Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation
MIT Press, 1998 - 146 pàgines
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism.
This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind--in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.
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The MindBody Problem Where We Now Are
Supervenience Realization and Emergence
Supervenience Is Not a MindBody Theory
The Layered Model and Mereological Supervenience
Physical Realizationism Explains MindBody Supervenience
The Many Problems of Mental Causation
Three Problems of Mental Causation
Program Explanation and Supervenient Causation
Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?
Levels and Orders
Reduction and Reductionism A New Look
Troubles with Bridge Laws
The Functional Model of Reduction
Functional Properties versus Functional Concepts
Multiple Realization Again
The Supervenience Argument or Descartess Revenge
Searle Fodor and the Supervenience Argument
Blocks Worries about SecondOrder Properties
Mental Causation The Backlash and Free Lunches
The Exclusion Problem
Do Counterfactuals Help?