Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International InstitutionCambridge University Press, 14 de jul. 2014 Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield. |
Continguts
Common Conjectures Norms and Identities | 23 |
The Laws ofWar in Their Strategic Context | 58 |
Tables | 83 |
3 Modeling Minutia | 89 |
Patterns of Compliance with the Laws ofWar during | 111 |
4 Statistical Gore | 146 |
Spoilt Darlings? Treatment of Prisoners ofWar during | 192 |
Aerial Bombing Chemical | 240 |
The Rational Evolution | 277 |
Current Issues and Policy Insights | 299 |
| 321 | |
| 337 | |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution James D. Morrow Previsualització limitada - 2014 |
Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution James D. Morrow Previsualització no disponible - 2014 |
Frases i termes més freqüents
1907 Hague Convention 1929 Geneva Convention actors acts aerial bombing Allied analysis army atrocities attacks battle battlefield behavior best reply correspondence Britain British camps captured chapter chemical weapons coefficients combat commit violations common conjecture comply conduct create criminal democracy dyad Eastern Front effect enemy enforce equilibrium estimated evolutionary game theory fight force German hazard rate high seas ICRC individual violations institutions instrumental variable international law issues Japan Japanese joint ratification killed laws of war legal clarity legal obligations level of violations limit merchant ships military Nash equilibrium norms ofthe ordered probit play Violate political POWs prisoners of war protection punishment reciprocal responses restraint retaliation rules shared understanding side’s sides commit signal Soviet Union statistically significant strategic bombing submarine surrender Table taken prisoner targets tions total compliance treatment of civilians treaty standard variables violence warfare warring parties wartime World World War II wounded