was responsible were homogeneous in their principal features-disposition of armament, power of maintaining speed at sea, and manoeuvring capability. Any of them could have been made a unit in a squadron without seriously prejudicing its efficiency. Full use was made, of course, of successive improvements in naval guns, propelling machinery, boilers, armour, gun-mountings, and the materials used in shipbuilding and engineering. In this manner, without very great increase in size and cost of individual ships laid down, as compared with their immediate predecessors, substantial progress was secured in speed as well as offensive and defensive powers. This gradual progress involved no radical change of type, and the lead of Great Britain was practically followed in essentials elsewhere, although there were many differences in details and designs of foreign ships.

It is conceivable, of course, that such a period as that described might be advantageously followed by a radical change of type such as occurred when the Dreadnought was laid down. No system of construction, however admirable it may be, can be regarded as applicable for an unlimited time. The march of invention is unceasing. On the other hand, before a radical change is made there should be full proof that the balance of advantage lies that way, and that increased size and cost are justified by gains in offensive and defensive power and general fighting efficiency. This is the question raised throughout this paper. Reasons have been given for holding the opinion that the defensive powers of the Dreadnought type are not well proportioned to the offensive powers; that the multiplication of heavy guns in individual ships involves some loss of efficiency in the individual pairs of guns, and some difficulties in regard to magazines. The real gain in speed in the Dreadnought over her predecessors has been shown to be less than the apparent gain, because vessels have been tried at draughts of water and displacements corresponding to different departures from their deep-load conditions. Further, the comparison of speeds is vitiated by the use of more efficient steam turbines in the Dreadnought as compared with reciprocating engines in preceding ships. As to the maintenance of speed at sea, the Dreadnought, with her greater length and weight, as well as the high forecastle, would doubtless have an advantage; but this could not be important, and her predecessors have done well in this respect. Their freeboard forward is less, and their forward pairs of 12-inch guns are lower; experience shows, however, that they can fight these guns efficiently in any weather in which an action is likely to occur. Increase in height of freeboard and height of guns above water beyond what is really necessary is accompanied by sensible drawbacks. It increases the area of target and raises the weights, thus telling against the maintenance of stability when ships are damaged in action. As to steadiness of gun-platform, all that need

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be said is that certain unavoidable conditions of the design of the Dreadnought type compel the acceptance of greater stiffness' than in preceding types; and this must tend to quicker rolling motion and to less steadiness of gun-platform than has been obtained in previous types. In regard to draught of water, the figures given above show that the Dreadnought, when fully laden, draws three feet more water than the King Edwards. This is a serious disadvantage in warlike operations, especially in comparatively shallow water like the Baltic; and it must limit the range of useful employment. It also involves difficulties in regard to harbours and docks. A year ago at Gibraltar the writer was informed that the Dreadnought when fully laden could not lie afloat in the harbour, except in the relatively deep water near the approach to the docks. Similar difficulties must be felt elsewhere, and the multiplication of these large and deep-draught ships must be accompanied by large expenditure on dredging, docks, &c. Already there are indications of what will become necessary if the big-ship policy is continued; and the matter requires thorough investigation. Finally, in regard to manœuvring power further information is required. There are in circulation rumours that the capabilities of the Dreadnought are inferior to those of her predecessors; these must give cause for anxiety if they are correct. It is a matter for great regret that the Dreadnought has not been treated in the same way as the Royal Sovereign class, the Majestic, and other new battleship types were treated. They were attached to fleets in active commission under the command of experienced admirals, and were thoroughly tested at sea and in steam tactics alongside their predecessors and under identical conditions. In no other way can a conclusive opinion be formed as to the suitability of a ship for taking her place in and working with a fleet. Apologists for the type have gone so far as to suggest that its superlative merits would justify its multiplication even if the manoeuvring qualities were so exceptional that vessels of the class would require to be always grouped in separate squadrons. This procedure would be novel, and is hardly likely to find favour with responsible authorities, or to be practicable continuously in the emergencies of a naval war.

In conclusion, the writer desires to state that the opinions he has endeavoured to express and support in the preceding pages are shared by many naval officers of great experience and high authority. Some of these have already made known their dissent from the recent British policy in ship-construction; others are not in a position to do so at present. It has been urged that the policy is justified by the practically universal adoption of its main features by the responsible authorities of foreign navies. There is weight in this argument, no doubt; on the other hand, it must be recognised that the supreme position occupied by the British Navy has resulted in its lead being followed generally for many years past. In the case of the Dreadnought,

moreover, such claims to superiority were made by responsible authorities in Parliament and in the Press, and such assertions of the disclassing of previous types were put forward, that it was only natural for possible rivals who were then far behind in the construction of those previous types to rush into the construction of the new type. Germany, in particular, has taken this course, and it has become the fashion to concentrate attention on the numbers of British and German Dreadnoughts and Invincibles and to estimate the relative forces of the British and German navies at selected dates, as if only ships of the new type counted and their predecessors were of very subordinate importance. Not a few high authorities, however, are of opinion that some vessels of preceding types are individually superior in fighting efficiency to the Dreadnought type, and for a given expenditure a larger number of such vessels can be produced. Blind persistence in our recent policy, without further comparison of types, is therefore undesirable. It would be foolish to plunge into a costly competition with the German Programme and to construct large numbers of improved' Dreadnoughts without further inquiry. Within three years from the commencement of the Dreadnought, and before adequate experience with that vessel as a unit in a fleet, the displacement tonnages of her successors have been considerably increased. If it be admitted to be necessary to concentrate in individual battleships the greatest possible offensive and defensive powers, it follows that there must be successive additions to size and cost. The St. Vincents have a Navy List displacement of 19,250 tons-1350 tons larger than the Dreadnought-and were said by Lord Tweedmouth to be a great advance' on the Téméraires of 18,600 tons, which he described as 'infinitely better' ships than the Dreadnought. Where is this progress in size and cost of warships to end? What considerations are to fix the upper limits of displacement draught and expenditure? The case of warship design obviously differs essentially from that of swift passenger steamships. In mercantile ships the test of commercial profit or loss and of suitable port accommodation can be applied, and so limits of size and cost can be fixed. Modern passenger steamers are really swift and luxurious floating hotels, unfitted for use as fighting machines. Limits of draught of water can be accepted for them which would involve serious disabilities and limitations in warships. Warships and merchant ships are essentially different in design because they are intended for radically different services, and are exposed to different risks.

It may be urged that the subject was exhaustively considered by the Board of Admiralty, aided by a special Committee on Designs, before the Dreadnought and Invincible classes were ordered, and that the conditions of naval warfare remain unchanged. The writer is of opinion that any impartial reader who peruses the official Report of the work done by that Committee will be convinced that the inquiry

made was not exhaustive, nor marked by the deliberate investigation essential to the solution of a problem of great difficulty and supreme importance. He recognises the right of the Admiralty to select the types of warships best adapted to the requirements of the British Navy. He has endeavoured to state the case fairly for and against the new types, and he ventures to believe that a case for further inquiry has been made out.

W. H. WHITE.

GENERAL GORDON

A PERSONAL REMINISCENCE

My acquaintance with General Gordon, which soon became a fast friendship, began in April 1880. He had been appointed Private Secretary to the Viceroy of India, and I was at that time acting in a similar capacity to Lord Hartington, who was Secretary of State.

On the 14th of May 1880 Gordon sailed for India, and my brother, who was aide-de-camp to Lord Ripon, sailed with him. They became very intimate, and Gordon gave him a little volume, Clarke's Scripture Promises, and wrote in it, 'To my dear and honest young Eugene L. Brett, 3 June, 1880.'

friend

It was the day that Gordon resigned his post as Private Secretary. On the 2nd of July he arrived at Pekin, and was soon engaged in helping his old friend, Li Hung Chang, who, as an advocate of peace, was in imminent danger from the War Party in China.

Gordon returned to England in November. Early in the following month he came to see me at the India Office, and from that time onwards was constantly in and out of my house in Tilney Street. He would generally come in the morning, a queer figure, with a loose comforter round his throat, and a hat--by no means a good onetilted back on his head; the eternal cigarette between his lips. He was of small stature-very small, like so many great men—and of spare figure. He would have passed unnoticed anywhere, except for his eyes, which were of that peculiar steel-like blue common to enthusiastic natures, more especially when the enthusiast is a soldier. He would lounge into the library, and stand-for he hardly ever cared to sit for hours at a time, leaning against the mantelpiece, or walking up and down the room.

His talk was as fresh as a spring morning, full of humour, and his language as simple as the book of Genesis.

Complexity of thought, confusion of ideas, prolixity of speech, were impossible to him. He saw with wonderful clearness, perhaps sometimes not very far.

He detested cant, and although he could be strangely indignant, and was deeply roused by faithlessness, his charity knew no bounds.