new confederacy in which Thebes gladly enrolled herself under Athens. Along with Timotheos the son of Konon and the orator Kallistratos Chabrias had such success in the Egean islands and elsewhere that Athens soon stood at the head of seventy confederate cities. But between the old state of things and the new there was this difference, that Athens had no coercive power, and that the allies were not really bound to do more than they liked. The circumstances of the moment created a vehement enthusiasm; but the flame soon died out, and Athens herself regarded with more than coldness the successes of the most powerful amongst her allies.

For the moment there was nothing to excite her jealousy even in the ardour with which the Thebans organized the celebrated body of troops known as the Sacred Band, and in the singular ability displayed by their leader Epameinondas. Sprung from the ancient stock of the Spartoi, the children of the dragon's teeth sown by Kadmos, this illustrious Theban had attained an eminence in art and science very rarely acquired by his countrymen. Born to no great inheritance, he made no effort to amass wealth; and this merit of personal integrity, always appreciated in Greece, was happily united with the strength of mind in which men pecuniarily incorruptible have sometimes been found, like Nikias, fatally deficient.

The year which followed the attempt of Sphodrias witnessed a Spartan invasion of Boiotia and the more significant sight of Peloponnesian hoplites declining to cross spears with the troops of the Athenian Chabrias. On his return home Agesilaos left Phoibidas at Thespiai; before many weeks were past, the hero of the Kadmeia was slain and his troops scattered by the Theban cavalry. During the next year Agesilaos again took the field; he returned home, after doing but little, stretched on a couch, from which for a long time he was unable to rise. Nor was his successor Kleombrotos more fortunate by land, while in a battle fought off Naxos (376 B.C.) the Spartan admiral Pollis was defeated by the Athenian Chabrias, who might have made the ruin as complete, so Diodoros tells us, as that of Argennoussai, had not the recompense dealt out to the commanders in that memorable conflict withheld him from pursuing the enemy while Athenian seamen were needing his help.

This great success added largely to the power not of Athens only, but of Thebes. But the jealousy of Athens was already

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awake, and it found open expression when the Thebans refused to contribute towards the expenses of the war by sea. They were probably unable to do so; but the Athenians, not easily convinced of this, would hear with increased dissatisfaction that the Theban Pelopidas had defeated the Peloponnesians in the open field, slaying their two commanders, that Thebes had practically recovered her supremacy over the Boiotian cities, and that she was preparing a fleet at her port of Kreusis on the Corinthian Gulf.

Under the fatal conditions which Spartan supremacy had imposed upon Hellenic life nothing more was needed to make Athens seek peace with her deadly enemy. (374 B.C.) The proposal was happily timed, at least for Sparta. Only eight years earlier she had forcibly put down the confederacy which might have served as a permanent bulwark against Makedonian aggression; and in that short time her power had been so shaken that she found herself compelled to allow the Pharsalian Polydamas, who sought her alliance, to strengthen the hands of Iason of Pherai. 'We cannot help you,' was their answer, 'you must make for yourself the best terms that you can.' The Olynthians had been crushed because they had striven to lay the foundations of a society which might have grown into a Greek nation. If vengeance be worth a thought, they were fully avenged when the Pharsalians, bidden to look to themselves, added their votes to those which made Iasôn of Pherai the Tagos of all Thessaly.

An opportunity for doing Sparta a mischief soon presented itself, and Iasôn readily seized it. Korkyra had again become the ally of Athens. (373 B.C.) As in the old days, there were not lacking exiles of the oligarchical faction who sought to gain their ends by bringing Lakedaimonians into the island; and these, too, made their petition for help at a suitable time, for the recent peace with Athens had been broken almost as soon as it was made. The long peace which Korkyra had now enjoyed had restored it to the splendid cultivation which made Chios a paradise until the Chians chose to throw in their lot with Sparta. The luxuriant crops were now destroyed by the Peloponnesians under Mnasippos, the vines cut down, the farm buildings levelled with the ground. But 600 Athenian peltasts, conveyed across Thessaly by Iasôn, managed to effect their entrance into the town, and making a sally with the inhabitants routed the besiegers and slew their general. At this

moment signals announced the approach of the Athenian fleet, and the Peloponnesians at once left the island.

To the Spartans it seemed that things were going against them not on the earth only but in the heavens. The great lamp or rod of flame suspended in the sky for many days together portended some grave disaster, and fully justified a fresh appeal to the despot who ruled at Sousa. A rescript from the Great King once more ordered the Greeks to settle all their quarrels and live peaceably each in his autonomous city; and this time Athens was scarcely less anxious than Sparta to abide by his decree. The re-establishment of Plataia with a Spartan garrison might seem a measure not much to the liking of the Athenians: but these may have felt that the ties which bound the Plataians to their Peloponnesian benefactors would prove less strong than the spell of a friendship unbroken for more than a century. Such at least was the feeling of the Thebans who complained that the new town was simply a hostile stronghold set up in their own land, and, it is said, even charged the Plataians with a plan of surrendering their city to the Athenians. They accordingly resolved to do what they had done before, and the precautions of the Plataians were foiled by a stratagem which shut them out from their city and compelled them to take refuge once more in Athens. (372 B.C.)

The new disaster which thus befell their ancient friends roused at Athens a deep indignation. An appeal was made, it would seem, to the conditions laid down by the Peace of Antalkidas; but the reply was ready that at the time when that peace was promulgated Plataia was not in existence, and could have no title to independence by the terms of that convention. The answer was conclusive; but it strengthened the resolution of the Athenians to put an end to the war, and their envoys appeared in the congress now held at Sparta to propose a division of power. No city could for the present dispute the pre-eminence of Athens on the sea; but if Athens was content to allow to Sparta precedence on land, she must insist that the terms of the peace should no longer be a snare and a delusion, and that Spartan harmosts and Spartan garrisons must at once become things of the past. Consenting to abide by these terms, Sparta nevertheless took the oaths for her allies as well as for herself, while Athens and the cities in alliance with her took them separately. When they were tendered to Epamei

nondas, the envoy of Thebes, he replied that he must take them as representing not Thebes alone but the Boiotian confederacy. To the retort of Agesilaos that the Boiotian cities had as much right to swear separately as Thebes herself, Epameinondas replied by basing the Theban claims on reasons which filled his hearers with dismay. Thebes was for Boiotia what Athens was for her Demoi and what Sparta perhaps was for the townships of Lakonia. Her title to supremacy stretched back to days long preceding the dawn of history, to days as distant perhaps as those of Theseus, the founder of the present Athenian commonwealth. Leaping from his seat in rage, Agesilaos bade him say out distinctly whether he would leave the Boiotian cities autonomous or whether he would not. Yes, we will, if you will leave Lakonia independent in like manner.' Agesilaos answered by a declaration of instant war. Three weeks later Epameinondas shattered the empire of Sparta on the field of Leuktra. (378 B.C.)

Without losing time the Spartans sent orders to Kleombrotos, then at the head of a Peloponnesian army in Phokis, to turn his arms against the Thebans. No one doubted the issue. The only question discussed related to the mode in which Sparta would treat the rebellious city. With this serene sense of superiority Kleombrotos encamped his army on the high ground near Leuktra between the mighty masses of Helikon and Kithairon. Had it not been for Epameinondas the Thebans would have made up their minds to withdraw within their walls and try the chances of a siege. The dislike of facing the redoubtable warriors of Sparta was heightened by alarming signs; but Epameinondas made the most of such favourable omens as might be reported whether from Thebes or from the shrine of Trophonios at Lebadeia. As it so happened, close by the Theban camp stood one of those memorials of infamous wrong which rose up not unfrequently in the track of the Spartan conquerors. The daughters of Skedasos, subjected to shameless outrage, had slain themselves; their father, having vainly sought redress at Sparta, came back and slew himself also. Not the most earnest eloquence of a tried and fearless general could appeal to their inmost heart with the force of this silent monument of high-handed and pitiless iniquity. Crowning the tomb with wreaths, the Thebans resolved to exert their whole might in the effort to punish their murderers. On their side, the

Spartans impetuously clamoured for instant conflict. But they had to deal with a general who refused to be hampered by traditions. To Epameinondas it was plain that his force must be concentrated with the utmost possible weight on the chief strength of the enemy,-in other words, on the Spartan hoplites to whom the right wing belonged by prerogative. If these could be overborne, he needed to trouble himself but little with the not over-zealous efforts of the Spartan allies along their whole front. The heavy-armed men were therefore drawn up to the depth of fifty shields, to give welcome to the Spartan king. At their head stood the Sacred Band under Pelopidas.

Wholly unaware of this change of tactic, the Spartans, drawn up twelve deep, saw with comparative unconcern the ineffectual onset and confused retreat of their cavalry. But as the main mass of the Spartan hoplites came to close quarters with the enemy, they felt at once that for whatever reason the encounter would strain their powers to the utmost. All that brave and strong men could do they did; but all was done in vain. The Sacred Band, pushed on by men as heavily armed and as determined as themselves, were hurled onwards with the weight of an avalanche; and the Spartans lay crushed beneath the advancing mass. Wounded early in the fight, Kleombrotos was carried back to his camp a dying man; and when such as escaped the carnage were there gathered again beyond the enemy's reach, it was found that three hundred genuine Spartans were all that remained of the seven hundred who had descended the hill with the conviction that they were marching to immediate victory.

The Divine Nemesis had done her work. A Spartan king, the first since Leonidas, had been slain. A few Spartans insisted that they should renew the battle and thus recover the dead. The rest saw that if they fought they would have to fight alone, for to many of their allies their disaster was a cause for anything but grief, while all were eager to get away. There was no help but to confess themselves beaten men by asking for the burial truce. The prayer was granted on the condition that the Peloponnesian allies should bury their dead before the Spartans,—a precaution which showed how shrewdly the Thebans suspected the real facts. The task of the allies was soon over. They had very few dead to bury. The whole brunt of the battle had fallen on the Spartans.