O'Connell, for the plaintiff, cited Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T.R. 225; Co. Litt. 303; Com. Dig. tit., Pleader E. 17; 1 Bl. Comm. 350; st. 37 Ed. 3. c. 1.; 4 Bl. Comm. 289, 290; 2 Hawk. P.C. cap. 13, sect. 18; 2 Hale, P.C. 110; 2 Inst. 52; Throgmorton v. Allen, 2 Roll. Abr. 558; Hamond v. Howell, 2 Mod. 218; Floyd v. Barker, 12 Rep. 23; Barnardiston v. Soame, 2 Lev. 114; Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938; Miller v. Seare, 2 W. Bl. 1141; Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 396; S.C. 2 Ld. Raym. 213; Comyns, 76; Lambard's Eirenarcha, 6, 12, 14; 1 Bl. Comm. 350; Windham v. Clere, Cro. Eliz. 130; Eaton v. Southby, Willes, 131; Rex v. White, Cas. temp. Hardw. 42; Le Caux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 594. Radcliffe, for the defendant, cited Rex v. Neal, Cas. temp. Hardw. 106; Grocers' Company v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 1 W. Bl. 770; Wilmot, Notes of Opinions, 97; Metcalfe v. Hodgson, Hutton, 120; 2 Hawk. P.C. cap. 13, sect. 20; Rex v. White, Cas. temp. Hardw. 42; Rex v. Burchett, 1 Stra. 567; Rex v. Almon, Wilmot, Notes of Opinions, 265; Damport v. Sympson, Cro. Eliz. 520; S.C. 2 And. 47; Aire v. Sedgwicke, 2 Rolle, Rep. 197; Lidderdale v. Montrose, 4 T.R. 248; Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anst. 533; Flarty v. Odlum, 3 T.R. 681; 2 Inst. 55. Burne, for the plaintiff, cited st. 48 Geo. 3. c. 58.; Rex v. White, Cas. temp. Hardw. 42; Rex v. Burchett, 1 Stra. 567; Rex v. Almon, Wilmot, Notes of Opinions, 265. The following is an epitome of the judgment of Fletcher, J., dissenting(a) :— (After stating the pleadings) the warrant, upon the pleadings, must be taken to have been illegally issued. It is said to have been a judicial act, but is merely pleaded as done by the Chief Justice, as Chief Justice, which does not necessarily imply that it was done judicially. Throgmorton v. Allen, 2 Roll. Abr. 558; S.C. Vin. Abr. tit. Trespass (C. a.), vol. 20, p. 477; cit. 1 Hale, P.C. 586; merely decides that a warrant lawful on the face of it is sufficient justification in an action for assault and false imprisonment against the officer executing it. The privilege of exemption from action for judicial errors extends to all persons exercising judicial functions-Floyd v. Barker, 12 Rep. 23; Barnardiston v. Soame, 2 Lev. 114; S.C. 6 St. Tr. 1063. But the functions of a justice of the Court of King's Bench are ministerial as well as judicial. So are those of a justice of the peace-Lambard's Eirenarcha, cap 9., pp. 54, 55, and cap. 3. p. 12. Issuing a warrant, either by a justice of the King's Bench or by a justice of the peace, is a ministerial act. The following authorities show the history of attachment :-Lambard's Eirenarcha, cap. 3. p. 12; Rex v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, p. 243; Reg. Brev. de hom. repleg. Fitz. N.B. 152 (2nd edn. by Hale); the authority of Reg. Brev. is supported by Nicholson's Eng. Hist. (ed. 1714), 1, 205, 206; (a) The judgment occupies seventy pages of Hatchell's report, and took nearly five hours to deliver. Selden on Fleta, cap. 9, s. 1; Bract. lib. 5 p. 413; Fleta, lib. 2, cap. 12. The authority of a justice of the King's Bench is distinct from that of the Court-2 Inst. 53; 4 Inst. 81, 182; Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, p. 100. The Chief Justice issued the warrant in his ministerial capacity as conservator of the peace, and as such he is ministerial to the King. It cannot be a judicial act, for it is not the practice of the Court to issue warrants for misdemeanor before indictment found or certificate of information filed. No warrant can issue for felony before indictment found-4 Inst. 174, 177; citing Lib. Ass. 42 and 63; stat. 1 & 2 Philip and Mary, c. 1., and 2 & 3 Philip and Mary, c. 10.; Y.B. 4 H. 8. fol. 16. At Common Law no Court can arrest on indictment found for any trespassFitz. Abr. tit. Assize, 17; citing 32 Hen. 8. pl. 10; ibid. tit. Process, pl. 188; Finch, 355; Y.B. 29 Ed. 3. pl. 18; 12 Rep. 131 (contra Rastell, 263; but that is under stat. 2 Hen. 5. c. 7.); 2 Hale, P.C. 191; and stat. 48 Geo. 3. c. 58. The passage in 2 Hawk. P.C. cap. 13, sect. 18, is not supported as to misdemeanors by the authorities in margine. 2 Hale, P.C. 108, is confined to felonies: so is 4 Bl. Comm. 187. And the dictum at the end of Reg. v. Tracy, 6 Mod. 179, is expressly overruled by Bengough v. Rossiter, 4 T.R. 505. In order to be protected the act must be judicial, but acts done out of Court are extra-judicial-Floyd v. Barker, 12 Rep. 23; Bushell's case, 1 Mod. 119. The act here was extra-judicial-4 Inst. 73; Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, 243. It does not follow that being done by a judge the act must be judicial. Rex v. White, Cas. temp. Hardw. 42, is not contra. The dictum in Rex v. Almon, Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, 269, as to the reason for punishing disobedience to a warrant by attachment, is not reliable. The reason given for the answer to the seventh question on habeas corpus, Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, 104, is inaccurate-see per Lord North in the Rioters' case, 1 Vern. 175; S.C. 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 441; Bridgman v. Holt, Show. P.C. 111. Fiats stand on a different footing; the capias is issued by the Court. Novelty is no objection to this action, for every cause of action must have been novel once. The fact that the statutes as to justices pleading the general issue do not extend to justices of the superior courts is in favour of the plaintiff. The action is not against public policy-Bridgman v. Holt, Show. P.C. 118. The following judgments of the majority of the Court are taken from Hatchell's Report: MAYNE, J. In this case, however sorry I am to differ from the learned judge who has preceded me in pronouncing the judgment of the Court upon this important case, yet I am decidedly of opinion that the demurrer ought to be overruled, and that the plea contains a bar to this action. I feel that the cause of my differing in opinion from my brother Fletcher is owing to his arguing on a question that is not before the Court. It has been argued mostly at bar and bench, as if the question was, whether it was lawful or defensible for a judge, without any offence committed or charge made upon oath of crime or suspicion of crime committed, to imprison a subject-ex mero motu-out of his mere caprice or malice. Nothing in my apprehension is less like the question before us. The Chief Justice(a) makes no such question. It is not the question here upon the record. (The learned judge then read the plea to which the demurrer was taken.) The action is for assault and false imprisonment. The plea in effect is, that all that is necessary or proper for the Court to inquire into in this action is that the defendant is Chief Justice of the King's Bench; and as such, and in the course of his office of Chief Justice, issued a warrant-legal on the face of it-to cause this plaintiff to do what was necessary for his answering the charge (in the warrant fully recited) of a criminal offence, fully also recited to have been sworn to; and that the only assault and imprisonment was the constable's bringing the plaintiff to give bail in the course of this proceeding on that charge. The plea of the Chief Justice does not say that it is the right of a judge to imprison without cause; but that it is the right of a judge not to be called on, in every man's action, upon every exercise of his official authority, to become a defendant before a court and jury, to show and make out the case by which it was his duty as a judge to imprison the party charged with crime or misdemeanor. But what is the fact to be put in issue? It is this: the plea of the Chief Justice says, "You, the plaintiff, being imprisoned under my warrant, have a right to try by your action in a court of law whether I am a judge of the King's Bench, and whether I did more against you than issue a warrant according to the legal course upon an alleged criminal charge. If I have done more you can, on my plea, prove it. If I made a warrant the fraudulent cover for oppression, or corruption, or malice, you can on my plea aver that. If I have done anything against you not in the course of my office you can say so. If the charge recited in my warrant is no legal charge of an offence your demurrer will serve you. But I deny your right to try before this court and a jury in this action the grounds of my judicial acts, or the rectitude or legality of my judgment." The plaintiff, not content with this answer, demurs, and thereby contends that the Chief Justice is by law bound here in this action to come to trial, not only of the matter of fact which he offers for trial, but of all the facts, grounds, details of proceedings, and circumstances of offence charged against the plaintiff; and also that he must discuss and bring to decision before this court, or the judge at nisi prius, the rectitude and reasons of his acts and judgment. The plea brings the case to the same question as if the plaintiff had declared that the Chief Justice, acting as a judge of the King's Bench, issued his warrant in the regular way, with recital of informations before him on oath, of a crime committed by the plaintiff, and that he held him to bail to answer against that charge in the proper court. The Chief Justice Las done no more than bring on the record what the plaintiff omitted of these truths. If the plaintiff had so declared, the Chief Justice, I (a) The defendant. See above, p. 1317n. presume, would have demurred, and I would be of opinion that such demurrer ought to be allowed. It is now the same question, viz., Does the imprisonment now appear to this Court to have been a judicial act? If it does, the plea standing admitted is a bar. A second question, scarcely attempted to be made at the bar, will not require much argument, and little more than an observation, namely, whether an action lies against a judge for his judgment or judicial acts. A third question, rather mentioned than argued, was on the distinction between judicial acts in court and out of court. And first, as to the question whether an action lies against a judge for his judicial acts. The Chief Justice is by the Common Law a depository of the King's authority for the purpose of administering justice to the nation; he acts upon oath and upon high confidence, and immediately with his court represents the King in that sacred and important duty. The King does justice through his judges; they are his delegates, and they are accountable to him alone for the pure and honest performance of their trust; and they and the King are towards the people in dispensing the law, as it were, one individual authority. There must be some place and part in the stage of proceedings, some point in the administration of the law, where unqualified confideuce is to be reposed and acknowledged; and in the declaring of justice to the nation that place rests in the King's judges. The difference between the judges of the superior and inferior courts has not been sufficiently attended to. The King's judges stand next to or with the King, or for him, appointed by him, and responsible to him; and he will have his justice done by them, and by them alone. The inferior judges stand under, and represent the authority of subjects; they have only the responsible power of subjects entrusted to them, or they are placed at a distance in responsibility from the King, and are subject to the control and direction of the superior courts. An action before one judge for what is done by another is in the nature of an appeal, and is the appeal from an equal to an equal. It is a solecism in the law. I say that the plaintiff's case is against the independence of the judges. The principle contended for would annihilate that independence. Judges are to be equally independent of the Crown and of the people. If there must be parties in the nation, and one is inclined to degrade judges and intimidate them into subjection to their views, it may also happen that another party may be so inclined the next day; the partisans of a King may wish to reduce them to servility, the partisans of anarchy or revolution to render them their instruments of a worse despotism or intimidate them from the performance of their duty and from restraining the first and insidious efforts towards confusion and rebellion. The honest, good, and constitutional mind will always wish to find them entirely free and unbiased, and will rather entrust them with a high and unquestionable authority, and if guilty leave their punishment to Parliament alone, than hazard their fortitude and independence by the alarm and question, pains and expense, of | Besides Sir Eardley Wilmot and Lord Coke, the as many actions as there may be acts of duty encountering the bad passions and prejudices of mankind. The constitutional idea of a judge is "dignity" for the sake of the King and people. There was one case in England where an attempt somewhat similar to this was made; an action against the judges at the sessions in London; and there it was soon decided that no such action lay. (a) Liability to every man's action for every judicial act a judge is called upon to do is the degradation of the judge and cannot be the object of any true patriot or honest subject. It is to render the judges slaves to every court that holds plea, to every sheriff juror, attorney, and plaintiff. If you once break down the barrier of their dignity and subject them to an action you let in upon the judicial authority a wide, wasting, and harassing persecution, and establish its weakness in a degrading responsibility. As to the authorities upon the subject, no such action was ever sustained; and save that of Hamond v. Howell, 1 Mod. 184, and 2 Mod. 218, so often mentioned, none was ever attempted but once before, and that in Ireland, where it was also thought of, to bring an action against the chief governor of the country. But, as in the case of the King's judges, so in that of his representative the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, (b) the constitutional remedy, if there were misconduct, is before the King and the Parliament. The case attempted in London was the strongest imaginable. The Recorder of London was the judge; his act was expressly declared illegal by the Court of Common Pleas upon discussing the case on a habeas corpus-Vaugh. 135. Upon that opinion of the Court an action afterwards was brought against him in the King's Bench before Lord Chief Justice Hale and his brothers; and what were Hale's expressions? That the action would not lie. That in the case of an erroneous judgment, though a writ of error doth make void the judgment, it doth not make the awarding the process void to that purpose; and the matter was done in a course of justice, and that they would have but a cold business of it1 Mod. 119, and afterwards in 2 Mod. 218 the same case came on; and Howell having pleaded the special matter the plaintiff replied de injuriâ sua propriâ; and to this the defendant demurred; and what was the opinion of the whole court? "That the bringing of this action was a greater offence than the fining of the plaintiff, and committing of him for non-payment; and that it was a bold attempt, both against the Government and justice in general." It was an error of judgment for which no action would lie. There is no other reported authority, for there was no other case of such an action attempted; but there is plenty of solemn authority on the law and principles of such an action. (a) Hamond v. Howell, 2 Mod. 218. (b) Tandy v. Earl of Westmoreland, 27 St. Tr. 1246. See Luby v. Lord Wodehouse, 17 Ir. C. L.R. 618; Sullivan v. Lord Spencer, Ir. R. 6 C.L. 173. authorities of both of whom have been questioned, Rolle, Hale, Hawkins, Blackstone, De Grey, and whoever else at the bar or bench have been referred to on the subject, are decidedly against the monstrous doctrine contended for by the plaintiff. We find in Floyd v. Barker, 12 Rep. 23: "Jurors are not to be drawn in question, nor judges. No proof to be admitted against the presumption that they, as sworn, will do justice. They are guardians of the King's oath, and are to answer to him alone; for otherwise it would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice; and those who are the most sincere would not be free from continual calumniations. For multa insidiæ sunt bonis." In Miller v. Seare, 2 Wm. Bl. 1141, De Grey, Chief Justice, said : "It is agreed the judges in the King's superior courts of justice are not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment; and this not so much for the sake of the judges as of the suitors themselves. The protection in regard to the superior courts is absolute and universal; with respect to the inferior, it is only while they act within their jurisdiction;' And again we find the following passage in 3 Bl. Comm. 42 : "Bracton expresses the power and dignity of the King's Bench when he says that the justices of this court are capitales, generales, perpetui, et majores; a latere regis residentes, qui omnium aliorum corrigere tenentur injurias et errores." And with those ancient and high authorities in our law is perfectly consistent what is said by Wilmot, 104, in answer to the question by the Lords, whether if a judge before the statute of Charles had refused to grant the habeas corpus, the subject had any remedy at law, by action or otherwise, against the judge. "I think," says he, "that the subject had no remedy at law, by action or otherwise, against the judge for such refusal. The denying a writ stands upon the same ground as any other breach of duty." And in p. 259 he illustrates his doctrine thus: "The Constitution has provided very apt and proper remedies for correcting and rectifying the involuntary mistakes of judges; and for punishing and removing them for any voluntary perversions of justice." It is also laid down in an ancient case in 1 Roll. Abr. 92 : "A man shall not have an action on the case against a judge of record for giving a false judgment." Again, we have the opinion of an eminent writer on criminal law, and of comparatively modern authority,-Serjeant Hawkins thus expresses himself in 2 Hawk. P.C. c. 15, s. 24 : "This statute (Habeas Corpus Act) makes the judges liable to an action at the suit of the party grieved in one case only, which is the refusing to award a habeas corpus in vacation time; and seems to leave it to their discretion in all other cases to pursue its directions in the same manner as they ought to execute all other laws, without making them subject to the action of the party or to any other express penalty or forfeiture: and this is most agreeable to the general reason of the law, which regularly will not suffer a judge to be liable to an action for what he does as judge." And observe, here he was speaking of acts done by judges out of court. Again, in the same book, 2 Hawk. P.C. cap. 13. s. 20:"No man is liable to an action for what he does as judge." What says my Lord Chief Justice Hale in Bushell's case, 1 Mod. 119: "I speak my mind plainly that an action will not lie. In case of erroneous judgment given by a judge, shall the party have an action of false imprisonment against the judge? No; nor against the officer neither-the matter was done in a course of justice." And again, in the same case, 2 Mod. 218, the whole court treats the action as criminal, and said "that the bringing the action was a greater offence than fining the plaintiff; and that it was a bold attempt against the Government and justice in general." See how such an action was considered by the bench and the bar in the celebrated modern case of Burdett v. Abbot, Speaker of the House of Commons. In 14 East. 123, Bayley, J., asks the counsel this question, Would an action lie in the Court of Common Pleas against the judges of this Court, or either of them, who signed a warrant of commitment? and how is it answered by Burdett's counsel, Mr. Holroyd? Chief Justice is a justice of the peace or a conservator, and a Chief Justice distinct; and we tell you he must have done such an outrageous act as this in his second person and in his inferior character as a conservator and not as a Chief Justice. If it could be thought of as a serious question-as a good ground of defence, the plaintiff would have replied so, and not demurred, for by so doing it is admitted that if there is no legal impossibility of the act being done as judge, it was done as judge, and in no other character. But it is said that the Act 48 Geo. 3. c. 58. is the only authority by which a judge of the King's Bench can issue any warrant for misdemeanor, before indictment; and it is truly said that this warrant is not under that statute, and is therefore void, or is nothing more than the warrant of a justice of peace in the person of the Chief Justice. But read the statute; and, I ask, does it declare, or even imply, anything against the judge's power, which he has practised universally, time out of mind, and which power is recognised by the authority of Hawkins and Dalton? Is not the statute made expressly to extend the kind of proceedings before given in revenue cases; and to give warrants marked for bail in specific sums; and to give plea and appearance by default? Indeed, if this warrant is void as a judge's warrant, I do not see how the justice of peace got the power to issue it, or the conservator mentioned by my brother Fletcher. A judge of King's Bench is as much a justice of peace as he is a constable or coroner. He has in him the power of all these; but he is not thereby the less a judge: justices of peace are ministerial often, judges of King's Bench never. It is said that they are ministerial to the King. Why? On the contrary, they have his whole legal power in matters touching the administration of justice; and he cannot but act by them. See the ludicrous consequences of treating them as ministerial, or subjecting them We find also legislative opinion upon this to an action. They become amenable to every point appearing in the statutes empowering other species of correction by a court, attachto plead the general issue, giving in such cases ment, &c. One hour at the bar, the next on notices to magistrates, limitations of actions, the bench, of the same or some other court. costs, &c. If this action lies here, so it would They would have a busy and a harassing time; in any of the most inferior courts in the king-getting from one station to the other-from the dom, the law draws no distinction. It is admitted that no action lies against a witness for what he deposes in a court of justice, because he must be free and unfettered in giving his evidence, and he is brought there in the course of law and by the summons of the King. As to the question whether the warrant here was a judicial act, the ground of argument arose from a confusion of ideas; because it is stated that certain other persons besides judges have power to do the like act in certain cases-if it did not occur, that another, who is not a judge of King's Bench, issues such warrants, it would not probably be argued that when a judge of King's Bench issues one, it is not a judicial Here is an act done by one who is a judge-done in a matter within his jurisdiction as a judge; and bond fide intending to act therein as a judge. How then can it be imagined that it is not a judge's act? Why, forsooth, say the counsel for the plaintiff, the "Certainly, no action would lie against judges: they are accountable in another way; no common proceedings in the ordinary way can go against them. But, with submission to the Court, if they issued a warrant of commitment in a matter of which they had no jurisdiction at all, and which appeared so on the face of the warrant, an action would lie there against the officer, who arrested or imprisoned the party upon such warrant." act. judge to the accused-from the corrector to the corrected. As to another topic relied on in the course of the argument, I must differ from those who have preceded me; for I consider one judge's act to be the act of all the Court; and my brother must be under some lapse in that respect in arguing on the contrary principle; for, in my mind, a judge in his chamber does no act which the Court may not also. Even his bailing is not like a justice of the peace's bailing; but, according to his discretion, and he has that power in all cases whatsoever-2 Inst. 189; nor was he ever thought to be affected by any of the multitude of statutes on which the power and authority of the justice of peace depends--his power is by the common law. How does the warrant of the Court differ from the warrant of the judge? Not in the least. Consider the nature of side bar rules and other acts of the same kind-fiats; taking bail; refusing it; granting habeas corpus; refusing it; discharging on it; remanding on it, &c. Would an action lie for every one, or for any one of these acts? What distinction is there between these most solemn acts of the Court in respect of the protection of the judge? and what difference between them and this warrant? None! It is only a confusion of ideas; because it is a thing which, in certain cases, can be done by others who are liable to the examen of the Courts, by action, which the judges are not; and this doctrine and reasoning is amply sustained by the several cases cited and commented on at the bar, namely, Rex v. White, Cas. temp. Hardw. 42, the arguments of the judges in Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, and also by the case of Goldschmidt v. Marryat, 1 Camp. 562. And Wilmot in the case of Rex v. Almon, p. 268, says: "I can make no difference between a judge acting in a Court, or judicially out of it (speaking as to the protection, privilege, and dignity of a judge in a case of libel), &c. He acts by virtue of the patent constituting him a judge of this Court, and of the power which the law gives him in that character and capacity. When he issues his warrant as a conservator of the peace, the Court punishes the officer who disobeys it, by attachment. Why? Because it is the act of a judge in his judicial capacity, &c. (Thus confirming the case of Rex v. White.) Suppose he was calumniated for issuing such a warrant, would not the Court grant an attachment for it?" And in p. 97 he again says: "The acts done in Court and out of Court, taken together, form that system of practice by which the benefit of the law is dealt out to the people." And, in p. 100:- "Judges issue warrants out of their own proper authority, separate from the Court, and out of term." Almost the same words are used by the three judges in Wilkes's case, 4 Burr. 2569 :— "A great deal that may be done in Court is done by judges at chambers in term time; in vacation, a great deal more is done by them in chambers, because it can be done nowhere else." This judge, Sir E. Wilmot, has been on the present occasion, I believe, for the first time, assailed in his character for knowledge and integrity; yet, in the parts only of his judgment in Rex v. Almon which press on this case he has other support than my opinion of him-so has the Court in which he sat; and the able reporter (a) of their enlightened and unanimous decisions. With respect to the book of his Opinions upon which so much has been said, What is its intrinsic merit? what its authority? Does it not prove itself? Has it not as good a claim to respect, and ought it not to carry as much weight with the law world, as other great men's commentaries? At least, how did the Court and bar receive it in Burdett v. Abbot when Sir V. Gibbs cited the judge's arguments in Almon's case and called it his "admirable argument ?" So far, I think upon principle and (a) Sir James Burrow, Master of the Crown Office. authority, there can be no question of the protection of the judge for acts done out of Court as well as done upon the bench; and now as to the act in question being one which he might do out of Court, see 2 Hale, P.C. 5, 6 :— 66 Any of the justices of the King's Bench may issue out their warrants for apprehending of a malefactor, or for surety of the peace, in any county; And, p. 105, as to the power of the King's Bench in cases of breaches of the peace, and before indictment : "The Court of King's Bench hath not only a power to issue writs upon indictments or appeals before them, but have also power by order to command the sheriff of the county where they sit, or the marshal of the Court, to apprehend felons or disturbers of the peace, and bring them before the Court." With respect to the plea which is here put upon the record in bar to the present action, I think there ought not to be a second opinion as to the necessity and propriety of putting it in by the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench. I can easily believe with Mr. Radcliffe, that the Chief Justice wished the decision to be on the abstract question, whether he ought to give other answer to the action than he has done by this plea. I think that those who surmised that this plea was prepared against his approbation, as if it was unfit for his candid and honourable justification, took away from him a merit to which he is entitled, and which is a further proof of his just conception of the judicial character, of his constitutional spirit, and of his fortitude and personal disinterestedness. I have a perfect recollection of the learned and respectable defendant stating to the judges (when taking their opinion whether he should sit on the trials of Kirwan and others) (a) that he was resolved to take no step in this action, nor put in any plea that should compromise the constitutional right of the judges, or desert that dignified and constitutional defence which a brothers Fox and Fletcher were not present at judge ought to make. It happened that my the time, and it may be a fact with which they are unacquainted; but I thought it infinitely to the honour of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench to display a temperate but fixed resolution to sustain the legal rights and privileges of the judgment seat of which he was the trustee.(b) Fox, J.(c): Two of my brethren having given their opinions upon this record, at considerable length, it will not be necessary for me to occupy much of the public time. My brother Fletcher in giving his judgment differed from the opinion (a) See 31 St. Tr. 543, a report taken from Ridgeway's shorthand report. Another account of these trials is contained in the Speeches of Peter Burrowes, Esq., on the Trials of Edward Sheridan, M.D., and Thomas Kirwan, merchant, under the Convention Act, Dublin, 1812. The Lord Chief Justice sat on those trials with the rest of the Court. (b) The remainder of the judgment is of no legal importance. (c) See above, p. 770. |