been borne, but only a governmental substitute for it, as it has not been removed, but only a way opened in which it may be; there is as much need of forgiveness, and as much to be forgiven, as though the Saviour had not died.

It is claimed as an advantage of this view of the atonement, that it makes it, as to its sufficiency, universal. The other view goes to limit the atonement; and so it is understood by those in general who advocate it. Christ would not endure the full penalty of the law for those whom it was not his purpose to save; and who, of course, would not be benefitted by his death. And yet the scriptures assure us that, as to its nature and sufficiency, the atonement of Christ is universal. It was made for all men. He "died for all;" he "gave himself a ransom for all;" he "tasted death for every man ;" he "is the propitiation, not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Christ's atonement is as sufficient for one as for another. It is sufficient for all who will embrace it, and rest upon it.

Accordingly, the invitations of the gospel are sounded. forth indiscriminately to all men. "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters;" "look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth;" "whosoever will, let him. come, and take the water of life freely." Such, clearly, is the scriptural view, as to the extent and sufficiency of the atonement; and such is the view presented in the Hopkinsian or governmental theory. This makes the atonement universal in its very nature. There is nothing to limit it but the sovereign pleasure of him who made it, or to whom it was made.

Another advantage of this theory is, that it harmonizes entirely the idea of a full and complete atonement, with that of free grace in forgiveness or justification. On the other theories noticed, these ideas can never be reconciled. If Christ paid our whole debt to justice, or suffered for us the full penalty of the law, then, supposing forgiveness possible (which it is not), certainly there could be no grace in

1 2 Cor. v. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Heb. ii. 9; 1 John ii. 2. VOL. XIX. No. 75.

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it. There might be grace in providing the substitute, but none in remitting a debt which had been fully cancelled, or a penalty which had been already endured. But on the other theory, the penalty of the law has not been endured, but only a governmental equivalent. Hence, as before remarked, there is as much need of forgiveness, and as much to be forgiven, and as much grace in bestowing pardon, as though the Saviour had not died. On this ground, the sinner is "justified freely by grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus" (Rom. iii. 4).

The views of Hopkinsians as to the nature of sin (of which we have before spoken), give a peculiarity to their ideas on another subject, viz. :

NATURAL DEPRAVITY.

Those who hold to two kinds of sin, original and actual, the sin of nature and the sin of practice, regard the former of these as innate. It is born with us. It attaches to the very nature and constitution of the soul, and, is with the strictest propriety, called our sin of nature. It lies back of everything active within us, and is the prolific fountain of corruption, out of which all actual transgression flows.

Such views of natural depravity, Hopkinsian writers, of course, do not accept. They believe in the doctrine of natural as well as entire depravity; that sin is natural to us; that we are the subject of a natural bias or tendency to evil, under the influence of which we sin, and only sin, until we are renewed by sovereign grace.

Hopkinsians believe that, in our fallen state, we have a nature to sin; nor would they object to the phrase sinful nature, if by this is meant an active nature; something which stirs itself spontaneously, actively, within us, and consists in an active sinning against God. But to the doctrine of a sinful nature which is not active, which is back of everything active within us, the source of all actual transgression, and without a change of which no right action can be performed, they have strong objections.

They find no ground in the scriptures or in their own

consciousness, for these two kinds of sin; for the one of which we feel guilty, and are conscious of deserving blame and punishment, but for the other of which we feel no guilt, since in it we have had no active concern.

Then the theory here examined makes God the responsible author of sin, at least of that sin which attaches to our nature, and is the source and fountain of all the rest. If God is not its responsible author, who is? Certainly we have had no active concern in its origination. It was born with us; it attaches to the very constitution of our souls; and must be charged, for aught we see, upon the great author of our being.

Also the theory under consideration divests us entirely and confessedly of every kind of ability to do our duty. We are utterly disabled. Until our natures are changed, and in this change of nature we are entirely passive, we can no more perform a good action than we can fly without wings, or work miracles.

Hence, the Bible, on this ground, is utterly in fault, in requiring sinners to do their duty, and in threatening them so severely in case they refuse to comply. It is in fault, too, in using motives with sinners to induce them to do what they have no ability of any kind to perform.

On this ground, ministers have little or nothing to do for the sinner, unless it be to condole with him, pray for him, and commend him to the mercy of God, who, peradventure, may have mercy upon him. Certainly, ministers can give no directions to the sinner, according to this theory, except that he use means with such a nature as he has, and wait and pray for God to change it.

It is further objected to the theory in question, that it is inconsistent with facts recorded in the scriptures. This theory accounts for all sin, by referring it to a sinful nature, and denies that actual sin can be conceived of as possible, on any other supposition. How, then, are we to account for the first sin of the rebel angels; and for that of our first parents? Did their first sin arise from a sinful nature? And if so, how was this sinful nature acquired?

But it is needless to pursue this theory of depravity further. It is a theory, not of the Bible, but of the schools. It is a philosophical theory, or rather a very unphilosopical one, of stating and defending some of the doctrines of the gospel. It is believed that the Hopkinsian view of sin and depravity, as before explained, runs clear of all the above objections, and is in strict accordance with the Bible, with sound philosophy, and with common sense.

NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY AND INABILITY.

Another peculiarity of the Hopkinsians consists in their cognizance and use of the very important distinction between natural and moral ability and inability. They cannot be said to have originated this distinction, because it is as old, probably, as the use of words. We find it in all languages, ancient and modern. We find it in all books, and in reference to all sorts of subjects; so that those who are inclined to repudiate it, find it next to impossible to succeed. The un dúvapai of the Greek, the non possum of the Latin, the ne puis pas of the French, the little cannot of the English, are continually used in two different senses; the one expressing what is called a moral, the other a natural inability; the one a mere inability of disposition and will, the other an inability extraneous to the will, and over which the will has no power. We ask a pious friend to lift for us a thousand pounds. He replies: "I cannot do it." We ask him to go to some place of amusement on the Sabbath; he replies again: "I cannot do it." In both cases he pleads, and pleads properly (as terms are used) an inability. But who does not see that here are two kinds of inability? Our friend has no natural power to lift a thousand pounds. He could not do it, if he would. He has the natural power to comply with the other request, and only lacks the willing mind.

We ask a companion who is walking with us in the field to leap to the top of a precipice fifty feet high. He says "I cannot." But having clambered to the top, we ask him to leap down; he says again "I cannot." In both cases,

his answer is the same in terms. He is unable either to leap up, or to leap down. But clearly, the inability in the two cases is not of the same nature. Our friend could not leap up the precipice, if he would; but he could break his neck by leaping down, if he was so inclined.

The distinction here illustrated is that between natural and moral ability and inability. It is a distinction, as we said, which runs through all languages and all books. It recurs continually in common conversation. Not one of us passes a single day, unless we pass it in utter solitude, without respeatedly using the words can and cannot in the two senses above indicated.

This distinction shows itself very often in the Bible, and that, too, in reference to a great variety of subjects. In the following passages, the inability spoken of is natural: "When Eli was laid down in his place, and his eyes began to wax dim that he could not see" (1 Sam. iii. 2). "The magicians did so with their enchantments to bring forth lice, but they could not" (Ex. viii. 18). The men in the ship with Jonah, "rowed hard to bring it to the land but they could not" (John. i. 13).

In the following passages, an entirely different kind of inability is spoken of. Joseph's brethren "hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him" (Gen. xxxvii. 4). "We cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard" (Acts iv. 20). I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come" (Luke xiv. 20). In each of these cases there is obviously no lack of capacity, of natural power. The inability is wholly of a moral nature, the inability of will.

In establishing the fact of the distinction in question, we have indicated, to some extent, the nature and grounds of it. Natural ability has respect to the natural capacity or faculties of an individual. Moral ability has respect to the disposi tion, the concurrent will, or (which is the same) to the predominant motive, with which the will always coincides. We have the natural ability to do whatever is within the reach of our natural capacity, faculties, or powers those with which the God of nature has endowed us. We have moral ability to