Powers separated by upwards of three thousand miles of ocean, and thus would be in a position to deal in detail with the naval forces arrayed against her. Great Britain, in fact, would have every possible strategical advantage. It is merely fighting an unsubstantial shadow to examine closely the possibility of such a contingency, because no one seriously believes it is likely to arise. No reasonable argument has been advanced for taking the American Fleet into definite account in calculating the measures which should at present be taken to maintain the British Navy in adequate strength.

If we eliminate the American Fleet from our calculations, what should be our policy in the future, bearing in mind our alliance with Japan, our entente with France, our friendship with Russianow fleetless and our cordial relations with Italy? In this connexion it may be profitable to recall some remarks made by Sir Edward Grey on the 27th of June 1904 at the Royal United Service Institution :

It is quite true that policy determines armaments, but armaments have also something to do with determining policy. We still have the Two-Power standard for the Navy-I think that is the official standard, that our Navy is to be equal to the Navy of any other two Powers. Yes, but the Two-Power standard does not mean what it did when it was first introduced. When we first heard of the Two-Power standard, we only contemplated two considerable navies, and therefore the Two-Power standard was almost equivalent to saying not only two Powers, but any probable combination against us. Now the number of considerable navies in the world is growing. There is Japan with a large Navy; Russia, who, even after this war is over, I presume, will not be content for long to be without a considerable Navy; France has a considerable Navy; Germany is sure to have an important Navy; Italy has a considerable Navy; and also the United States. There are six Powers alone. We cannot keep our Navy up to a Six-Power standard; we cannot even keep it up to a Four- or Five-Power standard if there are four or five other Great Powers who are going to spend their money in building ships. It has come to this, therefore, that while we must keep up our Navy to make us safe against any probable combination against us, yet, at the same time, with the great increase in the navies of the world, it is, in my opinion, necessary for us as a nation to depart from our old policy of splendid isolation.

Splendid isolation, I think, is no longer the policy for us, and I am glad to see in one respect, at any rate, we have departed from it. I am not much in favour of alliances, but splendid isolation is one extreme and alliances are the other extreme. The first desire of this country is to keep on good terms with the United States, so that in our shipbuilding the United States' programme may not be taken as a competitive programme which we have to meet. But our second important duty, I think, is that we must maintain closer and closer relations with some, at any rate, of the great European Powers. I said I am not speaking in the sense of making alliances. To give an illustration of what I mean, I would take the last agreement with France as the sort of thing which I do mean. That I call departing from the policy of splendid isolation: to go so far as, at any rate, to meet another European Power, and to come to some adjustment of our interests, which shall produce friendly feeling between the two countries. We cannot, I agree, check our shipbuilding simply because we happen to be on good terms for the time being with any particular foreign country;

but, at the same time, when we are looking to the future, we can quite compatibly with that see it to be the business of the Government of the day so to arrange their foreign policy that they endeavour, at any rate, to keep on friendly terms with a certain group of the Powers of the world, so as to make any probable combination which we are likely to have to meet as small as possible.

The foreign policy indicated by Sir Edward Grey has been consistently followed. Since the alliance was concluded with Japan, Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey have devoted themselves to carrying on the work initiated by the King himself in the case of the French entente. We are no longer in splendid isolation'; we have no longer any outstanding differences with the United States, France, Russia, Germany, or other Power. The international outlook, if it be not absolutely cloudless-for Germany is a source of world-wide anxiety-has at least fewer storm portents than at any time for fifty years past. May it not be legitimately suggested, therefore, that we can afford to revert to the naval standard of 1889: bare equality with the two next most formidable navies in Europe-France and Germany -regarding the now traditional attitude of these two Powers to one another as more than equivalent to the 10 per cent. margin looked upon as necessary when this country was building against the Dual Alliance? Or, again, may we not, in the alternative, be satisfied with two to one in keels against Germany alone?

If it be admitted that either of the standards is now adequate, how does our naval position in the immediate future work out?

Lord George Hamilton and the spokesmen of every Board of Admiralty have admitted that the strength of a Fleet should be judged mainly by its battleships, but, on the other hand, we have armoured cruisers more powerful in every respect than many foreign battleships. It is admitted, among others by Sir William White, the late Director of British Naval Construction, that the relative strength of fleets may be judged with fair accuracy from the relative displacement of contemporaneous vessels. That at the present moment the British Navy is above the Two-Power standard in battleships and in armoured cruisers is not seriously contested by any authority. But it has been urged that recent British shipbuilding programmes have not been adequate to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength in the future.

It is well to meet and deal in the most direct way with this insidious suggestion, because it leaves the door open to a mass of misrepresentation. Shipbuilding in this country is arranged year by year in accordance with the immediate necessities as judged by activity abroad in ship-construction, whereas in France and Germany the custom is to adopt programmes spread over a varying number of years. It is the practice of those who are busy in depreciating British naval power to take into calculation these French and German programmes and omit to mention the two essential facts

(1) that British programmes are expanded or diminished year by year in accordance with the necessities of the immediate future as revealed by construction abroad, and (2) that shipbuilding in this country is carried on far more rapidly than abroad. We are building the largest armoured vessels in about two years, Germany takes three years, and France five years and sometimes an even longer period; consequently there is always a deceptive number of men-of-war under construction in French and German yards, and by comparing the tonnage at any moment building in the United Kingdom (to be completed in two years) with that which is in hand in French and German yards (to be completed on the average in four years) it is possible to produce a picture of British naval decadence which is calculated to alarm those who do not appreciate the real inwardness of the misrepresentation.

Bearing in mind these two essential factors, what will be the naval position at the end of, say, 1911? In thus looking forward we obtain a picture of the programmatical' fleets of France and Germany as they will exist on the 31st of December 1911 in contrast with the British Fleet at that date, minus the new improved Dreadnought and the large armoured cruiser of the new shipbuilding programme (1908-9), which will by that time be at sea. Consequently the figures for the British Fleet are defective to the extent of the coming financial year's programme, while those of France and Germany are accurate. What are the facts? According to very careful calculations the naval position in completed battleships less than twenty years old and in similarly modern armoured cruisers will be as follows:

Germany

34, of 428,000 tons 78, of 959,800 tons

British superiority (10.2er cent. in number of ships

26.2 cent. in tons displacement

The relative fighting strength of the British fleets on the 31st of December 1911 may not appear unsatisfactory, but in the succeeding few months Germany will complete four large ships and France two. For this reason we cannot refrain from energetic shipbuilding if we would hold our own, always remembering that we can build a Dreadnought in about two years.

The Two-Power standard, however, bears not only upon ships built, but upon officers and men trained to fight them. It is useless for any naval Power to build ships which it is unable to man. Scratch crews of half-trained reservists will never achieve victory. The fortunes of war will be decided by ships manned and drilled month in and month out for the stern realities of battle. Man is still greater than the instruments under his control, and it is almost as important to the country that it should have a sufficient margin of superiority in personnel as in matériel. The history of modern warfare has shown, it is true, that the destruction of matériel during hostilities is far more considerable than the casualities to officers and men, but still the personnel is an important element in naval power. If a war continues for some months the same officers and men can be regrouped in order to commission fresh ships brought out from the reserve. On the other hand, if the resources in officers and men are inadequate it will be too late after war has broken out to take in hand the work of training additional personnel. The Two-Power standard must be held to apply to officers and men as well as to ships. How do we stand in this respect? In the present year the numbers of officers and men compare thus:

British superiority, 23.8 per cent. over the Two-Power standard

In officers and men trained and drilled in their warlike duties the British Fleet has not a 10 per cent. margin, but a margin of nearly 24 per cent. over the fleets of France and Germany.

But it may be said that these other nations have large reserves. So also has Great Britain, and the advantage of the British Fleet in this respect is an important one. In France the men of the fleet serve only for forty-four months under the colours, and in Germany for only three years, and then they pass into the reserve. In Great Britain

the minimum period of active service is five years, and this short term applies almost exclusively to stokers, while the majority of the seamen ratings remain in the fleet for a minimum period of twelve years before passing into the reserve. The result is that the British Fleet gains the inestimable benefit of men who have a far longer period of training, and we thus obtain a higher standard of efficiency in the

active fleet and a correspondingly higher standard in the reserve in comparison with Germany, and still more in contrast with France. The number of reservists of the German Navy is uncertain, but from the numbers on the active list it is certain that the available force is comparatively small, seeing that after their three years' active service men are required to remain in the reserve only for four years. In France the efficient reserve numbers approximately 50,000 men, who are for the most part only inadequately trained and have few facilities for keeping in touch with the Navy. On the other hand, the British reserves, including pensioners under fifty-five years of age, reach an aggregate of 57,255. These were the numbers actually borne on the 1st of January, 1907 giving the Navy a total strength of 184,884 officers and men, including regulars and reserves, a sufficient number to man adequately every war-worthy ship in the fleet. The aggregate naval personnel is 20,000 greater than it was even as lately as five years ago. The figures for the past five years are as follows:

The policy of the Admiralty has been to pass an increased number of stoker ratings through the Navy-five years in the active fleet and seven years in reserve-and thus build up the manning resources without unduly adding to the pension list. The result of this policy is that to-day, while the number of men on the active list is above the Two-Power standard and the majority of seamen still enter for twelve years, the British Fleet possesses a far larger trained reserve than any other navy in the world-the United States has none at all-and year by year the reserve forces continue to increase. The manning policy of the Admiralty has already been proved a conspicuous success: whereas in 1903 the number of reserves was less than 42,000, now it is over 57,000, a net gain of 15,000 officers and men, all of whom have been trained and are still being trained periodically to man the ships and do the actual duties which would be required of them in time of war.

The Two-Power standard may also be held to apply to the fleets which are kept at sea ready for any emergency. In making a comparison on this basis it may be well to eliminate all the British ships with nucleus crews-though abroad there is no organisation as perfect-in view of the acrimonious controversy which has arisen among civilian critics, and not among naval officers, as to the merits of this system of organising the older and still efficient men-of-war. The following figures represent the actual number of armoured ships which Great Britain, France, and Germany maintain all the year round in full commission in European waters-that is, with crews up