Greek and Romans, is evident from Cicero's rendering παθος, the word by which the philofophers of Greece expressed it; by perturbatio in Latin. In this sense of the word, paffion cannot be itself a distinct and independent principle of action; but only an occafional degree of vehemence given to those difpofitions, defires, and affections, which are at all times present to the mind of man; and that this is its proper sense, we need no other proof than that paffion has always been conceived to bear analogy to a storm at sea or to a tempeft

in the air.

With respect to the number of paffions of which the mind is fufceptible, different opinions have been held by different authors. Le Brun, a French writer on painting, justly confidering the expreffion of the pafsions as a very important as well as difficult branch of his art, has enumerated no fewer than twenty, of which the figns may be expreffed by the pencil on canvass. That there are so many different states of mind producing different effects which are visible on the features and the gestures, and that those features and geftures ought to be diligently studied by the artist, are truths which cannot be denied; but it is absurd to confider all these different states of mind as passions, since tranquillity is one of them, which is the reverse of paffion.

The common divifion of the passions inte defire and averfion, hope and fear, joy and grief, love and hatred, has been mentioned by every author who has treated of them, and needs no explication; but it is a question of some importance in the philofophy of the human mind, whether these different paffions be each a degree of an original and innate difpofition, distinct from the difpofitions which are respectively the foundations of the other paffions, or only different modifications of one or two general dispositions common to the whole

race.

The former opinion is held by all who build their system of metaphyfics upon a number of diftinct internal senses; and the latter is the opinion of those who, with Locke and Hartley, refolve what is commonly called instinct into an early association of ideas. (See INSTINCT). That without deliberation mankind instantly feel the paffion of fear upon the apprehenfion of danger, and the passion of anger or resentment upon the reception of an injury, are truths which cannot be denied and hence it is inferred, that the feeds of these passions are innate in the mind, and that they are not generated, but only swell to magnitude on the profpect of their respective objects. In support of this argument, it has been observed that children, without any knowledge of their danger, are instinctively afraid on being placed on the brink of a precipice; and that this paffion contributes to their safety long before they acquire, in any degree equal to their neceffities, the exercise of their rational powers. Deliberate anger, caused by a voluntary injury, is acknowledged to be in part founded on reason and reflection; but where anger impels one suddenly to return a blow, even without thinking of doing mischief, the paffion is intinctive. In proof of this, it is observed, that inftinctive anger ger is frequently raised by bodily pain, occafioned even by a steck or a fstone, which instantly becomes an object of resentment, that we are violently

not rational, and therefore it is supposed to be necef sarily instinctive.

With respect to other passions, such as the luft of power, of fame, or of knowledge, innumerable instances, says Dr Reid, occur in life, of men who facrifice to them their ease, their pleasure, and their health. But it is absurd to suppose that men should sacrifice the end to what they defire only as means of promoting that end; and therefore he seems to think that these passions must be innate. To add strength to this reasoning, he obferves, that we may perceive some degree of these principles even in brute animals of the more sagacious kind, who are not thought to defire means for the sake of ends which they have in view.

But it is in accounting for the passions which are disinterested that the advocates for innate principles seem moft completely to triumph. As it is impossible not to feel the passion of pity upon the profpect of a fellow-creature in distress, they argue, that the basis of that passion must be innate; because pity, being at all times more or less painful to the perfon by whom it is felt, and frequently of no use to the person who is its object, it cannot in such instances be the refult of deliberation, but merely the exertion of an original inftinct. The fame kind of reasoning is employed to prove that gratitude is the exercise of an innate principle. That good offices are, by the very conftitution of our nature, apt to produce good will towards the benefactor, in good and bad men, in the savage and in the civilized, cannot surely be denied by any one in the least acquainted with human nature. We are grateful not only to the benefactors of ourselves as indivi duals, but also to the benefactors of our country; and that, too, when we are conscious that from our grati. tude neither they nor we can reap any advantage. Nay, we are impelled to be grateful even when we have reason to believe that the objects of our gratitude know not our exiftence. This paffion cannot be the effect of reasoning, or of affociation founded on reafoning; for, in such cases as those mentioned, there are no principles from which reason can infer the pro-. priety or usefulness of the feeling. That public Spirit, or the affection which we bear to our country, or to any subordinate community of which we are members, is founded on instinct; is deemed so certain, that the man deftitute of this affection, if there be any such, has been pronounced as great a monster as he who has two heads.

All the diftinterested passions are founded on what philosophers have termed benevolent affection. Instead therefore of enquiring into the origin of each passion separately, which would fwell this article to no purpose, let us listen to one of the finest writers as well as ableft reasoners of the age, treating of the origin of benevolent affection, "We may lay it down as at Effays principle (says Dr Reid †), that all benevolent affec-the active tions are in their nature agreeable; that it is essential Powers of to them to defire the good and happiness of their objects; and that their objects must therefore be beinga capable of happiness. A thing may be defired either on its own account, or as the means in order to something else. That only can properly be called an objest of defire which is defired upon its own account;

and

Man.

Paffion, and therefore I consider as benevolent those affections only which defire the good of their object ultimately, and not as means in order to something else. To say that we defire the good of others, only to procure some pleasure or good to ourselves, is to say that there is no benevolent affection in human nature. This indeed has been the opinion of some philosophers both in ancient and in later times. But it appears as unreasonable to resolve all benevolent affections into self-love, as it would be to resolve hunger and thirst into self-love. These appetites are necessary for the preservation of the individual. Benevolent affections are no less necessary for the preservation of society among men; without which men would become an easy prey to the beafts of the field. The benevolent affections planted in human nature, appear therefore no less necessary for the preservation of the human species than the appetites of hunger and thirst." In a word, pity, gratitude, friendship, love, and patriotism, are founded on different benevolent affections; which our learned author holds to be original parts of the human conftitution.

This reasoning has certainly great force; and if authority could have any weight in settling a question of this nature, we know not that name to which greater deference is due than the name of him from whom it is taken. Yet it must be confessed that the philosophers, who confider the affections and passions as early and deep-rooted associations, support their opinion with very plaufible arguments. On their principles we have endeavoured elsewhere to account for the paffions of fear and love, (fee INSTINCT and Love); and we may here safely deny the truth of what has been stated respecting fear, which seems to militate against that account. We have attended with much folicitude to

the actions of children; and have no reason to think that they feel terror on the brink of a precipice till they have been repeatedly warned of their danger in fuch fituations by their parents or their keepers. Every person knows not only that they have no original or inftinctive dread of fire, which is as dangerous to them as any precipice; but that it is extremely difficult to keep them from that destructive element till they are either capable of weighing the force of arguments, or have repeatedly experienced the pain of be. ing burnt by it. With respect to sudden resentment, we cannot help confidering the argument, which is brought in proof of its being instinctive, as proving the contrary in a very forcible manner. Instinct is some mysterious influence of God upon the mind exciting to actions of beneficial tendency: but can any benefit arife from wrecking our impotent vengeance on a stock or a stone? or is it supposable that a Being of infinite wifdom would excite us to actions so extravagantly foolish? We learn from experience to defend ourselves against rational or sensible enemies by retaliating the injuries which they inflict upon us; and if we have been often injured in any particular manner, the idea of that injury becomes in time so closely affociated with the means by which it has been constantly repelled, that we never receive such an injury-a blow for instance-without being prompted to make the usual retaliation, without reflecting whether the object be sensible or insensible. So far from being instinctive does resentment appear to us, that

we think an attentive observer may cafily perceive Paffion. how the seeds of it are gradually infused into the youthful mind; when the child, from being at first a timid creature shrinking from every pain, learns by degrees to return blow for blow and threat for threat.

But instead of urging what appears to ourselves of most weight against the inftinctive system, we shall lay before our readers a few extracts from a dissertation on the Origin of the Passions by a writer whose elegance of language and ingenuity of investigation do honour to the school of Hartley.

physical and

"When an infant is born (fays Dr Sayers *), there * Disquifiis every reason to suppose that he is born without tions Meta. ideas. These are rapidly communicated through the Literary. medium of the senses. The same senses are also the means of conveying to him pleasure and pain. These are the hinges on which the passions turn: and till the child is acquainted with these sensations, it would appear that no paffion could be formed in his mind; for till he has felt pleasure and pain, how can he defire any object, or wish for its removal? How can he either love or hate? Let us observe then the manner in which love and hatred are formed; for on these passions depend all the rest. When a child endures pain, and is able to detect the cause of it, the idea of pain is connected in his mind with that of the thing which produced it; and if the object which occafioned pain be again presented to the child, the idea of pain affociated with it arifes also. This idea consequently urges the child to avoid or to remove the object; and thus arifes the paffion of dislike or hatred. In the fame manner, the passion of liking or love is readily formed in the mind of a child from the affociation of pleasant ideas with certain objects which produced them..

"The passions of hope and fear are states of the mind depending upon the good or bad profpects of gratifying love or hatred; and joy or forrow arises from the final fuccess or disappointment which attends the exertions produced by love or by hatred. Out of these possions, which have all a perceptible relation to our own good, and are universally acknowledged to be selfish, all our other paffions are formed."

To account for the paffions called difinterested, he observes, that in the history of the human mind we find many instances of our dropping an intermediate idea, which has been the means of our connecting two other ideas together; and that the association of thefe two remains after the link which originally united them has vanished. Of this fact the reader will find sufficient evidence in different articles of this work (See INSTINCT, no 19, and METAPHYSICS, n° 101) and, to apply it to the disinterested passions, let us suppose, with Dr Sayers, that any individual has done to us many offices of kindness, and has confequently much contributed to our happiness; it is natural for us to seek with fome anxiety for the continuance of those pleasures which he is able to communicate. But we foon difcern, that the surest way of obtaining the con. tinuance of his friendly offices is to make them, as much as poflible, a fource of pleasure to himself. We therefore do every thing in our power to promote his happiness in return for the good he has conferred upon us, that thus we may attach him to us as much as we are able. Hitherto all is plainly selfish. We have been evidently endeavouring, for the fake of our own fature grati

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