See ANNUITY. BANKRUPT, No. 12, 13, 14. COVENANT, No. 1. DEVISE, No. 14, 15.
to B.; and that B. might distrain other cattle of A. doing damage there. Burt v. More, T. 33 G. 3. Page 329 4. In such case B. might maintain tres-
pass against strangers.
5. Where a person has vesturam terræ, or herbagium terræ, he may maintain trespass quare clausum fregit.
1. The words limit and appoint in a deed may operate as words of grant, so as to pass a reversion. Shove v. Pincke, H. 33 G. 3. Page 124. 310 2. If a person, having several creditors, convey by deed the legal interest in See LIEN. part of his real and personal proper-
ty to a trustee, in trust (after de- ducting the expences respecting the
trust) out of the rents and profits to Sce OFFICE, No. 4. pay half the surplus to the grantor for his own use, and the residue among certain creditors named in a sche- dule, without any intention of frau- dulently delaying the creditors not named in the schedule in obtaining their demands, the deed is good in law. Estwick v. Caillaud, M. 34 G. 3. 420
See AGREEMENT, No. 3.
1. Words in an agreement that A. shall hold and enjoy, &c. if not accom- panied with restraining words, oper- ate as words of present demise. Secus, if they be followed by others which shew that the parties intended that there should be a lease in future. The whole must depend on the in- tention of the parties. Roe d. Jack- son v. Ashburner, II. 33 G. 3. 2. These words in an instrument, "be "it remembered that J. B. hath let, "and by these presents doth demise," &c. held to operate as a present de- mise; although the instrument con- tained a further covenant for a future lease. Burry v. Nugent, T. 22 G. 3.
165 3. A. demised to B. the milk of 22 cows to be provided by A., and to be fed at A's expence on certain closes belonging to A.; A. covenant- ing that B. might turn out a mare, and that no other cattle should be fed there; held that the separate herb- age and feeding of those closes passed
devise of a house to A. "paying yearly and every year out of the said house the sum of 15s. to B." will
carry a fee. Goodright d. Baker v. Stocker, M. 33 G. 3.
2. But only an estate for life passes by these words; "all the rest of my lands, tenements, and hereditaments, either freehold or copyhold, and also all my goods, &c. after payment of my just debts and funeral expences I give to A.," &c. Denn d. Moor v. Mellor, E. 34 G. 3.
A. by will devised to trustees to the use of B. for life, remainder to trus- tees, &c. remainder to the first and other sons of B. remainder to the daughters of B. remainder to the use of such person as he should ap- point by deed; and afterwards by a deed, in which he recited the will, he appointed the same premises after the death of B. and failure of her issue, to the use of the first and other sons of C. &c. B. afterwards died without issue: held that the limita. tions created by the will and the deed
could not be united; and that the li- mitation in the latter to the first and other sons of C. &c. was too remote to take effect; being after a general failure of issue of B. Habergham v. Vincent, M. 33 G. 3. Page 92 6. A devise of testator's lands at W. and all his interest in the estates of J. C. deceased to L. A. for life, and after L. 4.'s decease to E. S., charg- ed with an annuity to J. T. for life, gives a remainder in fee to E. S. An- drew v. Southouse, T. 33 G. 3. 292 7. By a devise to A. for life, without impeachment of waste, and after his decease to the issue male of his body, and the heirs and assigns of such is- sue male for ever, and for default of such issue male to B. &c.; A. takes an estate tail. Denn d. Webb v. Puckey, T. 33 G. 3. 299 8. But if in the above case A. had taken only an estate for life, yet as the remainder to his issue and the subsequent remainders were contin- gent, A. might have barred them by suffering a recovery before any issue born. ib. 9. A. devised his estates real and per- sonal, in trust to trustees for his brother B. and his first and every other son in tail male: failure of such issue to his brother C. and his first and every other son in tail male, &c. &c; in all the foregoing cases with- out impeachment of waste, other than wilful;" and directed the renewals of a leasehold estate to be made "by the tenant for life;" held that B. took only a life estate, with remain- der in tail to his children. Doe d. Phipps v. Ld. Mulgrave, T. 33 G. 3.
10. The words "first and every other son" may be taken as words of limi- tation, where it manifestly appears that the devisor intended to use them in that sense: but, generally speak- ing, they are words of purchase. And in the above case the devisor intended to use them as words of purchase.
11. A. devised to his nephew B., but if he died without male heir, then to another nephew C. and his heirs; VOL. V.
and charged the estate with an an- nuity to D., and several legacies to other persons to be paid at a future time; held that B. took an estate tail. Denn d. Slater v. Slater, T,
33 G. 3. Page 335 12. A. being seised in fee of several freehold estates, and also possessed of a leasehold rectory for lives, de- vised all his manors, messuages, lands, tenements, tithes, and heredita- ments, and all his real estate what- soever, (except what is thereinafter mentioned and devised) to trustees" in strict settlement; he charged his leasehold with rent-charges to two of his younger children, and directed that when any of the lives dropped the lease should be renewed, and the names of those two children put in, of whom a son was to have the preference; it was held that the rectory did not pass by the general words of the devise, but that A.'s eldest son and heir took, as spe- cial occupant, on the death of A. Sheffield Bart. v. Ld. Mulgrave, E. 34 G. 3.
realty and personalty to his wife for life; and after her death one freehold estate to the son, and another to the daughter," but if either or both of his children should die before the wife, then those legacies which were left to them should return to the wife; it was held that on the death of the son before his mother, the lat- ter was entitled to the reversion of that freehold estate. Hardacre v. Nash, T. 34 G. 3. Page 716 17. The word "legacy" may be ap- plied to a real estate, if the context of the will shew that such was the devisor's intention. ib.
DISORDERLY HOUSE,
See CERTIORARI, No. 5.
See DEMISE, No. 3. TENANT IN COM-
ENTRIES,
See EVIDENCE, No. 6.
ERROR, Writ of, See PRACTICE, No. 1. 31, 32.
See ARREST, No. 1, 2. SHERIFF, No. 1.
See ADMINISTRATOR, No. 1. NANT, No. 4. PEW, No. 2, 3. RIOT ACT, No. 1. SETTLEMENT BY CER- TIFICATE, No. 3.. SETTLEMENT BY HIRING AND SERVICE, No. 5, 6, 7. WITNESS.
messuage and 12 acres of land were immemorially parcel and a customary tenement of the manor of A.; and that there is a custom in the manor "that from time whereof, &c. the customary tenant of the said custo- mary tenement for all the time afore- said, has had right of common, &c." replication, traversing the custom: On these pleadings the plaintiff may prove that the messuage was built within 20 years, and not upon the scite of an ancient house. Dunstan v. Tresider, M. 33 G. 3. Page 2
In an action for use and occupation by an incumbent against a tenant of the glebe lands, who has paid him rent, the defendant cannot give evi- dence of a simoniacal presentation of the plaintiff, in order to avoid his title. Cooke v. Loxley, M. 33 G. 3. 4
3. An entry in the court-rolls of a manor, stating the mode of descent of lands in the manor, is admissible evidence of the mode of descent, al- though no instances of any person having taken according to it be proved. Roe v. Parker, M. 33 G. 3. 4. A judgment of ouster against one corporator is conclusive evidence against another who derives title under him. R. v. The Mayor of York, M. 33 G. 3. 66
5. If to an action brought by a creditor of a testator, the executrix plead judgments recovered, and no assets beyond, &c. to which the plaintiff replies per fraudem generally; it is not conclusive evidence of fraud that the judgments as pleaded were con fessed for more than the just debts; but the defendant may shew that they were entered up by mistake for more than was due, and that that was made known to the plaintiff before the ac- tion was brought. Pease v. Naylor, M. 33 G. 3.
6. Entries made by a third person de- ceased in his books of receipts of rent from his tenant for a particular estate, are not evidence to prove the identity of the land in a cause between two others. Outram v. Morewood, H. 33 G. 3.
1. Plea (to trespass) that an ancient 7. The parties producing on an appeal
at the sessions a parish certificate of 30 years' date need not give any ac- count of it: the bare production of it is sufficient. R. v. The Inhabitants of Ryton, E. 33 G. 3. Page 259 8. In trover by the assignees of a bank- rupt to recover goods taken by the defendant under a fraudulent bill of sale given by the bankrupt to the de- fendant (and which was an act of bankruptcy) the defendant's exami- nation before the commissioners, in which he admitted the execution of the deed, is sufficient evidence to prove the execution, and supersedes the necessity of calling the subscrib- ing witness. Bowles v. Langworthy, T. 33 G. 3.
9. The examination of a pregnant wo- man, taken before a justice of peace under the 6 Geo. 2. c. 31. is admissi- ble evidence on an application to the quarter sessions to make an order of filiation on the putative father, if the woman die before such application is made; and if not contradicted, ought to be conclusive. R. v. The Inhabi- tants of Ravenstone, M. 34 G. 3.
10. A gazette is evidence of all acts of state. R. v. D. Holl, M. 34 G. 3.
436 11. And therefore a gazette in which it was stated that certain addresses had been presented to the King from dif- ferent bodies of subjects, expressing their loyalty, &c. was admitted in evidence to prove an averment in an information for a libel, “that divers addresses, &c. had been presented to his Majesty by divers of his loving subjects, &c." ib. 12. It is not competent to a defendant, charged with having published a libel, to prove that a paper, similar to that for the publication of which he is prosecuted, was published on a for- mer occasion by other persons, who have never been prosecuted for it. ib. 13. The Journals of the House of Lords
are evidence to prove, not only the address of the Lords to the King, but the King's answer also. 455 14. The Articles of War, as printed by the King's printer, are evidence of
such articles. R. v. Withers, Nov. 17, 1784. Page 442. 446. 15. Anaverment in a declaration on the stat. 8 Ann. c. 9. against the master of an apprentice for not inserting the true consideration in the indenture, "that A. B. the apprentice, by a certain indenture executed on, &c. put himself apprentice to the defend- ant, &c." may be proved by the pro- duction of that part of the indenture executed by the defendant, in which it is recited that A. B. had put him- self apprentice, &c. Burleigh v. Stibbs, M. 34 G. 3.
465 16. A declaration by a bankrupt of his motives for absenting himself from his home, made at the time, is evidence in an action by the assignees against a creditor of the bankrupt's, in order to prove the act of bankruptcy. Buteman v. Bailey, H. 34 G. 3.
17. In an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, the latter cannot call the indorser as a witness to prove that the plaintiff had no right to recover upon the bill, having merely received it from the indorser in trust to obtain payment of it from the acceptor on account of the indorser himself. Buckland v. Tankard, E. 34 G. 3. 18. If a defendant rely on a certificate under a second commission of bank- rupt against him, under which he has not paid 15s. in the pound, the plain- tiff in order to deprive him of the be- nefit of it may produce the proceed- ings under the former commission, and prove that he submitted to it, without proving the trading, the act of bankruptcy, and the other facts which are necessary to support the commission as against third persons. Haviland v. Cook, T. 31 G. 3. 655 19. The mutiny act enables two justices to take the examination of a soldier respecting his settlement, and directs them to give an attested copy of it to the soldier, to be by him delivered to the commanding officer in order to be produced when required, and makes such attested copy evidence; it was held that no other attested copy of 3B2
1. On 21 June the excise officer granted a permit to the defendant to bring into his cellar 64 gallons of liquor; on the 25th he went to the defend- ant's cellar where he found a cask containing 76 gallons, for which quantity no permit had been ob- tained; the defendant being thereon convicted in the penalty of 20%. under
1. If A., being indebted to B.; and C., after being sued to judgment and exe- cution by B., go to C., and voluntarily give him a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, on which judgment is immediately entered and execution levied on the same day on which B. would have been entitled to execu- tion, and had threatened to sue it out, the preference so given by A. to C. is not unlawful, nor fraudulent within the meaning of the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. Holbird v. Anderson, E. 235 33 G. 3.
the 9 G. 2. c. 23. s. 7. together with See ADMINISTRATOR, PLEADING, No.
2. The information being required to be laid within 3 months after the offence committed by 24 G. 2. c. 40. s. 29. referring to prior statutes (1 W. & M. c. 24. s. 16. & 12 & 13 W. 3. c. 11. s. 17.) and the information in that case having been laid on the 15th September, and the discovery made on the 25th June, it is to be presumed that the liquor was then brought in, unless the contrary ap- pear; in which case the information would be exhibited in time. ib. 3. A permit for the removing of wine from one place to another under 26 G. 3. c. 59. dated 9 o'clock in, the morning of one day, and giving the
party one hour for removing it out See SHERIFF, No. 2.
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