dren, by Jesus Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will" (Eph. i. 4, 5). "For whom he did. foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified" (Rom. viii. 29, 30).

Is it said that the predestinating purpose of God, thus variously expressed, is based on the foreseen repentance and faith of men? We reply that repentance and faith are the very things said to be included in the divine purpose. "Chosen that we should be holy;" predestinated to be "conformed to the image of his Son" but there can be no holiness, or conformity to the image of Christ, which does not involve repentance and faith; and no repentance and faith which does not involve some measure of holiness and conformity to Christ. And, furthermore, it is abundantly taught in the scriptures that men, left to themselves, certainly never will repent and believe. If any do repent and believe, it is because God gives them the special influences of his Spirit. It is his Spirit, and so his decree to give that Spirit, which renders their repentance and faith certain, and therefore his foreknowledge of their conversion does not precede his decree to convert them. Such is the kind of evidence which the Bible affords, to prove the doctrine that the divine decrees extend to all events, both in the natural and the moral world. Nor does it seem possible, on any just principles of interpretation, to set aside this testimony of the inspired word.

In the course of our discussion we have made no effort to prove, as a distinct point, the eternity of the divine decrees. This has seemed to us needless. It would be, to our apprehension, much like attempting to prove a self-evident truth, to attempt to prove that whatever purposes God now has

"There seems to be no difference here between πроéуνw and wроάpire, while, too, in Acts ii. 23; 1 Pet. i. 2; Rom. xi. 2, πрóуvwσis is used directly for the divine will.” — Olshausen, Com. in loc.

he always had and that whatever he decrees at all he decrees eternally. We can conceive of a succession in his decrees in the order of nature, corresponding to the succession in their execution in the order of time; but to suppose that God forms new decrees, and is now, from day to day, adopting new plans, seems repugnant to our most fundamental conceptions of his character. Moreover all objec tions raised against the doctrine are as valid against present as against eternal decrees. And it is, doubtless, owing to the plausibility of certain objections against the doctrine, more than to any defect in the arguments in its favor, that it fails to gain universal credence among philosophers and Christians. Any discussion of the subject, therefore, would be incomplete which did not notice the principal of these objections. To these, therefore, we now turn.

III. OBJECTIONS.

The objections of greatest weight against the doctrine of divine decrees, and which we would here consider are three, viz: "that it is inconsistent with the moral character of God," and "inconsistent with the moral freedom of man, and is harmful in its practical influence." Are these objec

tions valid?

1. The doctrine of decrees is inconsistent with the holiness, benevolence, justice, and sincerity of God. We might,in a general way, reply to this objection, by observing that it lies quite as much against the doctrine of divine providence as against the doctrine of divine decrees. Decrees are God's purpose to do as he actually does, thereby rendering certain whatsoever comes to pass. If there is nothing in his agency inconsistent with his moral perfections, then is there nothing in his decrees inconsistent with them. But we will examine the objection in detail. How is the doctrine of decrees inconsistent with the holiness of God? By making him the author or approver of sin, says the objector. But to make God the author of the sins of his creatures the doctrine must affirm or imply that God is the efficient cause of the sinful acts of his creatures. But

this it neither affirms nor in any way implies. Our statement of the doctrine is that God determined so to constitute and circumstance his creatures that they will act as they do, not that they will, by their constitution and circumstances, be obliged to act thus, or be moved as machines or automatons. The relation of decrees to free-agency we shall consider more particularly hereafter. It is enough here to say that that is a gross misstatement or misconception of the Calvinistic doctrine, which makes the divine purposes sustain to the sinful acts of men the relation of cause to effect, and so makes God the author of sin. But if the doctrine does not imply that God is the author, it does at least, says the objector, "imply that he is the approver, of sin; and so particeps criminis." But if decrees imply approval of sin, it must be because they imply that God commands or desires men to sin. But decrees are not at all of the nature of commands or laws, as has been already explained. Neither do they necessarily imply a desire that the thing decreed exist. Here is just where the objection appears most plausible. Why, it is asked, did God determine so to constitute and circumstance men that they certainly would sin, if he did not wish them to sin? But, as a matter of fact, he did so constitute and circumstance them that they certainly would sin, whether he decreed to do so or not. The difficulty, therefore, is not peculiar to the doctrine of decrees; it is the old problem of the existence of sin. But our doctrine does not necessarily imply that God wished sin to exist, for its own sake, or for any other reason. It is certainly supposable that he decreed the existence of sin, that is, decreed to do what rendered its existence certain, for other reasons than because he desired men to sin.

Some have supposed that sin inevitably results from the very limitation of finite natures, and hence that, in whatever circumstances God should place moral beings, there would be "conditions privative," which would render an experience of sin certain. This supposition is not absurd, nor without some degree of plausibility, and might perhaps

be accepted, were it the only alternative to the rejection of the doctrine of divine decrees. But in our view, there is another supposition far more satisfactory, viz. that God purposes so to constitute and circumstance men that they certainly will sin, not because he wishes them to sin, not because he does not, in every instance, prefer their holiness to their sin; but because there would result from such a change of their constitution and circumstances as would prevent their sinning a greater evil than their sin is. This supposition does not imply that God could not prevent sin in a moral system, but that such a modification of the present system as would be necessary to its prevention would involve evils greater than its existence. Neither does it imply that sin is brought into the system as "the necessary means of the greatest good," but that the system itself, in which sin does exist, but ought not to, is the necessary means of the greatest good. God chose the system, not on account of the sin, but notwithstanding the sin, which it includes. He prefers this system with sin to an inferior system without sin; but he would still more prefer this system just as it is in other respects with holiness in the place of sin. He decrees the existence of sin, therefore, not because he desires it, but because that divine system or arrangement into which sin is sure to enter, is indispensable to the highest good of the universe. Hence there is nothing in the decrees of God relative to sin, inconsistent with that immaculate holiness by which his whole nature is set in intense and unchangeable opposition to sin. He may foreordain its existence, that is, foreordain what renders its existence certain, and yet hate it with perfect hatred, and do all which a regard to the highest good of the universe permits to prevent its existence.

And if the doctrine of decrees, relative to sin is not inconsistent with the holiness of God, how is it inconsistent with his benevolence? The objector affirms that a perfectly benevolent being cannot purpose the existence of that which is itself so great an evil, and which draws so many dire evils in its train. But it is an indisputable fact

that a perfectly benevolent being can permit the existence of sin; for he does, and therefore he can, decree to permit it; for it is plain that what benevolence can do, it can decree to do. But as respects this objection, what is the difference between saying that God permits sin, and saying that God so constitutes and circumstances men that they certainly will sin? The permission of sin can be explained only on the supposition that it may be better for God to permit than to prevent it. But this same supposition explains how he can give men such a nature, and place them in such circumstances, that they will sin, and how he can decree to do this. It may be that by no other arrangement could the highest good of the universe be secured. Benevolence, therefore, may require God so to endow and circumstance men that they will sin, and to decree thus to endow and circumstance them; which is only saying that benevolence may require God to decree the existence of sin.

And if the doctrine of decrees is not inconsistent with the divine holiness and benevolence, wherein is it supposed to be inconsistent with the divine sincerity and justice? Is it said that God cannot consistently forbid nor punish what he has himself decreed? But if, as we have already shown, his decreeing a sinful act is perfectly consistent with his most intense disapproval of the act, then may it be consistent, also, with an expression of that disapproval, in the form of prohibition, and threatened and inflicted penalty? There is surely no insincerity in his forbidding, and no injustice in his punishing, what is intrinsically hateful and ill-deserving; but the intrinsic nature of sin is in no way affected by the fact that it is decreed. This last point will come more distinctly under notice, when considering the second great objection to the doctrine of decrees; and to that we now turn, confident that there is nothing in the doctrine, as we have stated and explained it, which does not harmonize perfectly with right conceptions of the moral character of God; yea, more, that right conceptions of the moral character of God logically necessitate a belief of this doctrine.