noticed here is one peculiar to realty, and includes anything said likely to affect the title of a person in some estate. This is only actionable when it is false and malicious, and these elements of criminality must be conclusively shown (Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 831; Brook v. Rawl, 4 Ex. 421; Rogers v. MacNamarra, 14 C. B. 27, 2 Selw. N. P.; Bignell v. Bussard, 3 H. & N. 217, where Channel, B., held that "in slander a plaintiff may rely on proof of special damage). In libel special

damage has no existence as a ground of action. This is an intermediate case-it is not slander of title, but there may be a case of libel of title (Carr v. Duckett, 29 L. J. Ex. 468).

In Hatchard v. Metge and others (3 T. L. R. 118) the question at issue was the use of the word "Delmonico as a brand for wine. Manisty J., left it to the jury, whether the publication of such a word was a libel not on the person who was dead, but on his business continued by plaintiff. "In law a publication injurious to a man's trade or character was a libel." If it was a libel (he asked the jury), was it maliciously published, the law presuming that what was calculated to injure a man's business was prima facie malicious, and it was for defendant to call evidence to rebut the presumption. Absence of actual malice in fact was not sufficient. The jury found for plaintiff. Odgers in Libel and Slander, p. 137, thus describes the offence in the following passage, quoted with merited approval by Day, J., in Hatchard v. Metge (supra and 18 Q. B. D. 771): "But wholly apart from these cases there is a branch of the law generally known by the inappropriate but convenient name, slander of title, which permits an action to be brought against any one who maliciously decries the plaintiff's goods or some thing belonging to him, and thereby produces special damage to the plaintiff. This is obviously no part of the law of defamation, for the plaintiff's reputation remains uninjured. It is really an action on the case for maliciously acting in such a way as to inflict loss upon the plaintiff. All the preceding rules dispensing with proofs of malice and special damage are therefore inapplicable to cases of this kind. Here, as in all other actions on the case, there must be et damnum et injuria. The injuria consists in the unlawful words maliciously

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spoken, and the damnum is the consequent money loss to the public." This very clearly explains the principle, although since the remote statute of Edw. 3, the consistent course of practice in the Courts establishes the principle that a civil action dies with the death of the person libelled, while an injury to a trade does not affect the question of survivorship. In Wotherspoon v. Currie (L. R. 5 H. L. 508) it was ruled that in order to entitle a manufacturer to an injunction to protect his trade mark it was not necessary to shew any wrongful intention on part of the person against whom the injunction was brought, and in Twycross v. Grant (4 C. P. D. 40) it was held that, wherever a breach of contract or a tort had been committed in the lifetime of the testator, his executor is entitled to maintain an action if it is shewn upon the face of proceedings that an injury had accrued to the personal estate. claim in respect of a libel in the way of his trade does not survive, but, assuming the statement is calculated to bring a plaintiff's trade mark into disrepute so as to damage his property, the executor may succeed in establishing a cause of action in respect of which he can recover."

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