during the last five years as regards the solution of the Macedonian question, the immediate and direct cause of the present crisis. It is very evident, now that it is too late, that had this question been solved by the Powers, neither Bulgaria nor Austria-Hungary would have ventured in the present case to take independent action. Everybody is aware that certain of the Powers were in reality, for various reasons, not anxious for a solution; and this proves that the Berlin Treaty, for whose maintenance intact they were all responsible, had in fact already become a dead letter. That is to say, events had proved that the task which Europe undertook when framing this treaty was beyond her resources at an epoch when civilisation was developing with such rapidity in the Balkan Peninsula. ་ La force prime le droit.' Had Austria and Bulgaria not possessed powerful armies they would not have cared to risk incurring the displeasure of the Concert. It has become usual to minimise the importance of the Dual Monarchy in foreign questions owing to the existence of serious internal dissensions. It is now seen that on a foreign question of serious moment the Crown can rely upon a united army; the possession of this formidable armed force has enabled Austria to carry out a strong policy. In a similar way Bulgaria has ventured to realise her ambition to become an independent monarchy because she possesses a well-equipped and, in proportion to her population, large army, in which every able-bodied man is anxious to serve his country. That it was ungenerous to seize the moment when the institutions of Turkey were in a state of transition cannot be denied; but it must be remembered that one of the reforms most prominently announced by the New Party was the reorganisation of the military forces, and it was perhaps too much to expect that international chivalry should go so far as to induce the smaller State to wait until her big adversary was perchance ready to take the offensive and to endeavour to reoccupy Eastern Roumelia. By the Peace of St. Stephano, which brought the Russo-Turkish War to an end in 1878, Eastern Roumelia was assigned to Bulgaria as an integral part of the Principality. But the Treaty of Berlin, which followed immediately, nullified this arrangement, and the province remained under Turkish rule. The Christian inhabitants were by no means satisfied, however, and in response to their appeals Bulgaria occupied the country in 1885; an agreement was then drawn up between Turkey and the Powers under which the ruler of Bulgaria has since administered Eastern Roumelia. Though it is to all intents and purposes a part of Bulgaria, Turkey, had she desired to raise the question, might with some show of reason have maintained that the international status of Roumelia was still that of an autonomous Turkish province, and have claimed that the constitutional reform recently achieved in Constantinople entitled her to resume its administration. It is generally admitted that the injury inflicted upon Turkey has been entirely moral, for she has lost no territory over which she exercised direct authority, while she has obtained the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, a very considerable advantage. It is most satisfactory that she has behaved with admirable calm and patriotism, and that no weakening of the New Party is apparent as the result of recent events. Other States have been deterred from asserting their pretensions solely by their military weakness. Servia, whose hopes of expansion have been in large measure frustrated, has naturally been the loudest in her protests. Her claims, however, to an eventual aggrandisement through the acquisition of part of the provinces which have just passed to Austria are based upon no more solid grounds than that their Slav population is of Servian extraction. Such a reason as the affinity of races has never yet been admitted when considering the solution of the Macedonian question. In the case of Servia, again, we see how force is the main factor; for could she dispose of an army equal to that of Bulgaria, she would have long since marched westwards and given Austria more trouble than she cared for to repel her. The Turkish Empire, at the moment of its greatest expansion some five centuries ago, held the whole of the vast peninsula from the Mediterranean and Adriatic to the Black Sea, stretching northwards to the gates of Vienna, where the Ottoman advance was at length checked by Western Europe. While compelled gradually to retire the Turks still held for a long time all the country from the Mediterranean, northwards, as far as and including modern Servia and Roumania, and embracing Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Though conquered, however, the national spirit of the original inhabitants of these lands was not extinguished, and found its opportunity in the gradual decay and weakening of Turkey. Greece, greatly aided by British sympathy, was the first to earn her independence by the war of 1821-9. By the Treaty of Berlin, signed in July 1878, the independence of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania was formally recognised, and each received a considerable accession of territory; while Bulgaria became an autonomous Principality, owning only a nominal allegiance to the Sultan. It is clear, therefore, that the process of the disintegration of Turkey was attended by a corresponding increase in the degree of independence granted to countries which, after being at one time integral parts of the Ottoman dominion, won first the relative independence of autonomous provinces and finally achieved the freedom of sovereign States. In the case of Bulgaria it could but be expected that history would repeat itself, as soon as she had gathered the necessary strength to enforce her will and to strike out to free herself. It has perhaps been too hastily assumed in some quarters that the motive of Austria, in proclaiming the final annexation of territories VOL. LXIV-No. 381 3 C already practically her own in everything but name, was to cast discredit upon the new Turkish administration, and, by weakening its prestige, to pave the way for the re-establishment of the corrupt and weak autocracy. This policy would, however, be short-sighted, inasmuch as a strong Turkey, while never a danger to Austria herself, might some day be of no little value to her in aiding her to resist the pressure of other Powers. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that Austria's policy has been quite other, and that it has been directed against the Southern Pan-Slav union. It is notorious that there has been for many years past a widespread movement amongst the Slavs south of the Danube, of whom there are at least some twelve millions when the Bulgarians, Servians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Montenegrins, and Croatians are included, towards a union of interests, whilst each separate State maintained autonomy. Austria has been well aware of the danger which such a combination would have created for her at a moment in the future when, perhaps, she might have to face internal complications coupled with grave external troubles; the policy followed at the present crisis has indefinitely postponed, if it has not rendered entirely impossible, the realisation of these Slav hopes. By the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral parts of the Empire a wedge is driven between Servia to the east and Montenegro and Croatia to the west and north. Bulgaria, also, has alienated more than ever the friendship of Servia and Montenegro by the advantage she has gained; and, her present ambition satisfied, she will not be disposed to embark on a policy of adventure merely with the object of assisting her Balkan Slav rivals. The withdrawal of her troops from Novi Bazar is strong testimony that Austria has no designs against Turkey. The suggestion that German interests have been advanced by the recent annexation and declaration of independence will not bear examination. Germany's influence in the Near East has, on the contrary, received a decided check, for Turkey no longer feels the same friendship and confidence; the greatest sufferers, Montenegro and Servia, are anxious to take any opportunity which may arise; whilst Bulgaria, no more friendly in reality to German influence in Macedonia than heretofore, holds ready her powerful army to assist in driving back a German advance which might seek in the future to clear the way to Salonika. The net result of recent events in the Near East, therefore, if no fresh complications arise, is that the aspirations for a Southern PanSlav union and German influence in the Balkans have received a considerable check; Turkey gains a material advantage in the withdrawal of the Austrian troops; the prospects of a better understanding between Turkey and her northern neighbours are improved; and the chances of a pacific settlement of the Macedonian question are far greater than at any time since the Powers began, now more than five years ago, actively to interfere in the administration of that province. If, and when, a European Conference assembles its first duty will be to take stock of the actual situation in the Balkans, of the growth of national life in Bulgaria, and of the progress which that country has made in civilisation, in education, and, let it be added, in the art of war. It will have to say whether Bulgaria has not vindicated her right to independence and to take her place among the sovereign nations of Europe. The Bulgarians are a small people, but they have all the elements of greatness, a love of liberty, a love of knowledge, capabilities of self-government, and capabilities also to make great sacrifices to retain what they have won. Europe, and least of all Great Britain, cannot pretend for ever to keep them in leading-strings. The Treaty of Berlin has served its purpose, tant bien que mal; the time has come for the revision of its provisions in the face of new conditions. PERCY H. H. MASSY. THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST III. EUROPE AND THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION: It was at the very outset of the recent events in the Near East that the public opinion of Europe betrayed an uncommon degree of ignorance and want of experience in political and social matters in connexion with the problem before us. To begin with, the great surprise caused by the success of the Young Turkey party is quite incomprehensible. It was in 1864 that I met by chance a few young Turkish gentlemen, engaged upon editing a revolutionary paper, called Mukhbir, i.e. The Correspondent,' directed against the then almighty Aali Pashi, whose absolutist tendencies had long ago raised the anger of the younger Turkish generation, who were brought by a smattering of Western political views into collision with the ruling spirit at the Sublime Porte. As time advanced the opposition grew stronger and stronger, and the object of their attack was not only single high dignitaries, but their criticism extended also to the precincts of the imperial palace, whose officials were accused of all kind of vices and misdeeds, and particularly of leading astray the sacred person of the Padishah, whom, at that time, nobody ventured to assail. It is very natural that after the death of Sultan Abdul Aziz, and during the terribly absolutist and ruinous rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid, the number of the Young Turkish party should have attained excessive dimensions and embraced not only the easily inflammable young members of the Turkish society, but even many of the Efendis and Pashas of a riper age; nay, ladies and young girls took part in secret societies, and as an occasional contributor to Turkish revolutionary papers, and as a well-known friend to the Turkish nation, I have got letters in my possession in which ladies render thanks for my sympathies shown to their nation and encourage me to further participation in their cause. Considering the very faint knowledge the Yildiz camarilla could acquire in spite of the host of dearly paid spies and delators, we must not wonder at all that the Western world remained in utter darkness with regard to the part played by Young Turkey in the Ottoman Empire. The number of Turkish revolutionary papers had grown up like mushrooms, their editors expelled from one |