Paffion. gratification, to promote the happin fs of this perfon: but obferve the confequence. We have thus, by contemplating the advantage to be derived to ourselves from promoting the profperity of our friend, learned to affocite a fet of pleafint ideas with his happinefs; but the link which has united them gradually efcapes us, while the union itfelf remains. Continuing to affociate pleasure with the well-being of our friend, we endeavour to promote it for the fake of his immediate gratification, without looking farther; and in this way his happiness, which was firft attended to only as a means of future enjoyment, finally becomes an end. Thus then the paffion which was originally felfish, is at length difinterested; its gratification being completed merely by its fuccefs in promoting the happinefs of another."

In this way does our author account for the origin of gratitude; which at laft becomes a habit, and flows fpontaneously towards every man who has either been of intended to be our benefactor. According to him, it is easy to obferve alfo, that from afficiating pleafure with the happiness of an individual when we procure it ourselves, it muft of course foon follow, that we fhould experience pleafure from a view of his happinefs any way produced; fuch happinefs raifing at all times pleafant ideas when it is prefented to our minds. This is another feature of a difinterefted affection, to feel delight from the mere increase of happiness in the object whom we love.

"It may be objected, perhaps, that parents feem to have an infinitive difinterefted love of their offspring: but furely the love of a parent (4) for a new-born infant is not ufually equal to that for a child of four or five years old. When a child is first born, the profpect and hopes of future pleasure from it are fufficient to make a parent anxious for its prefervation. As the child grows up, the hope of future enjoyment from it muft increase: hence would pleasure be affociated with the well-being of the child, the love of which would of courfe become in due time difinterested."

Our author does not analyse pity, and trace it to its fource in selfishnefs; but he might eafily have done it, and it has been ably done by his mafter. Pity or compaffion is the uneafinefs which a man feels at the mifery of another. It is generated in every mind during the years of childhood; and there are many circumftances in the conftitution of children, and in the mode of their education, which make them particularly fufceptible of this paffion. The very appearance of any kind of mifery which they have experienced, or of any figns of diftrefs which they understand, excite

in their minds painful feelings, from the remembrance Paffion. of what they have fuffered, and the apprehension of their fuffering it again. We have feen a child a year old highly entertained with the noife and struggles made by its elder brother when plunged nake! into a veffel filled with cold water. This continued to be the cafe for many days, till it was thought proper to plunge the younger as well as the elder, after which the daily entertainment was foon at an end. The little creature had not been itself plunged above twice till it ceafed to find diverfion in its brother's fufferings. On the third day it cried with all the fymptoms of the bittereft anguish upon feeing its brother plunged, though no preparation was then made for plunging itfelf: but furely this was not difinterefted fympathy, but a feeling wholly felfish, excited by the remeinbrance of what it had fuffered itfelf, and was appre henfive of fuffering again. In a fhort time, however, the painful feelings accompanying the fight of its brother's ftruggles, and the foun of his cries, were doubtlefs fo affociated with that fight and that found, that the appearance of the latter would have brought the former along with them, even though the child might have been no longer under apprehenfion of a plunging itfelf. This affociation, too, would foon be transferred to every boy in the fame circumstances, and to fimilar founds and struggles, from whatever cause they might proceed.

Man.

Thus, as Dr Hartley obferves §, "when feveral § Observa children are educated together, the pains, the denials tions on of pleafure, and the forrows which affect one, generally extend to all in fome degree, often in an equal one. When their parents, companions, or attendants are fick or afflicted, it is ufual to raise in their minds the nafcent ideas of pains and miferies by fuch words and figns as are fuited to their capacities. They also find themfelves laid under many reftraints, on account of the fickness or affliction of others; and when these and fuch like circumftances have raised in their minds defires to remove the caufes of their own internal feelinga, i. e. to cafe the miseries of others, a variety of internal feelings and defires become so blended and affociated together, as that no part can be diftinguished feparately from the reft, and the child may properly be faid to have compaffion. The fame fources of compaffion remain, though with fome alteration, during our whole progrefs through life. This is fo evident, that a reflecting perfon may plainly difcern the conftituent parts of his compaffion while they are yet the mere internal and, as one may fay, felfith feelings abovementioned; and before they have put on the nature of

com

Paffion. compaffion, by coalefcence with the reft. Agreeably to this method of reafoning, it may be o' ferved, that perfons whose nerves are easily irritable, and thofe who have experienced great trials and afflictions, are in general more difpofed to compaffion than others; and that we are moft apt to pity others in thofe difeafes and calamities which we either have felt or of which we apprehend ourselves to be in danger."

Warbur

* Dr Price's Review, &c.

The origin of patriotifm and public fpirit is thus traced by Dr Sayers: "The pleafures which our country affords are numerous and great. The wifh to perpetuate the enjoyment of thofe pleafures, includes the wish to promote the fafety and welfare of our country, without which many of them would be loft. All this is evidently felfish ; but, as in the progrefs of gratitude, it finally becomes difinterefted. Pleafant ideas are thus ftrongly connected with the welfare of our - country, after the tie which firft bound them together has escaped our notice. The profperity which was at first defirable as the means of future enjoyment, becomes itfelf an end: we feel delight in fuch profperity, however produced; and we look not beyond this immediate delight. It is thus tot difficult to obferve in what manner a general and difinterested benevolence takes place in a mind which has already received plea. fure from the happiness of a few; the tranfition is eafy towards affociating it with happiness in general, with the happiness of any being, whether produced by ourfelves or by any other caufe whatever."

From this reafoning, our author concludes, that all our paffions may be traced up to original feelings of regard for ourselves. "Thus (in the forcible language of a learned writer of the fame school) does felflove, under the varying appearance of natural affection, domeftic relation, and the connections of focial habitude, at firft work blindly on, obfcure and deep, in dirt: But as it makes its way, it continues rifing, till it emerges into light; and then fuddenly expiring, leaves behind it the fairest iffue,"-benevolent affection.

Self-love forfook the path it first purfa'd, And found the private in the public good. Thus have we ftated the two oppofite theories respecting the origin of paffions in the mind, and given our readers a fhort fpecimen of the reafonings by which they are fupported by their refpective patrons. Were we called upon to decide between them, we fhould be tempted to fay, that they have both been carried to extremes by fome of their advocates, and that the truth lies in the middle between them. "It is impof fible but that creatures capable of pleasant and painful fenfations, fhould love and choose the one, and diflike and avoid the other. No being who knows what happiness and mifery are, can be fuppofed indifferent to them, without a plain contradiction. Pain is not a poffible object of defire, nor happiness of averfion." To prefer a greater good though diftant, to a lefs good that is prefent; or to choose a prefent evil, in order to avoid a greater future evil-is indeed wife and rational conduct; but to choose evil ultimately, is abfolutely impoffible. Thus far then muft be admitted, that every being poffeffed of fenfe and intellect, neceffarily defires his own good as foon as he knows what it is; but if this knowledge be not innate, neither can the defire. Every 'human being comes into the world

with a capability of knowledge, and of course with a Pafion. capability of affections, defires, and paffions; but it feems not to be conceivable how he can actually love, or hate, or dread any thing, till he know whether it be good, or ill, or dangerous. If, therefore, we have no innate ideas, we cannot poffibly have innate defires or averfions. Thofe who contend that we have, feem to think, that without them reafon would be infufficient, either for the prefervation of the individual or the continuation of the fpecies; and fome writers have alleged, that if our affections and paffions were the mere refult of early affociations, they would neceffarily be more capricious than we ever find them. But this objection feems to arife from their not rightly underftanding the theory of their antagonists. The difci ples of Locke and Hartley do not fuppofe it poffible for any man in fociety to prevent fuch affociations from being formed in his mind as fhall neceffarily produce defires and averfions; far lefs do they think it poffible to form affociations of ideas utterly repugnant, fo as to defire that as good which his fenfes and intellect have experienced to be evil. Affociations are formed by the very fame means, and at the very fame time, that ideas and notions are impreffed upon the mind; but as pain is never mistaken for pleasure by the fenfes, fo an object which has given us only pain, is never affociated with any thing that makes it defirable. We say an object that has given us only pain, because it is poffible to form fuch an affociation between life and the lofs of a limb, as to make us grateful to the furgeon by whom it was amputated. Affociations being formed according to the fame laws by which knowledge is acquired, it by no means follows that paffions refulting from them fhould be more capricious than they are found to be; and they certainly are fufficiently capricious to make us fufpect that the greater part of them has this origin, rather than that they are all infufed into the mind by the immediate agency of the Creator. If man be a being formed with no innate ideas, and with no other inftinctive principles of action than what are abfolutely neceffary to preferve his existence and perpetuate the fpecies, it is eafy to perceive why he is placed in this world as in a flate of probation, where he may acquire habits of virtue to fit him for a.better. It is likewife eafy to perceive why fome men are better than others, and why fome are the flaves of the moft criminal paffions. But all this is unintelligible, upon the fuppofition that the feeds of every paffion are innate, and that man is a compound of reafon and of instincts fo numerous and various as to fuit every circumftance in which he can be placed.

If paflions, whatever be their origin, operate inftantaneously, and if they be formed according to fixed laws, it may be thought a question of very little importance whether they be inftinctive or acquired.This was long our own opinion; but we think, that upon maturer reflection we have feen reason to change it. If paffions be the refult of early affociations, it is of the utmost confequence that no improper- affociations be formed in the minds of children, and that none of their unreasonable defires be gratified. Upon this theory it feems indeed to depend almoft wholly upon education, whether a child shall become a calm, benevolent, fteady, and upright man; or a paffionate, ca

pricious,

ftrangers, we are left in the dark; and yet we are not Paffion. puzzled about the meaning of these external expreffions in a ftranger, more than in a bofom-companion. Further, had we no other means but experience for understanding the external figns of paffion, we could not expect any uniformity, nor any degree of skill, in the bulk of individuals: yet matters are fo much bet ter ordered, that the external expreffions of paffion form a language understood by all, by the young as well as the old, by the ignorant as well as the learned: We talk of the plain and legible characters of that language; for undoubtedly we are much indebted to experience, in deciphering the dark and more delicate expreffions. Where then shall we apply for a solution of this intricate problem, which feems to penetrate deep into human nature? Undoubtedly if the mean. ing of external figns be not derived to us from fight, nor from experience, there is no remaining fource whence it can be derived but from nature.

Paffiou. pricious, felfish, mifcreant. By teaching him to refent every petty injury, the feeds of irafcibility are fown in his mind, and take fuch root, that before the age of manhood he becomes intolerable to all with whom he muft converfe. By exciting numberiefs de fires in his youthful mind, and inftantly gratifying them, you make him capricious, and impatient of difappointment; and by reprefenting other children as in any degree inferior to him, you infpire him with the hateful paffion of pride. According to the inftinctive theory, education can only augment or diminish the ftrength of paffions; according to the other theory, it is the fource of by far the greater part of them. On either fuppofition, parents fhould watch with folicitude over the actions of their children; but they will furely think themselves obliged to be doubly watchful, if they believe, that through their neglect their children may ac quire hateful paffions, to which, if properly educated, they might have remained ftrangers thro' their whole lives. And let it be remembered, that this folicitude fhould begin at an early period; because the mind is fufceptible of deep affociations much fooner than is fometimes imagined. Without this fufceptibility, no language could be learned; and therefore a child by the time he learns to speak, may have planted in his mind the feeds of paffions, on the juft regulation and fubordination of which depends in a great measure the happiness of mankind. See MORAL Philofophy, Part I. Chap. 1, & 2. Part III. n° 216.

PASSIONS and Emotions, difference between them. See EMOTIONS and Paffions.

External Signs of Emotions and PASSIONS. So intimately connected are the foul and hody, that every agitation in the former produces a vifible effect up on the latter. There is, at the fame time, a wonderful uniformity in that operation; cach clafs of emotions and paffions being invariably attended with an external appearance peculiar to itself. These external appearances, or figns, may not improperly be confi dered as a natural language, expreffing to all beholders emotions and paffions as they arife in the heart. Hope, fear, joy, grief, are difplayed externally the character of a man can be read in his face; and beauty, which makes fo deep an impreffion, is known to refult, not so much from regular features and a fine complexion, as from good-nature, goedfenfe, fprightlinefs, fweetnefs, or other mental quality, expreffed upon the countenance. Though perfet fkill in that language be rare, yet what is generally known is fufficient for the ordinary purposes of life. But by what means we come to understand the language, is a point of fomne intricacy. It cannot be by fight merely; for upon the most attentive infpection of the Luman vifage, all that can be difcerned are, figure, colour, and motion, which, fingly or combined, never can reprefent a paffion nor a fentiment: the external fign is indeed vifible; but to understand its meaning, we must be able to connect it with the paffion that caufes it; an operation far beyond the reach of eye-fight. Where then is the inftructor to be found that can unveil this fecret connection? If we apply to experience, it is yielded, that from long and diligent obfervation, we may gather, in fome meafure, in what manner thofe we are acquainted with exprefs their paffions externally: but with refpect to

Elements

We may then venture to pronounce, with fome degree of confidence, that man is provided by nature of Criticif with a fenfe or faculty that lays open to him every paffion by means of its external expreffions. And we cannot entertain any reasonable doubt of this, when we reflect, that the meaning of external figns is not hid even from infants: an infant is remarkably affected with the paffions of its nurfe expreffed on her countenance; a fmile cheers it, a frown makes it afraid but fear cannot be without apprehending danger; and what danger can the infant apprehend, unless it be fenfible that its nurse is angry? We must therefore admit, that a child can read anger in its rurfe's face; of which it must be fenfible intuitively, for it has no other mean of knowledge. We do not affirm, that these particulars are clearly apprehended by the child; for to produce clear and diftinct perceptions, reflection and experience are requifite: but that even an infant, when afraid, must have fome notion of its being in danger, is evident.

That we fhould be confcious intuitively of a paffion from its external expreffions, is conformable to the analogy of nature: the knowledge of that language is of too great importance to be left upon experience; because a foundation fo uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obftacle to the formation of focieties. Wifely therefore is it ordered, and agreeably to the fyftem of providence, that we should have nature for our inftructor.

Such is the philofophy of Lord Kames, to which objections unanfwerable may be made. It is part of the inftinctive fyftem of metaphyfics, which his Lordship has carried farther than all who wrote before him, and perhaps farther than all who have fucceeded him in this department of fcience. That a child intuitively reads anger in its nurfe's face, is fe far from being true, that for fome short time after birth it is not terrified by the moft menacing geftures. It is indeed abfolutely incapable of fear till it has fuffered pain, (fee INSTINCT); and could we constantly carefs it with what is called an angry look, it would be cheered by that look, and frightened at a fmile. It feels, however, the effects of anger, and is foon capable of obferving the peculiarity of feature with which that paffion is ufually accompanied; and thefe two become in a fhort time fo linked together in its tender mind,

that

Pallion. that the appearance of the one neceffarily fuggefts to it the reality of the other.

Locke.

Should it be faid that a loud and fudden noife ftartles a child immediately after birth, and that, therefore, the infant must be instinctively afraid, the fact may be admitted, without any neceffity of admitting the inference. The nerves of an infant are commonly very irritable, and the ftrong impulfe on the auditory nerves may agitate its whole frame, without infpiring it with the paffion of fear. The loud noife is, in all probability, not the fign of approaching danger, but the immediate caufe of real pain, from which the infant fhrinks, as it would from the prick of a pin, or the fcorching of a candle. But we have faid enough in the article immediately preceding, and in others which are there quoted, to fhow how the paffions may be formed by affociations even in early infancy, and yet operate as if they were inftinctive. This being the cafe, we shall through the remainder of this article fuffer his Lordship to fpeak his own language, with out making any further remarks upon it. We are induced to do this for two reafons; of which the first is, that many of our readers will probably prefer his theory to ours; and the fecond is, that his conclufions refpecting the figns and language of paffion hold equally good from either theory.

We perfectly agree with him, that manifold and admirable are the purposes to which the external figns of paffion are made fubfervient by the Author

of our nature.

1. The figns of internal agitation difplayed externally to every fpectator, tend to fix the fignification of many words. The only effectual means to afcertain the meaning of any doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it reprefents: and hence the ambiguity of words expreffive of things that are not objects of external fenfe; for in that cafe an appeal is denied. Paffion, Atrictly speaking, is not an object of external fenfe: but its external figns are: and by means of thefe figns, paffions may be appealed to with tolerable accuracy: thus the words that denote our paffions, next to those that denote external objects, have the moft diftinct meaning. Words fignifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are lefs diftinct. This defect, with regard to internal action, is what chiefly occafons the intricacy of logic: the terms of that science are far from being fufficiently afcertained, even after much care and labour beftowed by an eminent writer*; to whom, however, the world is greatly indebted, for removing a mountain of rubbish, and moulding the fubject into a rational and correct form. The fame defect is remarkable in criticism, which has for its ob. ject the more delicate feelings; the terms that denote thefe feelings being not more diftinct than thofe of logic.

2. Society among individuals is greatly promoted by that univerfal language. Looks and geftures give direct access to the heart; and lead us to felect, with tolerable accuracy, the persons who are worthy of our confidence. It is furprifing how quickly, and for the moft part how correctly, we judge of character from external appearance.

3. After focial intercourfe is commenced, thefe external figna, which diffufe through a whole affembly the feelings of each individual, contribute above all

other means to improve the focial affections. Lan- Paffion. guage, no doubt, is the most comprehenfive vehicle for communicating emotions: but in expedition, as well as in power of conviction, it falls fhort of the figns under confideration; the involuntary figns especially, which are incapable of deceit. Where the countenance, the tones, the geftures, the actions, join with the words in communicating emotions, thefe united have a force irrefiftible. Thus all the pleasant emo. tions of the human heart, with all the focial and virtuous affections, are, by means of these external figns, not only perceived, but felt. By this admirable contrivance, converfation becomes that lively and animating amufement, without which life would at best be infipid: one joyful countenance spreads cheerfulnefs inftantaneously through a multitude of fpectators.

4. Diffocial paffions, being hurtful by prompting violence and mischief, are noted by the moft confpicuous external figns, in order to put us upon our guard: thus anger and revenge, efpecially when fudden, difplay themselves on the countenance in legible characters. The external figns, again, of every paffion that threatens danger, raife in us the paffion of fear : which frequently operating without reafon or reflection, moves us by a fudden impulfe to avoid the impending danger.

5. Thefe external figns are remarkably fubfervient to morality. A painful paffion, being accompanied with difagreeable external figns, muft produce in every fpectator a painful emotion: but then, if the paffion be focial, the emotion it produces is attractive, and connects the fpectator with the perfon who fuffers. Diffocial paffions only are productive of repulfive emotions, involving the fpectator's averfion, and frequently his indignation. This artful contrivance makes us cling to the virtuous, and abhor the wicked.

6. Of all the external figns of paffion, thofe of af fliction or diftrefs are the moft illuftrious with refpe&t to a final caufe, and defervedly merit a place of diftinction. They are illuftrious by the fingularity of their contrivance; and alfo by infpiring fympathy, az paffion to which human fociety is indebted for itsgreatest bleffing, that of providing relief for the diftreffed. A fubject fo interefting deferves a leifurely and attentive examination. The conformity of the nature of man to his external circumstances is in every particular wonderful: his nature makes him prone to fociety; and fociety is neceffary to his well-being, becaufe in a folitary ftate he is a helpless being, defti. tute of fupport, and in his diftreffes deftitute of relief: but mental fupport, the shining attribute of fociety, is of too great moment to be left depen dent upon cool reafon; it is ordered more wifely, and with greater conformity to the analogy of nature, that it fhould be enforced even inftinctively by the paffion of fympathy. Here fympathy makes a capital figure; and contributes, more than any other means, to make life eafy and comfortable. But however effential the fympathy of others may be to our wellbeing, one beforehand would not readily conceive how it could be raised by external signs of diftrefs: for fidering the analogy of nature, if thefe figns be agree able, they muft give birth to a pleasant emotion leading every beholder to be pleased with human woes: if disagreeable, as they undoubtedly are, ought they not

con

naturally

well known, that paffion hath alfo an influence upon Paffion. our perceptions, opinions, and belief. For example, the opinions we form of men and things are generally directed by affection: An advice given by a man of figure hath great weight; the fame advice from one in a low condition is defpifed or neglected: a man of courage under-rates danger; and to the indolent the flighteft obftacle appears unfurmountable. All this may be accounted for by the fimple principle of affo ciation.

Paffion. naturally to repel the fpectator from them, in order to be relieved from pain? Such would be the reafoning beforehand; and fuch would be the effect were man purely a felfish being. But the benevolence of our nature gives a very different direction to the painful paffion of fympathy, and to the defire involved in it: inftead of avoiding diftrefs, we fly to it in order to afford relief; and our fympathy cannot be other wife gratified but by giving all the fuccour in our power. Thus external figns of diftrefs, though difa greeable, are attractive: and the fympathy they infpire is a powerful caufe, impelling us to afford relief even to a ftranger, as if he were our friend or relation..

It is a noted obfervation, that the deepest tragedies are the molt crowded: which in an overly view will be thought an unaccountable bias in human nature. Love of novelty, defire of occupation, beauty of action, make us fond of theatrical reprefentations; and when once engaged, we must follow the story to the conclufion, whatever diftrefs it may create. But we generally become wife by experience; and when we forefee what pain we fhall fuffer during the courfe of the reprefentation, is it not furprifing that perfons of reflection do not avoid fuch spectacles altogether? And yet one who has fearce recovered from the diftrefs of a deep tragedy, refolves coolly and deliberately to go to the very next, without the flightest obstruction from felf-love. The whole myftery is explained by a fingle obfervation: That fympathy, though painful, is attractive; and attaches us to an object in diftrefs, instead of prompting us to fly from it. And by this curious mechanifm it is, that perfons of any degree of fenfibility are attracted by affliction ftill more than by joy.

To conclude: the external figns of paffion are a ftrong indication, that man, by his very conftitution, is framed to be open and fincere. A child, in all things obedient to the impulfes of nature, hides none of its emotions; the favage and clown, who have no guide but pure nature, expofe their hearts to view, by giving way to all the natural figns. And even when men learn to diffemble their fentiments, and when behaviour degenerates into art, there ftill remain checks, that keep diffi nulation within bounds, and prevent a great part of its mifchievous effects: the total fuppreffion of the voluntary figns during any vivid paffion, begets the utmoft uneafinefs, which cannot be endured for any confiderable time: this operation becomes indeed lefs painful by habit; but luckily the involuntar figns cannot, by any effort, be fuppreffed nor even diffembled. An abfolute hypocrify, by which the character is concealed and a fictitious one affumed, is made impracticable; and nature has thereby prevented much harm to fociety. We may pronounce, therefore, that Niture, herself fincere and candid, intends that mankind thould preferve the fame character, by cultiva ting fimplicity and truth, and banishing every fort of diffimulation that tends to mifchief.

Influence of PASSION with refpect to our Perceptions, Opinions, and Belief. So intimately are our perceptions, paffions, and actions, connected, it would be wonderful if they fhould have no mutual influence. That our actions are too much influenced by paflion, is a known truth; but it is not lefs certain, though not fo

I

There is no truth more univerfally known, than that tranquillity and sedateness are the proper ftate of mind for accurate perception and cool deliberation ; and for that reason, we never regard the opinion even of the wifeft man, when we discover prejudice or paffion behind the curtain. Paffion hath fuch influence over us, as to give a falfe light to all its objects. A. greeable paffions prepoffefs the mind in favour of their objects; and difagreeable paffions, not lefs against their objects: A woman is all perfection in her lover's opinion, while in the eye of a rival beauty fhe is aukward and difagreeable: when the paffion of love is gone, beauty vanishes with it;-nothing is left of that genteel motion, that fprightly converfation, those numberlefa graces, which formerly, in the lover's opinion, charmed all hearts. To a zealot every one of his own fect is a faint, while the most upright of a different sect are to him children of perdition: the talent of speak. ing in a friend, is more regarded than prudent conduct in any other. Nor will this furprise any one acquainted with the world; our opinions, the refult frequently of various and complicated views, are commonly fo flight and wavering, as readily to be fufceptible of a bias from paffion.

With that natural bias another circumstance concurs, to give paffion an undue influence on our opi nions and belief; and that is a strong tendency in our nature to justify our paffions as well as our actions, not to others only, but even to ourselves. That tendency is peculiarly remarkable with respect to disagreeable paffions: by its influence, objects are magnified or leffened, circumftances fupplied or fuppreffed, every thing coloured and disguised, to answer the end of juftification. Hence the foundation of felf deceit, where a man impofes upon himfelf innocently, and even without fufpicion of a bias.

We proceed to illuftrate the foregoing obfervations by proper examples.

Gratitude, when warm, is often exerted upon the children of the benefactor; especially where he is temoved out of reach by death or abfence. The paffion in this cafe being exerted for the fake of the benefac tor, requires no peculiar excellence in his children: but the practice of doing good to these children produces affection for them, which never fails to advance them in our efteem. By fuch means, ftrong connections of affection are often formed among individuals, upon the flight foundation now mentioned.

Envy is a paffion, which, being altogether unjustifiable, cannot be excufed but by difguiling it under fome plaufible name. At the fame time, no paffion is more eager than envy to give its object a difagreeable appearance it magnifies every bad quality, and fixes on the most humbling circumftances:

Caffius.