moral faculty condemns.or approves. To discover the intention wherewith actions are performed, reasoning is often necessary; but the design of such reasoning is not to sway or inform the conscience, but only to ascertain those circumstances or qualities of an action, from which the intention of the agent may appear. When this becomes manifest, the conscience of mankind immediately and intuitively discloses it to be virtuous, or vicious, or innocent."*

Many abstract and practical principles of policy, observed by different European nations, may be attributed to the doctrine of free-will. Nothing seems, at first sight, more arbitrary and unjust, than a principle strictly observed by the English government, namely, the supremacy of the seas, and the right of searching the vessels of neutral nations. To look at the question in its natural aspect, as it were, we would conclude that a principle of this kind was contrary to the plainest suggestions of natural right; for nature seems to have made the seas to furnish an easy and mutual intercourse between one nation and another; and that nothing more decidedly wears the appearance of unjust mo

* Beattie's Essay on Truth, p. 185.

nopolization, than for any one nation to lay claim to that which appears to have been made for the use and benefit of all. Yet, to maintain this supremacy by England, is considered as a cardinal principle of her policy; and she has waged many wars for this exclusive right, and must go to war again, whenever she is in danger of losing it, if she consults her true interests and power as an independent nation. The reason of this is plain and manifest. England is peculiarly situated, and were she to allow other neighbouring nations to assume maritime superiority, her destruction as a nation would be speedy and inevitable. She has therefore no choice between keeping the upper hand, and that too by force when necessary, and losing her power and greatness. She resembles a man whose life is in perpetual danger from those around him, who has no choice, whose will is under constraint, and who is therefore obliged to endeavour to preserve his existence, by such actions of force or stratagem, as would, at other times, and under other circumstances, when his will was not so situated, be considered, and very properly, as cruel and unjustifiable.

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CHAPTER IV.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE INFLUENCE WHICH FREE WILL HAS IN OUR MORAL OPINIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG, FROM A CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC VIRTUES.

A VERY considerable portion of the conversation and discussion respecting the public and private conduct of men, arises from our perpetual efforts to gain a knowledge of their motives to action; or rather to know the exact share of voluntary power which each individual exhibits in his moral behaviour. If we look narrowly at the public declamations against, or the public eulogies in favour of, any conspicuous character, we will find that nine-tenths of what is said on either side, may be attributed, not so much to the nature of his actions themselves, whether injurious or beneficial, wise or foolish; but to what were the probable or known motives which led him to action; what share his free will had in

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the transactions, and how far he is to be considered in the light of a necessary or voluntary agent. The same moral investigation is carried on from persons of celebrity to persons of lesser note; throughout, in fact, the whole fabric of social life; and so habituated are we to this judicial inquiry into the share of moral approbation or disapprobation, which we deal out to our fellow-men by this measure, as a standard of voluntary agency, that we pass through long and intricate investigations with inconceivable rapidity, and without, in hundreds of cases, ever being the least conscious of the matter.

Public virtue is of the highest kind. The virtues of patriotism, moral and political courage, and a fervent and disinterested zeal for the moral and social advantage and happiness of mankind, do always receive unqualified commendation from mankind; and rank in their estimation considerably higher in the scale of merit than virtues of an exclusively private nature. To devote the whole of your time, your talents, your fortune, and your bodily energies to promote the welfare of others; to be instant in season and out of season when the public welfare is at stake; to lay aside all private considerations of interest or ambition, and to pursue the public good with steady and unerring aim, neither turning to the

right hand nor to the left; is a moral endowment of the greatest importance and highest merit. And if we will look at the matter attentively, we will find that it is always supposed by mankind, that persons possessing such public virtue, and who, by this means, receive such high praise and commendation, have the power of the will in greater strength and perfection, than persons who fill more subordinate stations in society.

To prefer the good of others to our own private emolument or advantage, and not only to give the former a silent preference, but to be actively engag ed in the means of promoting it, does seem, in the eyes of people in general, to excite wonder and amazement as well as praise. The love of private gain, honour, and distinction, is so strong a principle in all mankind, that it appears to every person to be no ordinary labour in the task of moral discipline, to keep the sordid and private passions in due and proper subjection, and not to allow them to exercise an improper influence over our public conduct. Many persons have the knowledge and intellectual endowments to qualify them for public stations, who are, nevertheless, entirely unfit for such elevation, on account of this want of proper moral discipline; this system of self-denial, prac.