passionate Redeemer. The consolation arising from reconciliation with God is subject to no such deduction. While we rejoice in the cross of Christ as the source of pardon, our satisfaction is heightened by beholding it succeeded by the crown; by seeing him that was for a little while made lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour, seated at the right hand of God, thence expecting till his enemies are made his footstool.'

7. There is one circumstance more which deserves to be taken into the account in replying to this objection. The substitution of Christ is a case which is absolutely peculiar.

Such a case could never be justified as a matter of ordinary or frequent occurrence. It could only be when something extraordinary called for its introduction, when such a combination of requirements met as could but seldom come together, that it would be warrantable to admit of the innocent being substituted in room of the guilty. Its frequent occurrence could not fail to have a most injurious influence in weakening the sense of moral obligation. That the bad should be pardoned at the expense of the good, the virtuous sacrificed that the wicked might be spared, and those who are a blessing to society cut off that such as are a curse might be perpetuated, are what no wise government could tolerate. The punishment of crime would, in this case, be so dissevered from the perpetration of crime, as to impair the motives to obedience and take away all fear of offending against the law. The purposes of good government thus require that the principle of substitution shall be but rarely introduced. It cannot take place in the common course of justice; it must be an extraordinary interposition; not contrary to law, but above law; departing from the letter, but maintaining the spirit; and introduced by one who possesses the right of exerting a dispensing power, that is to say, by the lawgiver himself. Now the substitution of Christ is exactly of the nature required. It is an event quite unique in the administration of God's moral government. It is strictly and literally an extraordinary proceeding. We have no reason to conclude that the like ever existed before, or shall ever exist again. It stands forth an insulated and prominent fact in the economy of Divine Providence-" a singleand solitary monument amidst the lapse of ages and the waste of worlds." Inspired history contains not a hint of any such transaction having ever be

* Hall's Works, vol. i., pp. 514-517.

fore occurred on the theatre of the universe; nor does pro phecy give us ground to expect that any thing similar is ever again to occur in the annals of eternity. It is the masterpiece of infinite wisdom-an unparalleled display of infinite goodness, calculated to engage the enraptured and eternal contemplation of every order of created intelligences. (See Hall, vol. i., p 516.) Christ hath ONCE suffered for sins. Christ was ONCE offered to bear the sins of many. ONCE in the end of the world did he appear to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.

V. We shall notice, only farther, the objection that the atonement of Christ was unnecessary.

It is supposed, that God could as honourably acquit sinners without as with a satisfaction. It will not be necessary to dwell long in replying to this position, as we intend to devote the next section wholly to the investigation of the necessity of Christ's atonement. A few brief remarks may

here suffice.

1. The objection is presumptuous.

It is not for us, on the ground of mere abstract reasoning, to say absolutely what is necessary or not necessary in a case like the present. When we venture to say what God ought to do or ought not to do, what course it would be honourable and what not honourable for him to pursue, we step quite beyond our limits; we set up our weak, erring, finite understandings as judges over the infinite mind of Jehovah. The only safe ground on which we can determine whether a certain line of procedure be necessary or honourable in God, is judging from what he has already revealed or done. To pronounce it antecedently unnecessary is thus to beg the question, it is just to affirm that an atonement has not been made, nor any data given from which it can be inferred. This, however, is the very point in dispute, and must be determined by quite a different process from that of arrogantly pronouncing an atonement unnecessary.

2. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that the necessity of an atonement could not be shown from any thing that appears, it would not follow, even then, that we are at liberty to pronounce it absolutely unnecessary.

There may be reasons for its existence which we have never discovered, or which we are not qualified to comprehend. There may be purposes to be served by it which have never been made known to us, and which our unaided faculties are incapable of penetrating. Unless we can say that we are acquainted with every possible reason that can

exist for such a course-unless we can affirm that we know every purpose which it is capable of serving, it must be obvious we have no right to pronounce it unnecessary; for, amongst those things which are not known to us, there may be reasons numerous and sufficient why an atonement should be made. As well may a child object to the necessity of some intricate scheme of national policy, because it cannot perceive such necessity, when the only reason of its not perceiving it is its want of capacity to understand the subject. Let it not be supposed, from these remarks, to be our opinion that the reasons for a vicarious satisfaction to the law and justice of God, are either not revealed or incapable of being understood. Far different is our conviction, as will appear in the sequel. But supposing it were so, we mean to say that the objection before us supposes an unwarrantable overleaping of the bounds of the human understanding.

3. The objection, too, supposes a most imperfect and restricted view of the nature of man's offence against God.

Inadequate views of sin are at the foundation of almost all the doctrinal and practical errors that exist in the world. Men are ready to regard it as something altogether different from what it is regarded by God. A thousand palliatives and excuses they can easily conceive for the commission of it, and, after it has been committed, they can talk of it in language which too plainly indicates the imperfection of their views. If sin were a mere insult offered to majesty, it might be overlooked, for dignity is often more consulted by passing by an offence, than by rigorously demanding satisfaction for every slight that is offered to it. If sin were a mere debt, it might have been remitted, as a creditor may, without any impropriety, suffer his debtor to go free. If sin were merely thing to be abhorred, it might have been pardoned, simply on the person's showing, by his repentance, a disposition to aphor it. But it is something more than all this. It is the violation of a holy, just and good law, an infraction of a moral constitution, in the maintenance of which the honour of God and the good of all his moral subjects are concerned. This alters the case materially, and renders it necessary, as we shall afterwards see, that steps be taken which would not otherwise have been required.

4. The objection, we shall only add, proceeds on a more imperfect view of the nature of human salvation.

Admitting that God might honourably pardon sin without a satisfaction, it should be remembered that the remission of sin is not the whole of salvation. The penal inflictions due

to sin may be supposed to be remitted without the soul being saved. The salvation of the soul supposes deliverance from other evils, and the possession of other qualities, to which, after all, the virtue of an atoning sacrifice may be indispensable. "Were we even to concede," says Dr. Smith, with much acuteness and force," that the Deity could remit the positive punishment of sin, by a determination of his gracious will; yet this would not effect the salvation of the sinner. This measure of gracious will (the supposition of which, however, I by no means think tenable) would be merely the forbearing from certain positive acts of righteous power, merely waiving a right, merely declining to effectuate that which, speaking analogically, as the scriptures so often do, would be an insulated act in the procedure of the blessed God, alien from the ordinary tendency and character of his government, and which he would not execute without the greates reluctance, "his strange work." But under a very differen respect, in moral consideration, would come the arbitrary taking away of the natural and necessary consequences of sin. These are not inflictions; but they are events and states of things which follow of themselves, according to the general constitutions of the universe, the laws of intellectual and moral nature; constitutions and laws which are essential to the harmony and well-being of God's entire world. To intercept this course of things, which infinite wisdom and goodness have established, to prevent these effects from ensuing, when their proper causes have already occurred, is not a case of forbearing to act; it is the exact reverse, it is a case of acting. It would be an interference of the Deity to suspend the operation of his own laws, to cut off the connexion between the cause and the effect, to change the course of nature; it would be to work a miracle.” (Disc. on Sac., &c. pp. 196, 197.)

We have thus endeavoured to state with fairness, and to examine with candour, the principal objections to the doctrine under review. If they have been, as we hope, satisfactorily refuted, an additional and important step of advancement has been made. We now not only see what atonement means, but are convinced that there exists no antecedent improbability that such an expedient should be introduced into the moral economy of God. No such antecedent improbability can be urged, either on the ground of reason, or of the nature of salvation. We cannot, therefore, but bewail that deep depravity of man's understanding and will, which is manifested in his failing to perceive, or, perceiving it, refusing to admit

the doctrine before us. sumption of human reason, which starts its little cavils against the great truths of revelation. We have need to be on our guard against the influence of objections which spring from a state of moral corruption common to all. Let us distrust ourselves, and, while we pity such as are led astray by gross and fatal errors, let us seek to enjoy the promised guidance of Him whose prerogative it is to lead into all truth. It belongs to God to bring good out of evil; and, although the existence of objections to divine truth is in itself to be deplored, the goodness and wisdom can never be too much admired which render this very evil a means of ultimate good. By leading to investigate the truth with greater care, by tending to quicken the understanding, by rousing to a more zealous defence of what is valuable, by producing stronger attachment to that for which we have had as it were to fight, and by inducing a firmer confidence in the truth itself as having stood the trial of the most searching scrutiny, the objections themselves may be turned to a profitable account. And how truly thankful ought those to be, who have been kept from error and established in the truth as it is in Jesus. If those who have escaped the temptations of the world through lust have reason to be grateful, those who have escaped the temptations of error through the prevalence of heretical opinion, have no less cause of gratitude. That mental error is safe and innocent, is much the same as saying that truth is a thing of no value; and neither the one sentiment nor the other can be held by those who have seriously pondered the import of those awful words-that they all might be damned who believed not the truth. And if error is in any case unsafe, and truth in any case valuable, it must be in a matter of such vital importance as that now under discussion.

Great indeed are the pride and pre

SECTION III.

NECESSITY OF CHRIST'S ATONEMENT.

The remarks at the conclusion of last section, on the obJection that an atonement is unnecessary, are merely negative. They are designed to prove only that it cannot be shown to be unnecessary, without going the length of positively maintaining its necessity. We now advance a step higher, and