'The vast ocean of being! What did Locke understand by the term 'BEing'? He has favoured the world with no definition of the phrase. Had he known the true meaning of the term, he would have known that among our thoughts may be found portions of the vast ocean of being;' and that truths which appertain to being' are, of all others, the truths which do most con

cern us.

αληθες

Truth is, according to Aristotle, being.' To de ús aλntes ov, το δε ὡς ψευδος μη όν.

Being, properly so called,' says Plotinus, is neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and its properties belong to the region of non-being. Again, the same profound thinker observes: No one of real beings subsists out of intellect, nor is in place; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation, nor corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings; since if they were generated and corrupted, they would no longer be real beings, but that which is adventitious to them would be being.'

Aristotle teaches, moreover, that there is a certain science which speculates being, so far as being, and the things which are essentially inherent in it. This science he defines to be the first philosophy.

When Locke, therefore, warns his followers against venturing on the vast ocean of being,' he warns them against entering on that metaphysical science, of which he aspired to be regarded as

a master.

⚫ Were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found, which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark part of things, between what is, and what is not, comprehensible by us,' men would, perhaps,' be in a better position than at present.

What a profound truth! How worthy of the leader of our English school of metaphysics! 'Were the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found, that sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark part of things,' we should, doubtless, have made mighty progress in metaphysical science; but if we are bound (as Locke proclaims) to discover the extent of our knowledge, before venturing on 'the vast ocean of being,' we might, certainly, without incurring loss, abstain from undertaking the voyage afterwards. That we should end, before we begin, is, in fact, the sum of Locke's philosophy.

'And Locke and his followers are regarded as reformers in science! They are, indeed, commonly described as men who purified metaphysical philosophy from the errors with which Aristotle and Plato overlaid it!

Νέοι γὰρ, διακονόμοι
Κρατοὺς ὀλύμπου νεοχμοῖς
Δὲ δὴ νόμοις

Ζεὺς ἀθέτως κρατύνει, τα

Πρὶν δὲ πελώρια νῦν ἀϊστοῖ.

Our modern metaphysical Jupiters do, indeed, attempt to abolish what ages wiser than our own regarded with veneration!

Dr. Brown frequently condescends, moreover, to be sophistical when extolling the merits of his favourite science. He attempts, for instance, to suspend all physical philosophy from his science of mental analysis. Thus, he observes, (p. 6,)

'It was not, however, to point out to you the advantage which arises to the study of our mental frame from the comparative facility as to the circumstances attending it, that I have led your attention to the difference, in this respect, of the physics of mind and matter. It was to show what is of much more importance-how essential, a right view of the science of mind is to every other science, even to those sciences which superficial thinkers might conceive to have no connection with it; and how vain it would be, to expect that any branch of the physics of mere matter could be cultivated to its highest degree of accuracy and perfection, without a due acquaintance with the nature of that intellectual medium, through which alone the phenomena of matter become visible to us, and of those intellectual instruments by which the objects of every science, and of every science alike, are measured, and divided, and arranged. . .. But it may be said-We are chemists, we are astronomers, without studying the philosophy of mind. And true it certainly is, that there are excellent astronomers and excellent chemists who have never paid any peculiar attention to mental philosophy. The general principles of philosophizing which a more accurate intellectual philosophy had introduced, have become familiar to them without study.

I am aware that it is not to improvements in the mere philosophy of mind, that the great reformation in our principles of physical inquiry is commonly ascribed. Yet it is to this source-certainly, at least, to this source chiefly-that I would refer the origin of those better plans of philosophical investigation, which have distinguished with so many glorious discoveries the age in which we live, and the ages immediately preceding. When we think of the great genius of Lord Bacon, and of the influence of his admirable works, we are too apt to forget the sort of difficulties which his genius must have had to overcome, and to look back to his rules of philosophizing as a sort of ultimate truths, discoverable by the mere perspicacity of his superior mind, without referring them to those simple views of nature, in relation to our faculties of discovery, from which they were derived. The rules which he gave us are rules of physical investigation; and it is very natural for us, therefore, in estimating their value, to think of the erroneous physical opinions which preceded them, without paying sufficient attention to the false theories of intellect which had led to these very physical absurdities. . . The question is not, whether our method of inquiry be juster than that of the schoolmen? for of our

superiority in this respect, if any evidence of fact were necessary, the noble discoveries of these later years are too magnificent a proof to allow us to have any doubt; but, whether our plan of inquiry may not still be susceptible of improvements, of which we have now as little foresight as the Scotists and Aquinists of the advantages which philosophy has received from the general prosecution of the inductive method?'

In these sentences is embodied a large amount of error. That a due acquaintance with the nature of the intellectual medium, through which alone the phenomena of matter become visible to us,' is of importance even in prosecuting the various branches of physical knowledge, may be safely conceded to Dr. Brown; but we may at the same time observe, that Proclus enunciated, not less admirably, the same important truth, when he proclaimed, that intellect is the measure of all science.'

A knowledge of accurate intellectual philosophy,' however acquired, is, according to Dr. Brown, indispensable to success even in chemistry and astronomy. Dr. Brown cannot deny, indeed, that many eminent astronomers and chemists have not appeared to be proficients in this accurate philosophy' of intellect. To assume, however, (as Dr. Brown does,) that the chemists and astronomers in question became familiar with this philosophy without study,' is but a slight assumption, when compared with many, which Dr. Brown's theory compelled him to indulge in.

As, however, this accurate intellectual philosophy' is a thing, confessedly of modern growth-as, according to Dr. Brown, the ancient Greeks were strangers to it-as, according to the same authority, accurate intellectual philosophy" had, in fact, no existence before the days of Locke it might have been interesting, had Dr. Brown condescended to explain how the ancient Greeks, and Egyptians, and Chaldeans, contrived to achieve their discoveries in mathematics and astronomy?

It might have been interesting, moreover, had Dr. Brown condescended to explain, why the wrestler or boxer must necessarily depend, for proficiency in his art, on familiarity with the discoveries of the anatomist?

Dr. Brown has uttered cant on too many subjects, not to have indulged in cant, in connection with the name of Bacon. Bacon was, according to Dr. Brown, a mighty benefactor to philosophy. Bacon taught, we are assured, new rules of physical investigation.' But how (if Dr. Brown's theory be accurate) might Bacon teach new rules of physical investigation,' until he had, in the first place, furnished the world with a theory of perception more true than that which flourished in the schools? Bacon however never attempted to supply that more accurate intellectual philosophy,' which, as Dr. Brown at other times teaches, is the necessary basis of all sound physical speculation. Bacon's la

bours must, therefore, in conformity with Dr. Brown's theory, be pronounced to have been necessarily futile.

Dr. Brown, after lauding Bacon and inductive science,' declares that our recent discoveries in the physical sciences prove, necessarily, the increasing purity and efficacy of our intellectual philosophy.

Dr. Brown's philosophy involves the adoption of materialism in certain of its forms; but in his materialism Dr. Brown is far from being consistent.

Let it here be noted, that the sole variety of materialism is not that, which denies to the human soul, immortality, and the loftier attributes of being. There is another, and more widely diffused species of materialism, which, without seeking to discuss the question of the soul's duration and destiny, assumes that the soul best discharges its functions, when it makes most rapid progress in the adaptation of the properties of matter to the use of man. By speculators of this stamp, the increase of luxury, the advancement of the mechanical arts, the diffusion of the means of physical enjoyment, have always been commended as the great object, which human intellect ought to propose to itself. Of such men, Plotinus, in his treatise on the Gnostics, speaks :

There are two sects of philosophers,' observes that illustrious Platonist, with respect to the attainment of the end of life, one of which places the pleasure of the body as the end; but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the desire of which is suspended from God.' The former sect, Plotinus subsequently declares, pursue pleasure, and their own concerns, and

UTILITY.'

·

Bacon belonged to this sect of materialists and utilitarians. Bacon deemed lightly of the importance of moral philosophy. He has, indeed, expressly declared that the functions of natural, or physical, philosophy, are far more noble' than those of moral science. The beautiful and virtue' occupied but a small portion of Bacon's thoughts. He proposed, as the chief end of his philosophy, what Plotinus has styled the pleasure of the body.' Bacon, in short, valued knowledge,' in direct proportion to the 'power,' which knowledge' might confer over the properties of matter. Bacon was, we repeat, in the strictest sense of the term, an utilitarian.

Bacon is described by his eulogists as the father of inductive science-as the founder of experimental philosophy. Bacon is, in short, commonly represented as a discoverer of the true principles of philosophical investigation-as the guide and prophet (to use Cowley's figure) who led inquirers through the desert, and showed them the promised land of truth.

This estimate of the character and tendency of Bacon's labours rests, to a great extent, on misapprehension of what Bacon's

predecessors had done, and what some of them had proposed to do.

The philosophy of induction' could boast of its eulogists and expounders, thousands of years before Bacon was born. Expemental philosophy' was in high favour with sects of teachers among the Greeks, more especially with the Stoics, with teachers among the ancient Egyptians, and among the, perhaps, still more remote sages of Chaldea.

The Greeks, the Egyptians, and the early Asiatics did not, in short, lack teachers who held, as Bacon subsequently did, that the only varieties of knowledge which are worth cultivating, are those varieties of knowledge which confer 'power' over external nature-teachers who held, as Bacon subsequently did, that the true end of knowledge' is the relief of man's estate'-teachers who sneered, as Bacon did, at all truth,' which is barren' of those results which conduce to physical enjoyment.

Dr. Brown has, as we have seen, declared that the superiority of modern metaphysical science is proved by the stupendous discoveries in physics, which have distinguished these later times. Does not this conclusion involve the application of a false test of value to metaphysical doctrines? Dr. Brown's theory on the subject assumes, in fact, that metaphysical truth is subordinate to physical assumes that what the Greeks styled 'the first philosophy' derives its lustre from sciences far less comprehensive in their nature than itself. Dr. Brown's theory is, in short, one of the many manifestations of the creed of materialism.

Dr. Brown might have derived instruction from the following observations of Proclus.

'Some,' as that great Platonist remarks, 'affirm that sensible experiments are more useful than the universal objects of the soul's speculation; that Godesia, or the mensuration of the earth, is preferable to geometry, and vulgar arithmetic to that arithmetic which is conversant with theorems alone: and that nautical astrology is more useful than that which teaches universally, abstracted from any application to sensible concerns.' According to these reasoners, continues Proclus, those mathematical sciences which are conversant with cognition, do not profit human life, and confer to action, but those only which are engaged in exercise, For those who are ignorant of the reasons of things, but are exercised in particular and sensible experiments, are, in every respect, more excellent for the purposes of human life than those who are employed in contemplation alone.'

The answer which Proclus offered to these objections might, we repeat, have been studied with advantage by Dr. Brown.

'We must confess with Aristotle,' says Proclus, that there are three things which especially cause beauty, both in bodies and souls-I mean order, convenience, and determination. Since