foreign colonies. To the senate, which would thus be largely under European influence, was quite frankly allotted a preponderating rôle. Great Britain's responsibility for good government in the last resort was to be safeguarded by a power of certification, analogous to that operating in India, but virtually to be exercised only with the assent of the senate.

It was this document which first seems to have seriously alarmed Egyptian ministers as to the possible implications of the Protectorate, and to have brought them into line with the aims, if not with the methods, of the nationalist agitation already gathering momentum. Allusion has already been made to the belief that the Protectorate was merely a war measure. The repeated endorsement by the Allies of the principle of selfdetermination further encouraged nationalist aspirations, and in particular the Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918, though referring only to Syria and Mesopotamia, seemed at least equally applicable to Egypt. The aim was here stated to be "the complete and definite enfranchisement of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population." Egyptians could reasonably argue that after thirty years of British tutelage they were fitted for an even greater degree of freedom than was being promised to other Turkish dependencies.

The Armistice was scarcely signed before the expectant anxiety of Egyptians about their country's future manifested itself. Rushdi Pasha, the Prime Minister, expressed the desire to discuss the situation immediately and personally with the British Government in London. He was told that his visit would be inopportune. Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the more extreme Nationalists, made the same request. He was refused permission to leave Egypt. These abrupt decisions of a preoccupied Foreign Office, taken against the advice of the British representatives on the spot, were serious errors of judgment which profoundly influenced the course of events. A little sympathetic attention, a declaration on the lines of that eventually made in February 1922, might have saved years of turmoil and negotiation. The British Government gravely underestimated the strength of the nationalist movement, and created the impression that Egyptian grievances and aspirations were being ignored.

The susceptibilities of Egyptian ministers were deeply wounded. Rushdi Pasha, in order to show what the Protectorate might really mean, disclosed Sir William Brunyate's memorandum on Constitutional Reform, a confidential document and purely the expression of a personal opinion. That action had a considerable effect. The government resigned and an offer to receive an official deputation in London came too late to smooth things over. The cry of complete independence had now been raised by the Nationalists, and to such lengths did agitation proceed that, in March 1919, the arrest and deportation of Zaghlul and some of his principal followers was effected by order of the British military authorities, though with the concurrence of the Sultan and the more moderate Egyptian leaders.

This action at once precipitated a crisis. There were serious riots in Cairo, Tanta, Damietta and Mansoura, which the British forces were called upon to quell, and which involved heavy casualties. Government officials, students and lawyers went on strike. To emphasise the national character of the movement Coptic priests addressed audiences in the mosques, and Moslem dignatories addressed congregations in the churches. Telegraph wires were cut everywhere. A train reached Minia from Deirut with the bodies of six British officers, who had been assassinated on the way. Communications with Upper Egypt were cut and the small outlying British garrisons and communities placed in considerable danger.

Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief, who was at this moment on his way to the Peace Conference in Paris, was sent back post haste to Egypt as Special High Commissioner, with discretionary powers for dealing with the crisis. He at once confirmed the Residency's opinion that the only alternative to holding Egypt by force was to make an immediate attempt to reach a settlement by negotiation, and that this would involve allowing the Nationalists to accompany the ministers to England. Stern repression might perhaps at this stage have met with success. There were still large British forces in the Middle East, and the country might possibly have been cowed into submission. But none of those best qualified to judge believed that a permanent settlement could be achieved by the use of force, and all chance of Egyptian co-operation in governing the country would have vanished. As soon as the first fury of the outbreak had expended

itself and the situation was under control, Lord Allenby recommended the immediate release of Zaghlul and his companions from internment, and the removal of all restrictions on travel. His advice was reluctantly accepted, and during the second week in April an Egyptian Nationalist delegation, headed by Zaghlul, set out for Europe to lay its case before the Peace Conference. Actual disturbances were now ceasing, but the country was still without a government and the strike of government officials still continued with the object of securing recognition for Zaghlul's delegation as the official mouthpiece of Egyptian aspirations. It was not until some weeks later, after Lord Allenby had threatened all strikers with instant dismissal, that normal administration was possible again.

The British Government thereupon decided to follow up its conciliatory policy and to take advantage of the reaction which followed the disturbances by sending out a special mission under Lord Milner to investigate the whole position. Unfortunately the departure of the mission was delayed until the end of the year. Meanwhile Mohammed Pasha Said, who had taken office in order to prepare the ground for the mission, had resigned under Nationalist pressure. Zaghlul and his associates, generally known as the "Wafd " (i.e. delegation), had failed to make any impression in Paris, but succeeded in poisoning the atmosphere in Egypt. Nevertheless, the boycott they proclaimed while the Milner Mission was in the country during the winter was only superficially successful. Eventually Zaghlul was induced to adopt a more reasonable attitude. Unofficial conversations were entered upon in London, and by the end of August, 1920, agreement seemed in sight.

The mission had agreed to recommend the abolition of the Protectorate and the substitution for it of a treaty recognising the principle of Egyptian independence, but safeguarding Great Britain's special interests. Egypt would be allowed to conduct her own foreign relations, but would undertake not to adopt a policy hostile to Great Britain. British troops would remain in Egypt for the protection of Imperial communications, but would be stationed only in specified districts. Great Britain would negotiate with other Powers for the abolition of the Capitulations and would take over the protection of foreigners and their interests. For this purpose a judicial and a financial adviser

would be retained by the Egyptian Government, and Great Britain would have a veto on legislation affecting foreigners.

A section of British opinion thought these concessions went too far. The mission's terms of reference had specifically premised the retention of the Protectorate. But for the sake of a generally agreed settlement the government would almost certainly have agreed to the proposals. The weak point in the scheme lay in its dependence on the abolition of the Capitulations. The control which the Milner Mission sought to impose on the Egyptian Government by making the High Commissioner virtually an executive as well as a diplomatic officer was the really crucial question; but there would be no justification for such an arrangement in an independent Egypt except in substitution for existing international bonds. As matter of fact it was clear almost at once that the Powers which had rights under the Capitulations were not willing to give up their privileges easily or for nothing.

Zaghlul was, of course, aware of these difficulties and at the last moment refused to commit himself definitely to the mission's proposals. He probably thought he saw an opportunity of getting better terms by playing off Great Britain against the other Capitulatory Powers, though in this he was mistaken. He was also unwilling to weaken his prestige in Egypt by countenancing any form of compromise. In particular, he feared the "Watanist" party, or old-fashioned Nationalists, who still had Turkish sympathies and were under the influence of Pan-Islamic ideas. His party and theirs had so far worked together, but were divided by acute personal rivalries, and the "Watanists " were quite ready to attack Zaghlul as a traitor in the hope of rallying the irreconcilable elements to their own standard. All Zaghlul would agree to was the publication of the proposals and the promise of his support if they were sufficiently well received.

The conceit, vacillation and obstinacy which Zaghlul showed during the negotiations alienated the goodwill not only of the Milner Mission and of Adly Pasha, but of some of his most intimate followers. The proposals were on the whole greeted with favour in Egypt, but Zaghlul not only refused to give a lead, but issued a critical manifesto which considerably damaged their prospects. The only organised opposition, however, came from the "Watanists," who maintained that the concessions were

illusory; they also for the first time made a point of the question of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. The mission had considered this matter outside its terms of reference. Lord Milner, in a letter to Adly Pasha, had simply said that no change in the existing system of dual control was contemplated and that Egypt need have no fear for her water supply.

By October, when the "Wafd" and the mission again met in London, it was clear that no further help could be expected from Zaghlul. But the feeling in Egypt in favour of a settlement was strong, and Egyptians were turning for leadership to Adly, the man chiefly responsible both for the initiation of the negotiations and for their having been so nearly successful.

The mission's report appeared in February, 1921. It recapitulated the events dealt with above and reaffirmed the proposals already made. Its reception in Egypt was favourable, criticism moderate, and the proposals generally accepted as a basis for official negotiations. The British Government thereupon issued a declaration of its agreement that the Protectorate was not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should stand to Great Britain, and invited the Sultan to send an official delegation to London. A few days later the Egyptian Government which, since Mohammed Said Pasha's resignation in November 1919, had played no active part, resigned, and Adly Pasha took office in order to take charge of the negotiations. Zaghlul at this point arrived in Egypt, where he was given a reception which completely turned his head. He would only co-operate with Adly if he was made leader of the delegation, and had a majority of

*The Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 secures to Great Britain "by right of conquest " a share in the settlement and future working and development of the Sudan. The British and Egyptian flags fly side by side. The Governor-General is nominated by the British Government, but appointed by the Ruler of Egypt. He governs by proclamation under martial law. Until 1924, the Egyptian army, of which the Governor-General was by custom Commander-in-Chief, was responsible for the country's defence and the Civil Service was partly British and partly Egyptian. After the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, in 1924, Egyptian troops and officials were withdrawn from the Sudan and its defence entrusted to a locally recruited Defence Force under British and Sudanese officers.

†See Cmd. 1131, 1921.

It is the best summary of the post-war

situation.