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shall be cursed. The law says, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but one jot or one tittle of the law shall not pass until all be fulfilled;" but, says the theory we are considering, not only one jot or tittle, but the whole penal sanction of the law shall pass completely away.

It reflects on the nature of the law. If the breach of the law can be passed over without compensation, it is clearly supposed to have been originally too strict, to have been over rigorous at first. This is much the same as to affirm that it was originally unjust, in opposition to the scriptures, which declare that the law is holy, just, and good. What a perfect law once was, it must ever continue to be. If it was originally just, it must be always just; but pardon without satisfaction, says either that it was originally unjust, or that it is now so. If it was originally holy, it must be always holy; but if pardon must be dispensed without satisfaction, either originally it was not so, or it has ceased to be what it once was, as it can never be wrong to carry the sanction of a holy law into execution. If it was originally good, it must be always good; but pardon without satisfaction proceeds on the supposition that it would not consist with goodness or benevolence to fulfil the threatening of the law. This scheme militates, thus, against the nature of the law, and supposes the moral constitution under which man is placed to be different from what both reason and scripture lead us to conclude.

It supposes, moreover, a relaxation to take place of the law or moral government of God, such as a perfect constitution can never undergo. If sin is pardoned without an atonement, then the law, which requires perfect and perpetual obedience, and which denounces punishment on every deviation from its requirements, is clearly understood to have relaxed its rigour: its requisitions are supposed to have been modified and abridged in adaptation to what is called human frailty or infirmity. This is not only supposed in the theory of pardon, against which we are contending: it is openly avowed, and strenuously defended. But against such a relaxation of God's law, we have more than one thing to urge.

First of all, we say that it supposes the law to have been originally wrong, seeing it could either need or admit of a change; and this we cannot but regard as a direct impeachment, both of the wisdom and equity of the Legislator.

Secondly:-It supposes that man's indisposition to obey, (for his inability is wholly to be traced to want of will,) can nullify the obligation to obey,-a principle which, if admitted, would put an end to all legislation whatsoever, as the conclusion would be, that men were bound to obey, only so far as thev chose.

Thirdly:-A law which does not require perfect obedience under pain of positive infliction, is absolutely no law at all; it is just a law which may be violated with impunity, the very propounding of which must be seen to be a burlesque on legislation.

Fourthly:It is impossible to define the extent of relaxation requisite. No one has attempted to say to what extent the supposed relaxation has been carried. If the ability or inclination of the subject is to be the rule, the relaxation of the law must vary in every individual case of its application. And what is this but to throw every thing loose, and to annihilate all standard of moral obligation.

Fifthly:The laws which govern the moral world are fixed and unalterable, nay, more so than those which regulate the material world. The importance of maintaining the latter steady and inviolable, is readily admitted, and strongly urged. Is it not at least of equal importance-we think it could easily be shown to be of greater that those of the intellectual and moral world be permanent and inflexible? Shall it be insisted upon that the laws which affect inanimate nature are to be considered incapable of a change, and yet maintained that those which connect the supreme moral Governor with his subjects, may fluctuate and vary indefinitely? The one supposes only a change in the divine procedure, and constitutes a miracle; the other supposes a change in the nature of God, and constitutes a grand moral contradiction.

In fine:-On the supposition in question, instead of the will of the creature being required to conform to the law of God, the law of God is required to conform to the will of the creature-which is not only a solecism in legislation, but a monstrous discrepancy in morals. We conclude, then, that, for all these reasons, the law of God cannot be relaxed; and if it cannot be relaxed, an atonement must be necessary to the pardon of sin.

Indeed, any other supposition tends directly to subvert all the purposes of God's moral government at large. Sin is an offence against the moral government of God; it is rebellion against the divine majesty; it strikes at the root of that authority on which repose all the order and happiness of the universe. It denies his right to the respect which is due to him as the head of the universe, the love which he deserves on account of his infinite excellencies, and the obedience which he has commanded as the sovereign Lord and lawgiver (Smith.) To pardon it without satisfaction, then, is to hold out such a view of the supreme lawgiver as cannot fail to encourage his moral creatures, both men and angels, to

disobey; it is holding out a powerful temptation to revolt; it is letting his moral subjects of every class distinctly understand that they may hoist the flag of rebellion and defiance without fear. Only conceive of the hideous consequences that must necessarily succeed from such a line of procedure, and you will acquiesce at once in the opinion that the purposes of God's moral government at large render an atonement necessary. If sin is pardoned, it must be in a way by which the law is magnified and made honourable, and by one, too, whose business it is, not to destroy the law but to fulfil it. We are the more confirmed in this view of the matter, that the punishment of sin is necessary to prevent the repetitior. of it, and that to pardon it without satisfaction is equivalent to throwing down the barriers of morality, and setting open the flood gates of iniquity; especially when we reflect how inadequately even the exhibition of the divine displeasure, which is made in the cross of Christ, restrains the growth of crime.

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Such are our reasons for maintaining that the nature of the divine moral government renders atonement a necessary, indispensable provision to the pardon of sin. As sin is an infringement of the moral constitution supreme wisdom has appointed, and is calculated to introduce disturbance into the constituted moral order of the universe, and casts contempt on all the moral and legislative attributes of Deity, we hold it utterly impossible that the supreme moral Governor can connive at any one sin; for his doing so would inevitably lead to the subversion of the whole moral system of the universe. empirics in medicine, contented with a few facts imperfectly understood and ill-combined, deride the extensive search and the cautious inductions of the enlightened physician; and as the vulgar, looking only at appearances as they seem to them, reject and often hold in high contempt the demonstrated facts of natural philosophy; so those who disbelieve the atonement of Christ and its correlate doctrines, seem to me to form their sentiments from a very superficial consideration, hasty and incomplete views, and an unwarrantable confidence in first appearances; overlooking the great principles and general laws of a comprehensive moral system. Above all, I fear

that they overlook the nature and obligations of obedience to the will of God, the rational grounds on which those obligations rest, and the true reasons of the demerit of sin.". (Smith on Sacrifice, p. 288.)

III. The necessity of an atonement may be argued from the inefficacy of every other scheme to secure the pardon of sin. Penitence and future amendment, or repentance and good works, as they are commonly called, are chiefly brought for

ward as all that is necessary for this purpose. If these can be shown to be sufficient, it follows, of course, that the atonement of Christ is unnecessary, and consequently that no such atonement has ever been made. God does nothing in vain; and it is a law in all his operations that the greatest good is effected at the least possible expense. If the pardon of iniquity could have been rendered consistent with the perfections of his nature and the interests of his moral government, by the mere sorrow and reformation of the sinner, it is not to be conceived that he would ever subject his only begotten Son to the pain of crucifixion, the misery of satanic assault, and the unutterable anguish of divine wrath. It is important, then, to ascertain whether these be sufficient for such a purpose.

That repentance is necessary to pardon, and in the case of adults inseparably connected with it, is not disputed. But that it is all that is necessary, or that the connexion is that of a meritorious ground or procuring cause, we unhesitatingly refuse; for these, amongst other reasons:

First:-No provision was made for repentance in the original moral constitution under which man was placed, and the necessity of maintaining which inviolate has already been shown. 66 "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die-The soul that sinneth it shall die," is the language in which that constitution expressed its sanctions. There is no stipulation of repentance; not even a hint of such a thing being so much as admissible. It is never spoken of but in connexion with a widely different constitution, in which, as we shall see, it springs from, rather than stands as a substitute for atonement.

Secondly:-Penitence does not remove guilt, or the legal desert of punishment. It changes, indeed, the character of the sinner, but it leaves his liability to suffer the penalty of the law the same as before. No compensation whatever is made by it to the claims of justice; the guilt is lessened in no degree it cannot, therefore, be enough to secure pardon, which is the remission of guilt.

Thirdly-Penitence can never repair the consequences of sin. By sin the majesty of God is insulted; repentance has no effect in wiping off this reproach. By sin a debt is contracted to the divine law and justice; penitence makes no compensation for this debt. In case of the breach of human laws, repentance is never looked upon as making legal compensation or removing the consequences of guilt. It is never known among men that the thoughtless speculator who has involved himself in bankruptcy, on giving signs of repentance, receives a discharge from his creditors, and takes again the

same honourable place which he formerly held in the commercial world. The intemperate voluptuary who has ruined his character, and fortune, and health, by his criminal indulgences, does not find these all retrieved, on his barely repenting of his misconduct. It does not even happen that the penitent finds immediate and permanent relief from the painful reflections of self-dissatisfaction; and if not satisfied with himself for having repented, how dare he have the presumption to fancy that God will be satisfied with him for it? It is contrary to all our notions of rectitude that punishment should continue longer than criminality, that the consequen ces of guilt should be perpetuated after satisfaction for guilt has been given. But it consists with the facts of daily experience, that compunctions and other effects of criminality remain after men have repented; and, as these are the natural punishments of crime, their continuance after repentance demonstrates its utter incompetency to form a legal compensation.

Fourthly:-It does not appear that, without an atonement, there could ever exist such a thing as genuine repentance. That deep sense of guilt which is essential in every case of penitence, would seem to be otherwise incapable of being produced. If all that God had done had been to make known his readiness to receive repentant sinners, we have the best reason to conclude, from what we know of man, that, instead of inclining him to repent, it would have tended rather to render him easy under his guilt, to harden his heart, and to encourage him to sin with a higher hand than ever. True mourning for sin is a thing unknown, excepting among those who have been taught "to look on Him whom they have pierced." Repentance is a state of soul which can only be produced at the foot of the cross. "He who receives the atonement weeps not to wash away his sins, but because they are washed away he weeps."

Fifthly:-The sinner is as incapable, in himself, of repentance, as of making an atonement. This important remark is so happily illustrated by an able theologian of our own day, that I cannot resist laying his remarks before the reader. "When it is said," remarks Mr. Dods, "that God is willing to pardon us upon our repentance, without any atonement, it is taken for granted that we can repent when we please. For, if repentance be something entirely out of our power, then it can afford us no comfort to tell us, even if it were true, that repentance will purchase our pardon. For, besides that it seems just as difficult to perceive the connexion between repentance and pardon, as to perceive the connexion between atonement and pardon, I know not

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