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would care but little to whom they sold so long as they got a fair price.

Some writers, and among them Mr. Barry O'Brien, in his Parliamentary History of the Land Laws, claim that the occupier should have the right of pre-emption in the event of a sale. I think this will hardly hold good in the face of the proposal that land should be as freely sold as a personal chattel, and in the case of 'individual' proprietors I fail to see why they should be obliged to deal with only one class of purchaser, on such terms as the latter may think fit to offer. In the case, however, of 'Corporations,' where no hardship would be inflicted on individuals, I think they might be called upon to sell, and, as was done with the Church property, the first offer should be made to the occupying tenants. I would also suggest that the whole of the purchase-money should be advanced to the occupying tenants under these clauses, in the event of their being in a position to purchase the fee-simple of their holdings; so long as the price given was not excessive, the advance would be amply secured as a first charge on the land. The reason for this suggestion is that in a great many instances (among others, I believe, on the Glebe lands, near Newry, visited by Mr. Shaw-Lefevre) the purchasing tenants have heavily mortgaged their properties to raise the proportion of the purchase-money they were required to pay down.

It may be asked, very fairly, whence the funds are to come, when the sum authorised (1,000,000l.) under the 54th Section of the Land Act is expended. Mr. Fawcett has fairly enough objected to experiments in Irish land legislation being carried out at the expense of England and Scotland. I think, as suggested by Mr. Vernon, that amply sufficient means could be provided by calling upon the Church Commissioners to raise money, under Sections 59 to 64 of the Church Act, on the unexpended balance of the Church property; if, however, this proved insufficient, it might be supplemented by calling upon the Loan Fund Boards to realise their investments, and transfer them to the general fund. I believe the result of this would be of greater permanent benefit to the people than the work done hitherto by the Boards, meritorious and beneficial as it has been.

Mr. Shaw-Lefevre has pointed out, in his pamphlet on the working of the Bright Clauses, that the chief cause of their partial failure is the absence of any Commission to act as link between vendors and purchasers, as was provided for in the sale of the property of the Church. If such a Commission be appointed, I trust it may consist of the Commissioners and staff employed under the Irish Church Act; their experience would be invaluable in carrying out the details of this

measure.

I may make one more suggestion, which I believe to be not altogether foreign to the land question-viz., that some means should be

devised, and assistance given, towards permanently providing houses and glebes for the ministers of religion of all denominations. I hope and believe it would be largely taken advantage of by the parish priest in the South and the Presbyterian minister in the North.

In conclusion, I would appeal to the Liberal party, to which I have the honour to belong, and especially to the press, to put the just construction on the motives and actions of Irish landlords. On many estates for generations the welfare of the tenantry has been the object of years of patient care and work on the part of the resident landlords, striving against difficulties altogether unknown in England. When not long ago a prominent member of the Government resigned his office, and paused in his political career, surely it was hardly decent for the first time, then, to bring forward an unsupported accusation of tyranny and oppression in the management of his estates.

The whole question is so momentous in itself, and the interests at stake are so great, that any policy of expediency would be intolerable. The Government, in their endeavours to frame a permanent settlement of the question, irrespective of passion, prejudice, and religious rancour, are entitled to the fullest support from all parties; and at the same time every sympathy is due to the Executive, on whom falls the burden of carrying out the onerous and stern task of repressing disorder.

DE VESCI.

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

THE Council of Judges appointed by the Judicature Act has, under the powers given to it by the 32nd section of that Act, recommended the consolidation of the three Common Law Divisions of the High Court into a single division, to be called the Queen's Bench Division, and the abolition of the offices of Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. Their report to this effect will be laid upon the table of each House of Parliament, and will acquire the force of law unless one of the Houses addresses Her Majesty against its adoption within thirty days.

The decision of the judges was not unanimous, and the discussion was conducted in private, but the matter is one which deeply affects the public interests, not so much in its immediate effects as because it forms part of a large and important subject-the organisation of the High Court of Justice. Upon this subject I desire to offer some remarks for public consideration, as I greatly fear that the proposed changes, though not of the first importance in themselves, will form part of a set of changes by which the dignity and efficiency of the Bench will be greatly impaired, and by which the administration of justice will be deprived of some of its most characteristic and most deservedly popular features.

It is, I think, much to be regretted that the powers contained in the 32nd section of the Judicature Act were ever conferred upon the Council of Judges at all. The effect of that provision is to enable the Council to make the recommendations which they have made, but it does not enable them to make any report or recommendation on cognate subjects. The result is that they were compelled either to be silent or to recommend two isolated changes, the effect of which can hardly be estimated unless a full statement is given of the scheme of which they are to form a part. It is impossible to give a satisfactory opinion upon a part of a building unless you have a plan of the whole, and can so judge of the general effect of the matters on which you are to advise. In the same way I think that whatever changes are required in the constitution of the High Court should be made by a statute which can be discussed as a whole in Parliament, and by the public, and not upon a report of judges to whom are submitted two specific propositions, which may be advantageous or otherwise, according to the other arrangements which may be connected with them. The practical effect of the resolutions passed by the judges will be that the changes recommended will be made without any proper public discussion of their nature and effect, and that when they have been made they will be taken as the foundation for other changes, which they will be said to involve in principle.

Upon these grounds I wished the Council of Judges to abstain from the expression of any opinion at all upon the subject, and to leave to the Executive Government the responsibility, which I think properly rests upon them, of making by statute such alterations in the present state of things as they consider necessary.

The alterations themselves, if they are to stand alone, and if it is to be understood that no further alteration is proposed, at least at present, in the constitution of the High Court, do not seem to me to be of the first importance. It is difficult to say precisely what would be the effect of fusing the three Common Law Divisions into one. For reasons which I will state more fully immediately, I do not think that such a fusion would make any great difference in the actual transaction of business. The same, or nearly the same, number of divisional courts (as they are called) would have to sit as at present, and it is by no means clear to me that it would in practice be found easier to make the detailed arrangements necessary for the transaction of business between fifteen men all consulting together than between three sets of five men, each set consulting by themselves.

With regard to the abolition of the two offices, more, no doubt, is to be said, though I think the question is one which interests the public much more than the judges. The promotion of a Puisne Judge to the position of a Chief Justice or Chief Baron has happened (I think) only once in the course of the last fifty years-namely, when Sir William Erle was made Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. In every other instance these offices have been conferred upon Law Officers of the Crown who had proved in Parliament their possession of the various qualities which procure parliamentary success. The question of their abolition is accordingly one in which the existing judges have practically no interest, except so far as they are specially interested in whatever concerns the efficiency and dignity of their office.

The argument upon the subject appears to me to stand thus: In favour of abolishing the offices it is urged that, if the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions are abolished, there will be nothing for the Chief Justice and Chief Baron to preside over, and that their names will thus become anomalous, and, indeed, unmeaning. It is added, that their duties being the same as those of the Puisne Judges, it is improper to give them a higher salary, superior titles, and the advantage of considerable patronage. Some persons go so far as to say that it is a positive advantage to break with the old associations which the names suggest, and to destroy the very semblance of continuity between the old courts and the new one. Finally, to the argument that the abolition of the offices would prevent the Law Officers from accepting judgeships, and so injure the relations between the Bench and the Bar, and diminish the authority of the Bench, it is replied, first, that such persons do not make good judges, and, secondly, that, though they would not accept puisne judgeships, they would accept the appointments of Lords of Appeal and Lords Justices.

To these arguments the following answers are given. It is admitted that the abolition of the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions of the High Court would leave no divisions for the Chief Justice and Chief Baron to preside over, but it is said that a title may remain as a title after the circumstances in which it originated have altered. If a great officer of the State can, without offence, be called Chancellor of the Exchequer, though he is not a Chancellor in any common sense of the word, and though no such place or office as the Exchequer exists, why should not an eminent judge be called Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, though there is no longer any Court of Exchequer, and though no more Barons are to be appointed? It is proposed to keep up the offices of Lord Chief Justice of England and Master of the Rolls, though the first is only a title, and the second little more. Why is the existence of four such offices any greater anomaly than the existence of two? The real question is whether it is expedient that either two or four of the judges should be paid more highly than the rest, both in money and rank. The argument that this is expedient is that otherwise Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General, and other barristers who have the prospect of holding such a position, will not accept judicial office; and as to their alleged willingness to accept the place of Lords of Appeal and Lords Justices, the answer is that the difference between the position of a Lord Justice and a Puisne Judge (which consists merely in the payment of the circuit expenses of the former, and in his being a Privy Councillor) would hardly be sufficient to induce men receiving already a higher salary, probably more than doubled by private practice, to accept the place; and that though the position of a Lord of Appeal is undoubtedly more attractive, it is not the one in which the public interests require men of this class to be placed. This last argument is of great importance, and unless it is fully understood it is difficult to appreciate either the importance of the offices proposed to be abolished, or the far more important question of the relation between the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice. It is based upon the principle that the business of a Judge of First Instance is of more importance than the business of a Judge of Appeal, and that it is highly desirable for

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