cause.

For example, it may be alleged that, in consequence of the alteration of a certain rate of duty upon a certain article of import, its importation had diminished, and it may thence be argued that the measure ought to be re-considered. Now upon investigation it may appear, either that the importation has, upon the whole, increased, or that if there be a diminution, it is owing to a deficient produce of the article, and consequent high prices. If the practical ground should be thus shifted by an alteration in the facts of the case, the maxim of policy applicable to it must be altered likewise. The maxim which recommends change, on the assumption that the measure has failed, must be converted into a maxim dissuading change, on the assumption that the measure has not failed.

$ 7 Another error to which the practical syllogism is liable, and which consists, not in the falsity of either of the premises, but in their relation to one another, arises from the use of an ambiguous or deceptive middle term. The political reasoner is, in this respect, subject to peculiar disadvantages, inasmuch as he often has no technical vocabulary, or, if he has, his nomenclature is so spoilt by popular use, that it performs none of the functions of a scientific language. An astronomer can reason about declination, right ascension, and parallax-a chemist can reason about oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon-a physiologist can reason about a stomach, a heart and a brain, about muscles, nerves, and bloodvessels-a botanist can reason about stamens, pistils, and corollæ,-without any danger of being misunderstood, or of using any of these terms with one meaning in one premise, and with another meaning in the other premise, and of thus committing a syllogistic error. But the politician is perpetually in danger of falling into this trap, on account of the vague, illdefined, and fluctuating significations of many of the principal terms in his vocabulary. Thus it frequently happens, in popular reasonings, that maxims are established with respect to those rights which by courtesy are called natural, and these maxims (often founded on arbitrary and ungrounded assumptions) are applied to actually-existing rights created by law, and properly

designated by this name. Again certain maxims, founded chiefly on an induction of absolute monarchies, are laid down with respect to monarchy generally, and these maxims are then applied to a case of limited or constitutional monarchy, although it differs essentially from the class of governments to which the maxim properly refers; or a maxim applicable to dependent colonies, settled by natives of the imperial state, is applied to a dependency of the same state acquired by conquest, and settled by natives of a foreign country, because such a dependency is, by a lax phraseology, comprehended under the general appellation of a colony. In such instances as these, the syllogism consists, in reality, of four terms, and no comparison is instituted between the two propositions which form the premises, so as to make it possible to draw any practical conclusion from them.

The politician, however, both speculative and practical, is, as we have shown in a former chapter, (18) in a less unfavourable position with respect to the possession of a technical vocabulary than he is sometimes represented to be. Many of the terms which immediately concern practice-such as those which are used for legal, financial, commercial, monetary, military and naval subjects-have a strictlydefined signification, and perform the same functions as the technical terms of one of the physical sciences or useful arts. The terms which represent the highest abstractions in politics are those of which the meaning is fixed with the least precision, and which most frequently mislead by their ambiguity; but similar defects may be often observed in the corresponding terms of the physical sciences.

§ 8 In endeavouring to exemplify the errors of practical reasoning in politics, it has been necessary for us to suppose a greater simplicity than really exists. Practice, for the most part, is essentially complex, and sophistry is indistinct, changeable, and obscure. As the process of refutation proceeds, a disingenuous opponent shifts his ground, and exhibits his fallacy in a new attitude. Hence, it rarely happens that a practical fal

(18) Above, ch. iv.

lacy presents itself in a form ready, without preparation, for a logical analysis. Moreover, it frequently happens (as we have already remarked) that the same argument labours under several defects at the same time. Error of fact, if it does not engender error of principle, will, at least in general, lead to the application of a wrong principle to the particular case. Now before we can understand any complex subject we must resolve it into its elements, and examine these separately. The mind must pass successively in review the several constituent facts which occur simultaneously. Nevertheless, in proceeding thus, we do not imply that they always, or often, or indeed ever, occur separately in practice. A tangled skein can only be unravelled by a series of single efforts, but by taking each part in succession the whole can be reduced into order.

390

CHAPTER XXVI.

ON THE SECURITIES AGAINST THE FALLIBILITY OF POLITICAL PRACTICE.

IN

N the previous chapter, we have classified the causes of practical errors in politics, and have shown how they arise from different defects in the reasoning process which precedes and leads to action. A perception of the defects to which this process is liable may afford material assistance in their detection when the practical syllogism has once been formed, and therefore the explanation of them may facilitate the discovery of errors when they exist. It will, however, be possible, consistently with the object of this treatise, to go one step further, and to point out certain methods, which will not only enable us to pass judgment on practical syllogisms when they have been already formed, but may assist the politician in their construction, and direct him to the right path, while he is still uncertain which course he shall take.

In the first place, then, the practical politician should form a clear conception of the nature of the problem which he undertakes to solve, and of the general conditions to which it is subject. He should consider how much of the field of action he can command, and how far the future can be brought under his control; how many of the elements of the problem can be reduced to certainty, and how many must be abandoned to the undisputed dominion of chance. His dealings are with men, and he must therefore appreciate correctly the difference between acting upon the human will and acting upon insentient matter, together with the various consequences which this difference involves. All anticipations of the conduct of men upon a supposed contingency are, more or less, uncertain; but in proportion as men are more under the influence of reason, their probable conduct is more easily predicted. With reference to the powers of

In

prediction, the acts of caprice, folly, passion, and insanity are, to those of reason, what the movements of the clouds, of the winds, and of meteoric lights, are to the movements of the planets. Each may have their own laws; but the former can be discerned and used as the basis of prediction-the latter cannot. Rational conduct, both of nations and individuals, both in public and in private life, can be safely predicted within certain limits.(') We can say with tolerable confidence what a wise government, or a wise man, in a supposed case will not do. We can cut off the infinite, and reduce their probable courses to a few alternatives: whereas the number of possible courses which a foolish government or a foolish man may take is practically unlimited. deed, it is not only impossible to determine which, out of a large number of given courses, a rash or foolish man is likely to take, but his conduct may even defy conjecture as a possible alternative. He may chuse some by-path which nobody perceivedhe may start up in some place where nobody looked for him. The maxim, that nations and governments and individual men will act according to their interest, may be of use where discreet and prudent persons are in question, but it is utterly inapplicable in cases where discretion and prudence are wanting, (2) and where men are not only not prudent themselves, but do not seek the advice of others competent to supply their defects, and therefore act, without hesitation, under the impulse of their fancy, caprice, or passion. Unreason sets all calculation at defiance; whereas reason is a sort of constructive notice, or tacit signification of intention. It gives to others a moral security against eccentric divagations of conduct. Hence it supplies, to

(1) The difference between rational and irrational conduct, with respect to prediction, may be compared with the difference between good and bad play at whist, with respect to the insight which players obtain of each other's hands: Where the sets are really good players, before half the cards are played out they are as well acquainted with the material ones remaining in each other's hands as if they had seen them. Where two regular players are matched against two irregular ones, it is nearly the same advantage as if they were permitted to see each other's cards, while the latter were denied the same privilege.'-Mathews on Whist, p. 7; ed. Bohn.

(2) See Shaftesbury's Characteristics, vol. i. p. 115.