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into which it put Rome and Carthage two thousand years ago. Germany wishes to possess that which Great Britain wishes to keep, and it is difficult to see how, under the circumstances, a collision between the two countries can be avoided.

Germany has entered upon the same line of business as Great Britain, and the consequence is that almost every profit to Germany means a loss to Great Britain, and almost every profit to Great Britain means a loss to Germany. The prosperity of the German manufacturing industries caused serious damage to our own industries. The success of the German chemical industries resulted in the decline of the British chemical industry, of the West Indian sugar industry, and of the Indian indigo industry. Germany's prosperity is largely built up on the ruin of British industries, and a revival of British industries will cause the ruin of many German industries. Great Britain, finding Germany's progress too fast, is becoming exasperated at seeing herself deprived of trade, industries, and shipping by Germany, and having her industrial population thrown out of work and forced to leave the country. Germany, on the other hand, finding her progress too slow, is becoming exasperated at seeing herself hampered in every direction by British vested interests.

The foregoing makes it clear that Germany and Great Britain can be friends only if Germany does not wish to obtain those commercial harbours which she so urgently requires for her manufacturing industries and her merchant marine; if she does not desire to obtain those naval harbours which she so urgently requires for her new fleet; if she does not want to obtain those colonies which she so urgently requires for her population; if she has, indeed, no wish to remain a great Power but is willing to sink, with the advance of the British, American, and Russian Empires, to the level of a secondrate Power. However, that is evidently not the policy of Germany or of her Emperor.

British Governments are habitually surprised by events; German Governments anticipate them. The possibility-or, rather, the necessity of a collision between Germany and Great Britain has for many years occupied the mind of the Emperor and of his advisers, and they are preparing everything for that event. Let us look into Germany's naval policy, aims, and preparations.

The preamble of the Navy Bill of 1900 stated: Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a struggle with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power.' That somewhat indiscreet phrase is the best summary of Germany's naval policy and aims, and it should be known by heart by every English

man.

Until lately the German fleet was pre-eminently a fleet for home defence. The ships measured only from 10,000 to 13,000 tons, and they had but a small coal-carrying capacity and radius of action.

They were evidently rather meant to manœuvre among the shallows and the tortuous channels of the Baltic and the North Sea than to fight in blue water. The Germans had apparently not yet entirely ridded themselves of the old coast-defence idea. Besides, ships of more than 13,000 tons could not pass through the Baltic and North Sea Canal. However, it was thought that the small but agile German ships might be able to tackle the larger English ships in the cramped home-waters of the German coast. The battle of Tsushima showed the value of large ships. The building of the Dreadnought opened the eyes of the naval men in Germany. They began to understand that the era of small ships had passed, that English Dreadnoughts would have to be met with German Dreadnoughts, and they resolved also to build Dreadnoughts.

The Dreadnought type has superseded all existing types of battleships. It seems likely that in the naval battles of the future ships of this class only will fight in the first line. Therefore, the coming of these will convert most British fighting ships into second-rate ships, and it will almost abolish Great Britain's naval superiority. By her ships of the Dreadnought type finished, launched, and building Great Britain has only a small advantage over Germany, and Germany means to outbuild this country in ships of the largest size. According to the supplementary Navy Bill of 1906, Germany was to lay down every year two Dreadnought battleships of about 20,000 tons-the exact measurements are not known-and a cruiser-battleship of the same size; but lately the Reichstag has added another Dreadnought battleship to this number, making the yearly increase of the German fleet three battleships of the Dreadnought class and a cruiser-battleship of similar dimensions. In other words, Germany will lay down in every year four Dreadnoughts whilst Great Britain laid down only three in 1906 and 1907, and the German Dreadnoughts are to be larger, faster, and more powerfully armed than their British prototypes. In a few years Germany will have a fleet of twenty Dreadnoughts, and the German public and the German Press, led by the foremost semiofficial publications, find the German shipbuilding programme, which for the first time in history exceeds that of this country, quite insufficient. Voices are raised demanding a further increase in the shipbuilding votes.

The Navy Bill of 1900 made provision for thirty-eight battleships. With regard to the 1900 programme, the semi-official naval and military monthly Überall states in its last issue: A bad fleet is the greatest luxury a State can indulge in. It is useless to have a battlefleet composed half of Dreadnoughts and half of ships of inferior fighting value, though they may be new ones,' and it demands that all the thirty-eight ships should be of Dreadnought size. To complete such a fleet Germany would have to lay down six Dreadnoughts a year. Her shipbuilding facilities are adequate, and there are reasons for

thinking that another expansion of the German shipbuilding programme is being prepared. Great Britain began building a single experimental Dreadnought. Germany is simultaneously building three experimental Dreadnoughts, and she could hardly be expected to do more than this in the first year. There are good reasons for believing that Germany will very greatly increase her yearly output of Dreadnoughts as soon as the first one has proved a success.

The fact that Germany is making a determined attempt at outbuilding this country in ships of the largest size is exceedingly serious. Unfortunately, many Englishmen, implicitly trusting in unwarranted official declarations, are under the impression that Great Britain can outbuild Germany; that British ships are better than German ones, and that they are built more quickly. According to the German shipbuilding records given in the year book Nauticus, German warships are built not more slowly but more quickly than British ones, and Admiral Tirpitz has only recently confirmed that fact. Private enquiries have elicited the information that the German private shipbuilding yards alone can turn out seventeen Dreadnoughts every year fully provided with armour, guns, &c.

Perhaps still more serious is the fact that, according to various high German authorities, there are some very weak spots in our fleet. German technical authorities have a very low opinion of the British twelve-inch wire gun. According to their unanimous view, it has proved a failure. Its barrel rapidly loses its shape. In the twelveinch wire guns of the Japanese fleet the distortion of the barrels became so great that the shells turned over and over in the air like a clumsily-thrown stick instead of flying straight. Therefore the Japanese had at Tsushima to rely chiefly on their secondary armament. The longer the barrel, the greater is the weakness of the wire guns, and our Dreadnoughts are armed exclusively with the longest type of twelve-inch wire guns. In other words, the strongest and most modern English guns are, according to the German authorities, quite unreliable. Besides, the twelve-inch Krupp guns are not only found to be more reliable, being built up on a different principle, but, according to the German Ordnance Tables, they are far more powerful than the corresponding British guns. According to the German naval authorities Great Britain cannot at present make guns to equal those of Krupp. As warships are merely floating gun-carriages, that defect in the British ships is most serious. German authorities also maintain that Great Britain keeps an insufficient reserve of heavy guns and that British gunnery is largely useless because the ships fire at stationary targets instead of at moving ones. According to Admiral Tirpitz, the German armour plates are superior to the British ones and, according to Count Reventlow, the large number of accidents and breakdowns in the British fleet are to be ascribed to the fact that British seamen and artificers are inferior to the German ones. Lastly,

it must be doubted whether the organisation of the British fleet is equal to that of the German fleet. An old organisation, old naval traditions and precedents, and old naval bases like all old machinery cannot easily be modernised. There are, according to the German critics, various other weak spots in Great Britain's naval armour, but it would lead too far to describe them in this article.

Provided the defects in the British Navy can be remedied-the wire guns may have to be abandoned-it is chiefly a question of money whether Great Britain will outbuild Germany or whether Germany will outbuild Great Britain. Unfortunately it seems possible that Germany may be able to outbuild this country. The picture of Germany 'groaning' under the burden of militarism and of protective taxation is a fancy picture. On an average Income-tax is 100 per cent. and Local Taxation is 150 per cent. higher in Great Britain than in Germany. Besides, the taxes on beer are four times heavier, on tobacco six times heavier, and on spirits ten times heavier in Great Britain than in Germany. The well-to-do German who pays a penny to a penny-half-penny for his cigars, and the German working man who buys three cigars for a penny, who gets a glass of excellent beer for a penny, and a glass of spirits for a half-penny, can certainly stand some additional taxation on these articles. The fact that there are 800,000,000l. in the German savings banks compared with 200,000,000l. in the British savings banks shows that Germany is rich and that she can afford to challenge Great Britain to a preliminary financial duel.

Whatever the cost may be, the German challenge must be accepted. The security of Great Britain and of the Empire is at stake. For every German Dreadnought Great Britain must build at least two, and even then it is doubtful whether Great Britain will be secure from German attack. Count Reventlow has very justly pointed out that Great Britain, having a world-empire to protect, will hardly be able to keep her fleets permanently concentrated in the North Sea. Herein lies, according to German writers, Germany's chance. Unless Great Britain possesses an overwhelming supremacy over Germany, her coasts cannot be secure. She will be able to transfer her ships to another part of the world only with Germany's permission and even then Germany might use her opportunity and strike whilst a large part of the British fleet was away. Therefore two British ships for every German ship should be the minimum to be laid down, and Lord Tweedmouth had better bring in new estimates immediately.

The strategical position is greatly in favour of Germany. Whilst Great Britain's position is a very delicate one, owing to the vastness of the interests which must be defended, Germany has nothing to protect. Not a single German town lies on the coast and her shores are sheltered by vast shallows. Therefore, she will rely for coast defence on permanent fortifications, torpedo-boats, and submarines,

VOL. LXIII-No. 371

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which she is now planning and constructing, and on floating mines. For this reason Germany declared at the Hague Conference that the indiscriminate use of floating mines was indispensable to her. The whole German fleet will serve as a striking force and be used for the attack.

Although Germany has proclaimed that she requires a powerful fleet for the protection of her colonies and of her foreign trade, she will neglect both colonies and trade in case of war. Her colonies are not worth protecting, and her trade can go on without protection. Germany, not being an island, cannot be starved into surrender. If Great Britain should blockade the German coast, Germany will draw her corn from Russia or Austria-Hungary by land, and her cotton and other produce will come via Antwerp, Rotterdam, Trieste, and Genoa. Whilst Germany is not easily vulnerable, her cruisers might attack British trade and cause widespread distress and starvation in Great Britain by causing a general rise in the prices of foodstuffs and raw materials. German cruisers, issuing from Wilhelmshaven or Kiel, could hardly pass the Dover Straits, but would have to go round the north of Scotland. For that reason a harbour situated as far north as possible, such as Skagen in Denmark, and a well-fortified coaling station or two near Gibraltar would form admirable cruiser bases. These are apparently the reasons which caused Germany's repeated and very energetic endeavours to obtain a footing on the west coast of Morocco.

For the moment and for some time to come, Germany is in a very awkward and insecure position with regard to Great Britain. The Danish straits are too shallow to allow of the passage of Dreadnoughts from the North Sea to the Baltic. Germany is, therefore, unable to send her Dreadnoughts to Kiel. Hence she is as rapidly as possible enlarging the Baltic and North Sea Canal to Dreadnought dimensions. It will take some years-how many is uncertain-until the passage through the canal will be practicable for 20,000-ton ships. Meanwhile Germany will have to find for them some temporary shelter which will not be very secure, and she will be very grateful to Providence if no necessity for using her fleet against Great Britain arises until her big ships and her canal are ready.

During the next five or six years Germany cannot afford to go to war with Great Britain, but when her Dreadnoughts and her canal are finished, matters will be different. It is, therefore, natural that the German Emperor is most anxious to avoid friction with England, and that he has come over here to give a public demonstration of his good will and friendship for England. The hope of gaining the harbours Germany requires and perhaps a colonial empire too, and the hope of seeing twenty years of endeavour at last rewarded by success, was worth a journey.

When the Baltic and North Sea Canal is finished, Germany's

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