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following dates approximately: Minas Geraes, September-November 1909; São Paulo, December 1909-March 1910; Rio de Janeiro, December 1910-March 1911. These dates, moreover, involve rapid construction-as rapid, indeed, as that which is quoted as the highest standard attainable by the German Navy; and it may safely be said that if the vessels are completed by the dates named it will only be owing to their purchase by another Power. In any case, however, it is obvious that these vessels could be of no use to Japan if a struggle be imminent. If it be postponed till 1911-1912, she can probably make other and better arrangements.

At the same time-and with the greatest deference to the Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires, who has recently declared that his Government has no intention of selling these ships to any other Power-it is almost impossible to believe that they were designed without an arrière pensée. When the Triumph and Swiftsure came into the market, our Government refused at first to buy them, on the ground that they 'do not fulfil Admiralty requirements.' Later, under stress of circumstances which are well known, we bought them, and have been sorry for it ever since. But the Brazilian ships, so far, at any rate, as the outward signs of structural strength go, are up to the standard of any Navy in the world. There is no 'cuttin' the frames too light' here, and, of course, the great names of Armstrong and Vickers Maxim are guarantees of the excellence of material and workmanship. At any rate, both the political and financial equilibrium of South American Republics is unstable, and it is pretty certain that, at this moment, Brazil would not refuse a good offer for the ships. In some quarters it is certainly believed that this course will be forced upon the Brazilian Government by the res angusta domi.

I want, however, to discuss the matter from a more general standpoint. If, by the middle of 1911, there be three Dreadnoughts for sale or hire, what effect will that have on the naval balance of power? I take the Brazilian ships for example; but be it remembered that at least one other country not generally classed among the great Naval Powers-Austria-Hungary, to wit-is building ships which may be classed with the Dreadnoughts; Spain is not impossibly about to do so; and there are rumours of formidable programmes for China, Chili, and even for Holland and the Scandinavian States.

I take the beginning of 1912 (January to March) for my epoch of comparison. At that date, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Triple Alliance (nominally so far as Italy, actually so far as AustriaHungary is concerned) will still be in existence, as well as, presumably, that between Russia and France. We may take the following as being the Powers or groups of Powers between which collision is most likely to occur: the United States and Japan; Great Britain and Germany, with or without the alliance of Austria-Hungary; Italy and Austria-Hungary.

To take the most probable first. In the event of war breaking out

between the United States and Japan in (say) March 1912, the relative strength of the opposing fleets in capital ships, or, as I prefer to call them, ships of the line, will be as follows, so far as can be reasonably anticipated at this date:

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The figures in brackets show the modification caused by the purchase of the Brazilian ships by the weaker Powers. Ships of the Lord Nelson and Invincible classes and their foreign equivalents are counted as Dreadnoughts.

The Japanese, like ourselves, plan to have their ships ready for sea in two years from the date of laying down. If this arrangement were adhered to, and the programmes for the years immediately ensuing be the same as for those immediately past, another pair of battleships and of armoured cruisers ought to be added to the total. But financial stringency may cause a delay in the completion of some part of the programme.

The Americans have a superiority in pre-Dreadnought ships and in the lighter type of gun-a superiority which, seeing that in Dreadnoughts and in Dreadnought-carried heavy guns they are about equal to the Japanese, ought, if material were everything (which it is not), to give them the victory. Add the Brazilian ships to the American total, and their superiority becomes assured. But add them to the Japanese total, and the balance inclines quite markedly the other way. The United States must certainly take these vessels into account, or lay down three additional Dreadnoughts themselves and press them rapidly to completion, in order to secure a bare margin of material superiority over Japan in 1912.

The next hypothetical struggle to which reference will be made is one between Great Britain and Germany. In this case, the account in March 1912 will stand thus:

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I have here allowed for a British programme of four large armoured ships to be laid down next year and to be finished by the end of 1911. Similarly, I have estimated that the German ships which will be laid down in July next, under the programme of 1909, will be ready for service in March 1912. Were Germany to purchase the Brazilian ships, our margin of superiority to her alone would still be considerable, but we should be very far below the two-Power standard. Suppose (and it is not an extravagant supposition) Austria-Hungary were in alliance with Germany. Then the figures would stand:

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Taking Dreadnought ships alone, the eighteen British vessels will mount 160 12-inch guns and twenty 9.2-inch, against 162 12- and 11-inch and twenty-four 9-4-inch guns for the German and AustroHungarian ships. Should the Brazilian Dreadnoughts pass to either Power, the alliance would have an actual superiority of forty-two heavy guns in its Dreadnought ships, and that is somewhat heavy odds. As the standard German weapon is the 11-inch gun, it is on the face of it unlikely that Germany will complicate her artillery by the purchase of these ships, but the temptation to do so, were war imminent, would be great, and it must be remembered that the German element in Brazil is now very large.

Next let us take the event of war between Austria-Hungary and Italy. The naval forces of the two nations will stand thus:

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In this case, the acquisition of the Brazilian ships by AustriaHungary would turn the scale, which is fairly evenly balanced at present, decidedly in her favour.

It may be said, of course, that there is nothing new in all this. Minor Naval Powers have always had ships for sale or hire, and have 2 Habsburg and Wien classes added for purpose of comparison with Italy, these ships being capable of fighting in the Adriatic.

sometimes been compelled to sell or hire them to belligerents, as we found to our inconvenience between 1776 and 1783, and again in 1807. So far, that is true; but since the era of armoured ships began no minor Power has ever possessed vessels which were right up to the standard of the latest and most powerful designed for the leading Powers; and if any have approached it, they have always been bought by one or other of those leading Powers. These Brazilian Dreadnoughts, therefore, are of new and ominous significance. And not less so are the Austro-Hungarian ships, which, though not for sale, may be said to be on hire as reinforcement for the Navy of a Power with which it is convenient to Austria-Hungary to ally herself. From our point of view, and from that of the Americans and the Italians also, the uncomfortable feature is that for twenty years to come we shall always have to take the Minas Geraes and her sisters into account in estimating our naval needs, even if they should remain for the greater part of that time under the Brazilian flag. When the outbreak of war has become a matter of months, as, for example, it was in September 1903, the payment of 5,000,000l. or so for a reinforcement of three first-class ships will be the merest drop in the bucket of expenditure to be incurred. The stronger Power, even if it does not want the ships, will be compelled to buy them to keep them out of the enemy's hands. We have done this once for a friend, with results on which I am afraid we are hardly entitled to congratulate ourselves, however convenient our action may have been to Japan. I suspect that the lesson of the Triumph and Swiftsure and their purchase has not been thrown away on irresponsible republics on the make.' If we repeat the operation, we shall lay ourselves open to a system of diplomatically correct blackmail very much to be deprecated.

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But what is the alternative? I confess I do not see one. Now that (quite rightly, in my humble judgment) the same sum of money goes in the construction of one battleship that formerly sufficed for two, and one cruiser of the Indomitable type absorbs the provision which would formerly have sufficed for three, the number of ships which nations can afford to build is necessarily much smaller than it was. But it is of vital importance that the great private shipbuilding yards should be kept employed. The shipbuilding resources of Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States have been so largely developed that these countries now not only build all they require for themselves, but can undertake work for foreign nations as well. Spain is patriotically and prudently developing her dockyards before starting on the building of her new Navy. Nought remains to our shipbuilders but the orders of the minor States, and every ship of great fighting force which they build for one of these may hereafter become an embarrassment to their own country. That is the irony of the dilemma in which we are placed.

So John Bull must pay, and continue to pay, and look as pleasant as he can. Since his very existence depends on it, he must not only take into account the warships of any two Powers which might, under conceivable circumstances, combine against him, but also the potential reserves of these Powers in the hands of minor States. He need not concern himself very seriously about the much-discussed epoch of 1911-as I have shown above. But when 1915 comes, and with it the expiration of the alliance with Japan, he may, and probably will, find himself face to face with new responsibilities against which he can hardly begin to make provision too soon. That, however, is another story, and one which is too long to be told here.

GERARD FIENNES.

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