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Ar the present moment public interest in the programme of shipbuilding for the Royal Navy is greater than it has been since the Naval Defence Act of 1889 was introduced. Many circumstances have contributed to this re-awakening. Determined efforts are being made by Germany to produce a formidable war-fleet; the Law of 1900 has been amended and supplemented by successive laws, culminating in the great programme approved by the Reichstag at the commencement of the present year. Concurrently with this abnormal activity in Germany there has occurred a considerable diminution in the British Vote for new construction, and a reduction in the number of warships laid down. Every student of naval affairs is familiar with the reasons given by the Government for this temporary slackening in our rate of shipbuilding. They are twofold: first, it is claimed and universally admitted that, at present, British naval supremacy is well assured, and that the margin of our naval power is ample; second, that it has been intended to give practical proof of the desire of the British Government and people

VOL. LXIV-No 332

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to encourage a limitation of expenditure on armaments, so far as can be done without prejudice to that indisputable superiority on the sea,' which is of vital necessity to the existence and well-being of the Empire. The Hague Conference having demonstrated the hoplessness of reaching an agreement in regard to such a limitation, and in view of the determined action of Germany and its effects upon the shipbuilding programmes of other countries, the question now naturally arises whether or not the time has arrived for taking corresponding action here, and embarking without delay on a large and necessarily costly programme of new construction. In some quarters it has been asserted that the delay has already been too long continued, that risks have been incurred which can be remedied only by urgent and special measures, and that if this is not done at once our naval supremacy will disappear three or four years hence. In support of this view it is pointed out that since March 1907 Germany has laid down seven battleships and three armoured cruisers of the largest size and most powerful types, whereas our shipbuilding programmes for the last two financial years have included only four battleships and one cruiser of comparable types. Moreover, the German programme, as recently amended, provides for laying down in each of the three years 1909-11 three battleships and one armoured cruiser, and for meeting the large further increase in expenditure consequent thereon. In 1904-5 the German Vote for new construction and armaments was (in round figures) 4,645,000%. ; in the current financial year it is 8,366,400l.; and for 1909-10 is to be 10,988,000l. On the other hand, the British Vote for new construction and armaments, which exceeded 13,500,000l. in 1904–5, has gradually fallen to 8,660,000l. this financial year, and is lower than it has been during the present century. The average British Vote for ten years has been about 10,600,000l.

These and other figures have been freely used for the purpose of awakening public sentiment and securing prompt action in laying down a considerable number of new ships. The balance of opinion on the subject, so far as can be judged from a persual of many articles and speeches, is that at least six and possibly seven battleships, exceeding in dimensions and fighting powers any existing vessels, ought to be laid down at an early date, and pressed forward rapidly to completion in order to make our naval position secure in 1912. The total outlay involved in this programme would be from twelve to fourteen millions sterling, and it is urged that it should be finished within two and a half years. There are large outstanding liabilities on vessels of various classes now in process of construction, and the proposed additional programme would necessitate, therefore, a great increase in the Vote for shipbuilding and armaments in 1909-10 and the following financial year. In addition, there are considerable increases in naval expenditure-more or less automatic in character,

and therefore unavoidable-which must be provided for next year, as was explained in detail by the writer in the April number of this Review. In these circumstances it is of extreme importance to examine closely the reasons which have been advanced in support of this new shipbuilding programme. Everyone will agree that if the additions to our fleet are really necessary they must be provided at all costs. The incident will be regrettable, but if the need exists it must be met, and no good purpose can be served by spending time and thought in ascertaining who may have been responsible for the unsatisfactory conditions which make this 'spurt' in shipbuilding imperatively necessary. On the other hand, unless there is an absolute necessity for an immediate increase in our naval force, it is preferable not to commence so many ships simultaneously, and to concentrate such great expenditure within a very limited period. From the national point of view it is desirable to approximate more closely to a uniform rate of expenditure; from the industrial point of view it is preferable to maintain a fairly constant and regular flow of orders for warships and their

armaments.

In passing, allusion may be made to an argument that has been put forward lately in favour of large immediate orders for warships, on the ground that this action would relieve, to some extent, the prevailing depression and unemployment in the shipbuilding, engineering, and steel-making industries of Great Britain; while it would enable contracts to be placed at low prices. This statement is unquestionably true, but it might be applied equally well to many other classes of Government orders. While sympathising heartily with industries which would be benefited by an immediate commencement of a considerable number of warships, the writer is of opinion. that their claims to consideration are not special or pre-eminent as compared with other industries. The subject should be dealt with as a whole if dealt with at all; and there must be consideration and decision of the nature and extent of the aid which the Government should or ought to give towards the employment of labour in periods of industrial depression.

The fundamental question to be examined in connexion with British programmes for warship-building, including that for 1909-10, is, What is necessary for the defence of the Empire and the maintenance of our naval supremacy? The responsibility for dealing with this matter rests upon the Government, acting under the advice of the Admiralty, and in many technical matters under the special guidance of naval members of the Board. The writer has no intention to join the ranks of the naval experts' who have been freely tendering advice in regard to the number and types of new ships which ought to be laid down without delay. His long experience of official life and responsibility convinces him that any such action on his

part would be undesirable and unnecessary. On the other hand, he is of opinion that the case presented to the public recently by advocates of a great shipbuilding programme has been exaggerated, and that the comparisons of British and foreign fleets which have been made have been in some respects misleading. It is proposed, therefore, in this article to draw attention to certain facts that appear to have been either misunderstood or overlooked, although their due and fair consideration is essential to a correct appreciation of the existing naval situation.

On the 12th of November, the Prime Minister-in answer to a question of Mr. Lee (formerly Civil Lord of the Admiralty)-stated in the House of Commons that the Government accepted the two-Power standard of naval strength, as meaning a preponderance of ten per cent. over the combined strengths in capital ships of the two next strongest Powers.' Mr. Asquith then confirmed the adherence of the present Government to a formula which has been adopted by successive Governments during the last twenty years. Lord Tweedmouth had made a similar announcement during the naval debate in the House of Lords on the 18th of March, and other members of the Government on different occasions have said the same thing. Apart from these public declarations of policy, it is obvious that the responsibility for fixing the proper standard for the naval and military forces of the Empire must always rest upon the Government of the day. In some quarters, however, there has been a confusion of ideas on this matter, and it has been assumed that responsibility for fixing this standard, although nominally resting on the Government, is really borne by the Board of Admiralty. The true function of that Board is to advise the Government in regard to the numbers and types of ships which are required to be added to the existing fleet from time to time, in order that the standard laid down by the Government may be secured. The members of the Board are responsible for the arrangement and execution of shipbuilding programmes, as well as for the training of the personnel, the organisation and discipline of the Royal Navy, the maintenance of the fleet in an efficient condition, and all other matters which affect its readiness and fitness for war. These duties are sufficiently varied and onerous to tax severely the ability and energy of the members of any Board of Admiralty, and especially of the naval members. The professional and technical business of the Admiralty is distributed amongst the members by the First Lord, and may be varied at his discretion. Of course the limitation of official responsibility does not preclude individual members of the Board of Admiralty from forming and expressing opinions as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the standard of naval force laid down by the Government under which they are serving. When that standard has been publicly declared, as is the case at present, there is also no bar to the free expression

of opinion as to its sufficiency by any naval officer or British citizen. In fact, instances are not lacking in which the condemnation of an officially accepted standard by educated public opinion has led to its modification. The two-Power standard, however, runs no risk of revision at present.

It is interesting to note that this standard was proposed by a Committee of three distinguished admirals appointed in 1888 to consider and report on the naval manœuvres of that year. The members of the Committee were Sir William Dowell, Sir Vesey Hamilton, and Sir Frederick Richards (now Admiral of the Fleet). Their report was remarkable in many respects, and it bore fruit subsequently in the well-considered and far-reaching policy which was carried into practical effect during the long and distinguished service of Sir Frederick Richards as First Naval Lord. In these days of shortlived memories it may be permitted to quote the following passage:

If England could consistently with national honour' control the question of peace or war there would be no need for haste in bringing up her naval force to the standard required for insuring, under Providence, a successful issue to a struggle for the freedom of the seas; but, as there seems nothing to support the belief that she would have any option in the matter, when it suited another great Power to challenge her maritime position, we are decidedly of opinion that no time should be lost in placing her Navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers. Without particularising her possible antagonist, there can be no doubt but that, were England involved in a maritime war, and she were to resume her natural rights as a belligerent-which appear to have been voluntarily laid aside by the Declaration of Paris in 1856-complications with neutral States would inevitably ensue, and her whole commercial position and the immense carrying trade by which it is sustained would be jeopardised at the outset, were war to be forced upon her at a time when her Navy was weak. No other nation has any such interest in the maintenance of an undoubted superiority at sea as has England, whose seaboard is her frontier.

England ranks among the great Powers of the world by virtue of the naval position she has acquired in the past, and which has never been seriously challenged since the close of the last great war. The defeat of her Navy means to her the loss of India and her Colonies, and of her place among the nations. Without any desire to question the sums annually granted by Parliament for the maintenance of the services, we cannot but note the disproportion in the appropriation when the magnitude of the issues involved is taken into consideration. It would, in our opinion, be far more in consonance with the requirements of the nation by the provision of an adequate fleet to render invasion an impossibility, than to enter into costly arrangements to meet an enemy on our shores (instead of destroying his 'Armadas' off our shores); for, under the conditions in which it would be possible for a great Power to successfully invade England, nothing could avail her; as, the command of the sea once being lost, it would not require the landing of a single man upon her shores to bring her to an ignominious capitulation, for by her Navy she must stand or fall.

In 1888, and for many years after, the two-Power standard possessed a very real meaning and remained unquestioned. France and Russia owned the two most powerful war-fleets, were in practical alliance, and adjusted their shipbuilding programmes in such a fashion as to

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