neighbour, under the pretext of giving us the benefit of his institutions, threatened our independence. There can be no doubt that, apart from the special connection of Holland with the Transvaal, considerations of this nature have largely influenced Dutch opinion. To deny the right of nations and states to dispose of their own destinies at their own pleasure and to judge for themselves what is conducive to their happiness, is a most dangerous principle for the existence of small States, especially where annexations are carried out from the purest motives. The good aims which one power exercises in reality are too easily made a pretext by another, and soon every conquest and arnexation, however iniquitous and unwarrantable, is completely justified.

Sir Bartle Frere, in his interesting article about the Transvaal which appeared in the last number of this Review, speaks of Dutchmen 'who look forward to the ultimate absorption of Holland into the Germanic Empire.' We do not know whether such Dutchmen actually exist-we fortunately have never come across any-but this we do know, that it is that section of the Dutch nation which, if there were any danger of the absorption of their country into the German or any other Empire, would appeal to England in the first place, that has been most painfully impressed by the events in the Transvaal.

But those Dutchmen, of whom Sir Bartle Frere suspected the existence, would, according to him, wish for the conversion of the Transvaal into an allied colony of Germany. Where, as I stated above, the persons themselves are unknown quantities to me, I cannot judge of their wishes and objects. Among the Dutchmen of my acquaintance there are few who have ever contemplated the eventuality of a German connection with the Transvaal, and there is not one among them who would contemplate such a combination with equanimity.

The position of our race in South Africa would not certainly be improved by being ensconced between two great powers. The relations between the Dutch and English already have given rise to difficulties. With the German race the Dutch have much less in common, and they would find it, in the long run, impossible to live on good terms with them. The uneasy relations between the German missionaries and the Transvaal Boers somewhat illustrate this fact.

There exists besides a more general reason why no Dutchman will wish for any intervention of Germany in South African affairs. It is a reason which is self-evident, and can be better appreciated in England than in any other country in the world. No English statesman can wish that either Germany, or Italy, or any other noncolonial European power, should make the acquisition of colonies an object of its policy. And if one of the most powerful European States, with the largest colonial dependencies in the world, objects to the prospect of new colonial rivals, how much more strongly will that

objection be felt by a people with much smaller dependencies beyond the sea and with a European territory comparatively much smaller!

A German protectorate is certainly the last thing we wish for our Transvaal brethren. If they cannot live without protection, then may England discharge those functions; but we are not yet convinced that they are unable to protect themselves. A population which of its own accord leaves its homesteads to defend its independence on its frontiers against an enemy superior in numbers, shows, it seems to me, that it possesses sufficient energy and national vigour to be able to maintain its independent existence. That they are less skilled in the difficult science of government than the civilised European nations who have had a long experience is natural. And even in some civilised States of Europe such conflicts between the executive and the legislative powers as appear to have taken place in 1877 in the Transvaal are not unknown. President Burgers may have uttered bitter words about the Volksraad, and the Volksraad may have shown itself intractable towards the President, but at least let it not be forgotten that the one thing they agreed in was a protest against the annexation by England.

Will such an annexation, which, as its partisans must themselves admit, has never received the formal sanction which they maintain it might so easily have obtained, be upheld by the English Government against the manifest will of the people?

As a foreigner I will abstain from criticising the colonial policy of the present English Government in South Africa. As a Dutchman I hope that the claims of my countrymen in South Africa may be weighed and considered with as much care as those of the races in the Balkan peninsula.

England's prestige on the Continent is sufficient not to require for its sake an easy military triumph over a weaker and badly equipped enemy.

However great may be the tension and anxiety in Holland, we still trust in the justice and impartiality of the English Government, and in the feelings of generosity and loyalty of the British nation.

W. H. DE BEAUFORT.

THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY.

No. L. APRIL 1881.

THE MILITARY IMPOTENCE OF

GREAT BRITAIN.

ON November 9, 1876, Benjamin Disraeli, as Premier of Great Britain, made a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London which attracted immense notice. The political importance of the speaker, the tone of the speech, the universal echo it found in the country, justify the reproduction of its most noticeable phrases at the commencement of this paper. There is no country,' said Disraeli, 'so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. Peace is especially an English policy. She is not an aggressive Power, for there is nothing which she desires: she covets no cities and no provinces.'

6

Who was not reminded by these words of the memorable speech of Louis Napoleon, when Prince-President, at the banquet of the Chambers of Commerce at Bordeaux, on October 9, 1852, which culminated in the famous phrase, 'L'empire c'est la paix'? The Empire which this speech was to introduce came, but it was war; war in the Crimea, in Italy, in Cochin China, in Mexico-in France.

Disraeli had surely only to thank his famous predecessor, if the world did not entirely believe in 'Peace so especially the policy of England.' To be sure, the noble lord who from 1874 to 1879 governed the British Empire with strong hand did his best to keep alive this distrust in the truth of his words. Although nothing existed which England could wish for, although she desired no states, no provinces, yet she has pushed forward the boundary lines of her power within the last five years. In 1874 England occupied Lahedsch, in Arabia, and annexed the Fiji Islands; in 1875 purVOL. IX. No. 50.

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chased Mohammereh, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and by the acquisition of 177,000 Suez Canal shares gained a casus interventionis in Egypt; in 1877 she occupied Khetta, in Beloochistan, and annexed, in spite of the protests of the population, the Transvaal Republic in South Africa; in 1878 she occupied Cyprus. During this period she felt herself threatened and disturbed by the French, the Turks, the Russians in India, and by the firstnamed also in Africa. She has had repeated differences with Egypt, and quite lately also with Burma; has been very near a warlike collision with Guatemala, China, and Russia; and has actually gone to war with the Ashantis, Afridis, Afghans, and Zulus.

This, then, is peace-the policy so peculiarly England's! Nevertheless, we are of the same opinion as Disraeli-that there is no country so interested in the preservation of peace as England. A State whose prosperity, under the blessings of peace-as Porter informs us amounts to the yearly sum of 80,000,000l., dreads naturally the burning questions of high policy, and their solution through blood and iron. But still more powerful than the interests of Britain is the spirit of the age. In the struggle for existence, the recognition of the importance of economic factors and the pursuit of material gain become every day more universal. Wherever the spirit of enterprise spreads its wings it encounters the resistance of Great Britain-hitherto the Farmer-General of the profits of the world.

In this daily-widening contest England recognises her conflicting interests, and feels that she will be obliged to want states and provinces-nay, even to make war-if she is to preserve her existence. The British Empire, spread over the whole world, must have its military representatives, ready to fight and prepared to strike for the protection of its interests throughout the world.

Is this, however, the case? Does England's readiness for war correspond to the world-wide extent of this empire, and to the dangers involved in it? Does it correspond to the requirements of modern warfare? The Premier of England answered these questions with a proud 'Yes.'

'But although the policy of England is peace, he continued in his speech at the banquet, 'there is no country so well prepared for war as our own. What she wishes is to maintain and to enjoy the unexampled empire which she has built up, and which it is her pride to remember exists as much upon sympathy as upon force. If she enters into conflict in a righteous cause-and I will not believe that England will go to war except for a righteous cause if the contest is one which concerns her liberty, her independence, or her empire, her resources, I feel, are inexhaustible. She is not a country that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a second or a third campaign. She enters into a campaign which she will not terminate till right is done.'

The effect of this speech on the audience was, as might be expected, highly inflammatory. The subdued rage which had been aroused in the nobility and gentry of the country by the consideration

of Asiatic affairs dissolved under the impression of the bold words of the noble lord in a feeling of power, self-consciousness, and pride. Before the speaker, perhaps, hovered the form of the great Pitt; before his mind's eye, perhaps, rose up that proud time of English history when British gold gave life to the coalition of Europe against France, set her troops in motion, and healed her wounds; that period when England deluged the Continent with her agents, and fought the French Republic by smuggling in false assignats, by tricks and conspiracies; that proud time when countless troops of English soldiers fought now on the Continent, now in the Colonies, and English war fleets covered every sea. It was only natural that Disraeli's speech should produce a fiery effect throughout the whole of Great Britain. We, however, who are not Englishmen, nor boon companions of the Lord Mayor of London, can, without eliciting any rebuke, apply the knife of criticism to this important after-dinner speech, and with sharp shears separate the truth and falsehood which are so remarkably mingled together in it.

'There is no country,' says Disraeli, 'that is so well prepared for war as England;' and, in full consciousness that he is addressing the richest country in the world, he proceeds: 'it is not a country which, at the outbreak of a war, requires to ask whether it can support a second or a third campaign.'

In this sense, doubtless, also General le Bœuf, French Minister of War, had a full right to exclaim to the deputies who thronged around him at the memorable sitting of July 10, 1870, 'Nous sommes archi-prêts.' If any country, surely France-France, crushed in so unprecedented a manner in 1870-1-can declare that her resources are practically inexhaustible. And yet history replied to the phrase 'Nous sommes archi-prêts' with the battles of Metz, the catastrophe of Sedan, the capture of the Rhine army, the capitulation of Paris, the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine, and the payment of 5,000 million francs as a war indemnity. Here, as on each of her pages, history furnishes a proof that all the resources, all the riches in the world, are inadequate to compensate for the want of a military organisation suited to the times.

If we desire to obtain a clear notion of Great Britain's capability for going to war, we must turn our attention to its military resources compared with the political problems it has to face.

GREAT BRITAIN AS A NAVAL POWER.

For fully ten years, from 1858-1868, France maintained-without proof, indeed, yet without challenge the position of first naval Power. Since the war with Germany, however, she has been content with the second place; and England has taken the opportunity to resume her natural position as first naval Power.