Imatges de pÓgina

Being who has regard to human affairs. Some clowns in the Weald of Kent, who had been kept as much as possible on the "taste not" system,--left in a state of gross ignorance,—yet believed that the Deity did impart special powers to certain men; and that belief, coupled with excessive stupidity, led them to take an insane fanatic for a prophet. In this case, this "little learning" actually caused an insurrection in his favor, in order to make him king, priest and prophet of the British empire; and many lives were sacrificed before this insane insurrection was put down. If a "little learning" is a "dangerous thing," you will have to keep people in a perfect state of idiotey in order to avoid that danger. I would, therefore, say that both the recommendations of the poet are impracticable.

The question arises, what are we to do? Simply to impress upon ourselves and upon all people the importance of laboring in that much neglected branch of human knowledge—the knowledge of our own ignorance;—and of remembering that it is by a confession of real ignorance that real knowledge must be gained. But even when that further knowledge is not attained, still even the knowledge of the ignorance is a great thing in itself; so great, it seems, as to constitute Socrates the wisest of his time.

Some of the chief sources of unknown ignorance may be worth noticing here. They are to be found in our not being aware: 1. How inadequate a medium language is for conveying thought. 2. How inadequate our very minds are for the comprehension of many things. 3. How little we need understand a word which may yet be familiar to us, and which we may use in reasoning. This piece of ignorance is closely connected with the two foregoing. (Hence, frequently, men will accept as an explanation of a phenomenon, a mere statement of the difficulty in other words.) 4. How utterly ignorant we are of efficient causes; and how the philosopher who refers to the law of gravitation the falling of a stone to the earth, no further explains the phenomenon than the peasant, who would say it is the nature of it. The philosopher knows that the stone obeys the same law to which all other bodies are subject, and to which, for convenience, he gives the name of gravitation. His knowledge is only more general than the peasant's ; which, however, is a vast advantage. 5. How many words there are that express, not the nature of the thing they are applied to, but the manner in which they affect us; and which, therefore, give about as correct a notion of those things, as the word "crooked" would, if applied to a stick half immersed in water. (Such is the word Chance, with all its family.) 6. How many causes may, and usually do, conduce to the same effect. 7. How liable the faculties, even of the ablest, are to occasional failure; so that they shall overlook mistakes (and those often the most at variance with their own established notions) which, when once exposed, seem quite gross even to inferior men. 8. How much all are biassed, in all their moral reasonings, by self-love, or perhaps, rather, partially to human nature, and other passions. 9. Dugald Stewart would add very justly, How little we know of matter; no more indeed than of mind; though all are prone to attempt explaining the phenomena of mind by those of matter: for, what is familiar men generally consider as well known, though the fact is oftener otherwise.

The errors arising from these causes, and from not calculating on them,—that is, in short, from ignorance of our own ignorance, have probably impeded philosophy more than all other obstacles put together.

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Certain it is, that only by this ignorance of our ignorance can a little learning"


a dangerous thing." The dangers of knowledge are not to be compared with the dangers of ignorance. A man is more likely to miss his way in darkness than in twilight: in twilight than in full sun. And those contemners of studies who say (with Mandeville, in his Treatise against Charity-schools) “If a horse knew as much as a man, I should not like to be his rider," ought to add, "If a man knew as little as a horse, I should not like to trust him to ride." It is indeed possible to educate the children of the poor so as to disqualify them for an humble and laborious station in life; but this mistake does not so much consist in the amount of the knowledge imparted, as in the kind and the manner of education. Habits early engrafted on children, of regular attention,-of steady application to what they are about,-of prompt obedience to the directions they receive, of cleanliness, order, and decent and modest behavior, can not but be of advantage to them in after life, whatever their station may be. And certainly, their familiar acquaintance with the precepts and example of Him who, when all stations of life were at his command, chose to be the reputed son of a poor mechanic, and to live with peasants and fishermen; or, again, of his apostle Paul, whose own hands "ministered to his necessities," and to those of his companions—such studies, I say, can surely never tend to unfit any one for a life of humb'e and contented industry.

What, then, is the "smattering "-the imperfect and superficial knowledgethat really does deserve contempt? A slight and superficial knowledge is justly condemned, when it is put in the place of more full and exact knowledge. Such an acquaintance with chemistry and anatomy, e. g. as would be creditable, and not useless, to a lawyer, would be contemptible for a physician; and such an acquaintance with law as would be desirable for him, would be a most discreditable smattering for a lawyer.

It is to be observed that the word smattering is applied to two different kinds of scanty knowledge-the rudimentary and the superficial; though it seems the more strictly to belong to the latter. Now, as it is evident that no one can learn all things perfectly, it seems best for a man to make some pursuit his main object, according to, first, his calling; secondly, his natural bent; or thirdly, his opportunities: then, let him get a slight knowledge of what else is worth it, regulated in his choice by the same three circumstances; which should also determine, in great measure, where an elementary and where a superficial knowledge is desirable. Such as are of the most dignified and philosophical nature are most proper for elementary study; and such as we are the most likely to be called upon to practice for ourselves, the most proper for superficial; e. g., it would be to most men of no practical use, and, consequently, not worth while, to learn by heart the meaning of some of the Chinese characters; but it might be very well worth while to study the principles on which that most singular language is constructed; contra, there is nothing very curious or interesting in the structure of the Portuguese language; but if one were going to travel in Portugal, it would be worth while to pick up some words and phrases. If both circumstances conspire, then, both kinds of information are to be sought for; and such things should be learned a little at both ends; that is, to understand the elementary and fundamental principles, and also to know some of the most remarkable results—a little of the rudiments, and a little of what is most called for in practice. E. g., a man who has not made any of the physical or mathematical sciences his favorite pursuit, ought yet to know the principles of geometrical reasoning, and the elements of

mechanics; and also to know, by rote, something of the magnitude, distances, and motions of the heavenly bodies, though without having gone over the intermediate course of scientific demonstration.

Grammar, logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics, [or the philosophy of mind,] are manifestly studies of an elementary nature, being concerned about the instruments which we employ in effecting our purposes; and ethics, which is, in fact, a branch of metaphysics, may be called the elements of conduct. Such knowledge is far from showy. Elements do not much come into sight; they are like that part of a bridge which is under water, and is therefore least admired, though it is not the work of least art and difficulty. On this ground it is suitable to females, as least leading to that pedantry which learned ladies must ever be peculiarly liable to, as well as least exciting that jealousy to which they must ever be exposed, while learning in them continues to be a distinction. A woman might, in this way, be very learned without any one's finding it out.

"Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested." It would have been well if Bacon had added some hints as to the mode of study: how books are to be chewed, and swallowed, and digested. For, besides inattentive readers, who measure their proficiency by the pages they have gone over, it is quite possible, and not uncommon, to read most laboriously, even so as to get by heart the words of a book, without really studying it at all; that is, without employing the thoughts on the subject.

In particular, there is, in reference to Scripture, "a habit cherished by some persons, of reading-assiduously, indeed-but without any attentive reflection and studious endeavor to ascertain the real sense of what they read-concluding that whatever impression is found to be left on the mind after a bare perusal of the words, must be what the sacred writers designed. They use, in short, little or none of that care which is employed on any other subject in which we are much interested, to read through each treatise consecutively as a whole,-to compare one passage with others that may throw light on it, and to consider what was the general drift of the author, and what were the occasions, and the persons he had in view.

"In fact, the real students of Scripture, properly so called, are, I fear, fewer than is commonly supposed. The theological student is often a student chiefly of some human system of divinity, fortified by references to Scripture, introduced from time to time as there is occasion. He proceeds-often unconsciously-by setting himself to ascertain, not what is the information or instruction to be derived from a certain narrative or discourse of one of the sacred writers, but what aid can be derived from them towards establishing or refuting this or that point of dogmatic theology. Such a mode of study surely ought at least not to be exclusively pursued. At any rate, it can not properly be called a study of Scripture.

"There is, in fact, a danger of its proving a great hindrance to the profitable study of Scripture; for so strong an association is apt to be established in the mind between certain expressions, and the technical sense to which they have been confined in some theological system, that when the student meets with them

1 See Essays on the Difficulties of St. Paul's Epistles. Essay X. page 233.

in Scripture, he at once understands them in that sense, in passages where perhaps an unbiassed examination of the context would plainly show that such was not the author's meaning. And such a student one may often find expressing the most unfeigned wonder at the blindness of those who can not find in Scripture such and such doctrines, which appear to him to be as clearly set forth there as words can express; which perhaps they are, on the (often gratuitous) supposition that those words are everywhere to be understood exactly in the sense which he has previously derived from some human system,- -a system through which, as through a discolored medium, he views Scripture. But this is not to take Scripture for one's guide, but rather to make one's self a guide to Scripture.

Others, again, there are, who are habitual readers of the Bible, and perhaps of little else, but who yet can not properly be said to study anything at all on the subject of religion, because, as was observed just above, they do not even attempt to exercise their mind on the subject, but trust to be sufficiently enlightened and guided by the mere act of perusal, while their minds remain in a passive state. And some, I believe, proceed thus on principle, considering that they are the better recipients of revealed truth the less they exercise their own reason.

"But this is to proceed on a totally mistaken view of the real province of reason. It would, indeed, be a great error to attempt substituting for revelation conjectures framed in our own mind, or to speculate on matters concerning which we have an imperfect knowledge imparted to us by revelation, and could have had, without it, none at all. But this would be, not to use, but to abuse, our rational faculties. By the use of our senses, which are as much the gift of the Creator as anything else we enjoy,—and by employing our reason on the objects around us, we can obtain a certain amount of valuable knowledge. And beyond this, there are certain other points of knowledge unattainable by these faculties, and which God has thought fit to impart to us by his inspired messengers. But both the volumes—that of Nature and that of Revelation—which He has thought good to lay before us, are to be carefully studied. On both of them we must diligently employ the faculties with which He, the Author of both, has endued us, if we would derive full benefit from his gifts.

"The telescope, we know, brings within the sphere of our own vision much that would be undiscernible by the naked eye; but we must not the less employ our eyes in making use of it; and we must watch and calculate the motions, and reason on the appearances, of the heavenly bodies, which are visible only through the telescope, with the same care we employ in respect of those seen by the naked eye.

"And an analogous procedure is requisite if we would derive the intended benefit from the pages of inspiration, which were designed not to save us the trouble of inquiring and reflecting, but to enable us, on some points, to inquire and reflect to better purpose,-not to supersede the use of our reason, but to supply its deficiencies."

Although, however, it is quite right, and most important, that the thoughts should be exercised on the subject of what you are reading, there is one mode of exercising the thoughts that is very hurtful; which is, that of substituting conjectures for attention to what the author says. Preliminary reflection on the subject is, as has been above said, very useful in many cases; though, by the way, it is unsafe as a preparation for the study of Scripture; and, in all studies, care should be taken to guard against allowing the judgment to be biased by

notions hastily and prematurely adopted. And again, after you have studied an author, it will be very advisable (supposing it is an uninspired and consequently fallible one) to reflect on what he says, and consider whether he is right, and how


But while actually engaged in perusal, attend to what the writer actually says, and endeavour fairly to arrive at his meaning, before you proceed to speculate upon it for yourself.

The study of a book, in short, should be conducted nearly according to the same rule that Bacon lays down for the study of nature. He warns philosophers, earnestly and often, against substituting for what he calls the "interrogatio naturæ," the "anticipatio naturæ ;" that is, instead of attentive observation and experiment, forming conjectures as to what seems to us likely, or fitting, according to some hypothesis devised by ourselves. In like manner, in studying an author, you should keep apart interpretation and conjecture.

A good teacher warns a student of some book in a foreign language that he is learning, not to guess what the author is likely to have meant, and then twist the words into that sense, against the idiom of the language; but to be led by the words in the first instance; and then, if a difficulty as to the sense remains, to guess which of the possible meanings of the words is the most likely to be the right.

E. g. The words in the original of John xviii. 15, ó ådλos μaðnrís, plainly signify "the other disciple;" and one of the commentators, perceiving that this is inconsistent with the opinion he had taken up, that this disciple was John himself, (since John had not been mentioned before, and the article, therefore, would make it refer to Judas, who alone had been just above named,) boldly suggests that the reading must be wrong, (though all the MSS. agree in it,) and that the article ought to be omitted, because it spoils the sense; that is, the sense which agrees with a conjecture adopted in defiance of the words of the passage.

This one instance may serve as a specimen of the way in which some, instead of interpreting an author, undertake to re-write what he has said.

The like rule holds good in other studies, quite as much as in that of a language. We should be ever on our guard against the tendency to read through colored spectacles.

Educational habits of thought, analogies, antecedent reasonings, feelings, and wishes, &c., will be always leading us to form some conjectural hypothesis, which is not necessarily hurtful, and may sometimes furnish a useful hint, but which must be most carefully watched, lest it produce an unfair bias, and lead you to strain into a conformity with it the words or the phenomena before you.

A man sets out with a conjecture as to what the Apostles are likely to have said, or ought to have said, in conformity with the the theological system he has learnt; or what the Most High may have done or designed; or what is or is not agreeable to the "analogy of faith," (see Campbell on the Gospels ;) i. e., of a piece with the christian system—namely, that which he has been taught, by fallible men, to regard as the christian system; and then he proceeds to examine Scripture, as he would examine with leading questions a witness whom he had summoned in his cause.

As the fool thinketh,
So the bell chinketh."

Perhaps he "prays through" all the Bible; not with a candid and teachable

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