unto thy Soul, and Grace to thy Neck; then fhalt thou walk in thy Way fafely, and thy Foot fhall not stumble. And at the End of thy Days Wifdom fhall make thee to inherit Glory, but Shame fhall be the Promotion of Fools.

1

SER

SERMON XVI.

The natural Tendency of welldoing to fecure us against Harms from Men.

I PE T. III. xiii.

And who is he that will harm you, if ye be Followers of that which is good?

ТНЫ

"HIS is one of two Arguments, whereby St. Peter perfuades Chriftians to the Univerfali Practice of Virtue and Goodness in this Chapter.

The former is in the Verfe before the Text: The Eyes of the Lord are over the Righteous, and his Ears are open unto their Prayers: but the Face of the Lord is against them that do Evil. For, fays he from the Pfalmift,

Pfalmift, z. 10. he that will love Life, and fee good Days, let him refrain his Tongue from Evil, and his Lips that they speak no Guile. Let him efchew Evil, and do Good; let him feek Peace, and enfue it. And then, v. 12. he gives this reafon for it from the Pfalmift, For the Eyes of the Lord are over the Righteous, and his Ears are open unto their Prayers: that is, the Providence of God is especially concerned in behalf of thofe that efchew Evil, and do Good, to deliver them from the Troubles of this Life, and their Prayers for Deliverance are pleafing to him: Whereas he doth not only neglect the Wicked, in Comparison to the Care he hath of the Righteous, but very often in his juft Indignation he fends Afflictions and Calamities upon them. So that St. Peter's firft Argument is from the Providence of God, which is always converfant about the Affairs of Men in this World.

The fecond is from the natural Tendency of well-doing to fecure us from receiving Harm by Men; and this is expreffed in the Words of the Text: And who is he that will barm you, if ye be Followers of that which is good? No good Man to be fure, no nor evil Men neither, for if he had not meant them, it had been but a flat Queftion, by no means worthy of the Apoftle; for every Man knows that Perfons truly good are fo far

from

from doing Injuries one to another, that they will not wrong their Enemies. But if the good Practice of the Righteous hath fuch a powerful Influence, as to fave them. from being molefted and injured by vicious Men, this Infruction hath fome Life and Spirit in it, and promises a Truth, which deferves and requires fome Confideration'; and therefore it is this which I intend to confider.

There are but Two Reafons upon which I can apprehend any Danger of Harm from Men.

That they have a mind to hurt me. And,

That they have not only Will, but also Power to do it.

And there must be both these to expose me; for if they want either Will or Power to do me Harm, I am fecure.

And the following that which is good will fecure me one or both of thefe Ways, either by taking away from them the Will to hurt me, or the Power, or both the one and the other.

Now I fhall try what may be faid to illuftrate the Truth in the Text upon both thefe Heads, for the Words will bear both Confiderations; for altho' in our English Tranflation they seem to run, as if only the Will to do Harm were meant, yet the Original implies more, Τίς ὁ κακώσων ὑμᾶς, who

fhall

fhall harm you, or who is like to harm you, be Followers of that which is good?

if ye

Therefore I fhall confider in the first place how far the doing of that which is good takes away from others the Will to hurt us, and then how it difarms them of Power, when it doth not restrain their Wills.

I fhall discourse of the former, by fhewing that there is a natural Force in welldoing to gain the good Affections of all, even of bad Men; for if this be true, then according to the natural and ordinary. Course of Things, the Righteous will for the moft part be fecured by their Integrity this way, which is enough both to justify the Truth of what is here affirmed, and to encourage Men upon the Motive of that Security to follow that which is good.

Now thofe good Difpofitions of Mind towards us from other Men, which the fundry Kinds of well-doing are proper to beget, are these three.

I. The not meaning or intending us any Harm thro' Anger against us.

II. Love or Good-will to us. And, III. Opinion, Reverence, or high Esteem of us.

Accordingly I fhall difcourfe as diftinctly and feparately as I can of Three forts of Virtues, which being all confidered together,

may