that they rest their hopes of happiness beyond the grave. Hence, then, it is maintained, that our notions of the rectitude of the moral government of the Deity, all ideas of Christian duty and obedience, and the stability and permanency of our future expectations, are founded upon the doctrine of Divine free agency; a position, illustrative, as far as it goes, of the principles contained in this Essay. Besides, it may be remarked, that the perpetual effort, (whether a successful one, is a different question) which has so commonly been made by writers on election, to show that their system did not militate against the common notions of man's moral agency, but, on the contrary, that these notions were perfectly reconcilable with the doctrine of election, may be considered as tantamount to an unconditional declaration, that our notions of morality are inseparable from the opinions we form to ourselves of moral free-will. 113 CHAPTER VII. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED--AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF SEVERAL EMINENT WRITERS ON THE FREE-WILL OF THE DEITY. In the writings of Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards, though zealous disciples of the necessarian scheme, we will find, that when they come to apply their principles to the doctrines of natural and revealed religion, they illustrate these principles with so many qualifications and reservations, that it becomes not only difficult to say what opinions they really do hold on necessary influence when applied to religious subjects; but they lay themselves open to inferences favourable to the opposite side of the controversy. From the general line of argument which they both follow, it would seem that they are very desirous to avoid the doctrine of neces sity in its absolute sense, as it appeared to them hostile to all our just notions of Deity, and of moral obligation. Leibnitz says that men are influenced in their actions by representations of good and evil, certainly and infallibly, but not necessarily; and that the Deity was infallibly but not necessarily induced to create the world by his wisdom and goodness, and that this act of creation was perfect in all its parts, and the result of the most perfect and complete liberty of action.* He perceives clearly that necessity, in its common acceptation, is entirely at variance with right conceptions of the divine nature and attributes; and he labours hard to avoid the plain, but to him dis *«Cela posé, l'on voit comment nous pouvons dire avec plusieurs Philosophes et Theologiens célébres, que la substance qui pense est portée à sa resolution par la representation prevalente du bien ou du mal, et cela certainement et infailliblement, mais non pas necessairement: c'est à dire, par des raisons qui l'inclinent sans necessiter. C'est pourquoi les futures contingens, prévu et en aux-mêmes et par leurs raisons, demeurent contingens; et Dieu a été porté infailliblement par sa sagesse et par sa bonté à créer le monde par sa puissance, et à lui donner la meilleur forme possible; mais il n'y etoit point porté necessairement; et le tout s'est possé sans aucune diminution de sa liberté parfaite et souveraine. Et sans consideration que nous venons de faire, je ne sais s'il seroit aisé de resoudre le nœud Gordien de la contingence et de la liberté." Remarques sur le Livre de l' Orig. du Mal. agreeable inference, which follows so clearly from his positions. Hence the various subtile and verbal distinctions, and qualifications, which clog his arguments on this subject. Viewing what he says in the most candid and dispassionate frame of mind, his language is so indefinite and equivocal, that it appears in many places to be tantamount to a virtual renunciation of his own professed principles. The same remarks that are here made on Mr. Leibnitz, equally apply to the writings of Dr. Jonathan Edwards, on the nature of the Divine will. I take the following words as containing the substance of his remarks on this subject. "The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him; whereby' He doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou.' The following things belong to the sovereignty of God, viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite power, whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power; and so, without any hinderance or restraint, that it should be either impossible or at all difficult for him to accomplish his will; and without any dependence of his power, on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it would stand in any need of; so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent upon him. (2.) That he has supreme authority; absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority, and also without restraint by any obligation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) Thus his will is supreme, underived, and independent of any thing without himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his will not being subject to, or restrained by the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his wisdom, which DETERMINES his will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isaiah xl. 14, With whom took he counsel ? and who instructed him and taught him the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and |