him to withhold forgiveness. Such is the objection with which we have now to deal. It is more specious, certainly, than some others, and, consequently, a great favourite with the enemies of atonement. But the following observations may serve, it is hoped, to show its groundlessness. 1. The objection supposes justice and grace to be opposed to one another, not only in their nature, but in their exercise, so that both cannot respect the same object. This supposition has already been refuted, and we must beg our readers to revert to what was before advanced in proof of the perfect harmony of these perfections of the divine nature. (See p. 14.) In addition, we may here observe, that the inspired writers appear to have had no idea of any incongruity between justice and grace in the pardon of sin. On the contrary, they represent both as connected with forgiveness. What one apostle ascribes to grace, another refers to justice. Paul says, "We have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his GRACE:" (Eph. i. 7.) while John, writing under the direction of the same Spirit, tells us, that "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and JUST to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." (1 John i. 9.) It is worthy of remark, too, that in both these passages pardon is connected with atonement; in the former mention being made of "redemption through the blood" of Christ, and in the context of the latter reference being made to "the blood of Jesus Christ God's Son which cleanseth from all sin." This is agreeable to other parts of scripture; as, for example, when Paul, writing to the Romans, in one verse ascribes forgiveness through the redemption of Christ to grace, and in the very next speaks of it as a manifestation of justice. Being justified freely by his GRACE, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his RIGHTEOUSNESS for the remission of sins. (Rom. iii. 24, 25.) Can any thing more distinctly prove that the inspired writers had no notion whatever of an essential incompatability between justice and grace, or between atonement and free favour? 66 2. The objection overlooks the origin of Christ's satisfaction. It did not originate with man, but with God. Man did not find a surety for himself; it was God that found out the ransom. If another than God who pardons sin had provided the ground on which the pardon rests, there might have been room to deny the graciousness of the act. But as it is God that provides the Mediator, the work of the Surety, so far from interfering with the freeness of man's forgiveness, becomes the most illustrious proof and confirmation of divine grace. God manifests his grace in determining to pardon man; it is farther displayed in providing a legal ground on which pardon might proceed in consistency with justice; and it is again brought into view in accepting the satisfaction offered by the Surety, which he was not bound in absolute justice to do. 3. The objection also overlooks the circumstance, that although the satisfaction of Christ may be regarded as a legal purchase of pardon, the bestowment of pardon is altogether an act of grace as regards the persons on whom it is conferred. It is free pardon at least to men. They have no claim; no satisfaction is made by them; they do nothing to procure for themselves forgiveness. If the pardon of sin is an act of justice at all, it is so only to Christ; to the sinner it is one of pure sovereign goodness. It flows through an equitable channel; it proceeds on a righteous foundation; the ground on which it rests is such as to meet every claim of divine justice: but, as regards the spring from which it issues and the objects on whom it terminates, it is wholly a display of superabounding mercy. "Being justified through the redemption that is in Jesus" is thus no way inconsistent with "being justified freely by God's grace." "Fancy to yourselves," says Dr. Wardlaw, " a band of traitors, apprehended, convicted, condemned, lying in irons under the sentence which their crimes have deserved. Suppose their prince, naturally benignant, desirous to extend mercy to them; but at the same time, wise and righteous and mindful of the interests of the community, as well as benignant, solicitous to effect this in such a way as may at once secure the dignity and authority of his government, attach the hearts of the criminals to its administration and to himself, and impress all his subjects with the conviction that the remission of the penalty in the particular case implies no relaxation of the rigour of the law and the stability of its sanctions. Suppose that, in such circumstances, he should contrive some method by which these ends might be effectually answered; and that, having completed his scheme, and publicly announced its purpose, he should give his clemency its desired indulgence: would the pardon now be less a matter of free favour or grace to the delinquents? Clearly not. The scheme does not render them one whit more deserving of it. It does not lessen their guilt: it rather shows its magnitude, by declaring it such as could not be passed by without some precautionary means for securing the honour of the prince and the respect due to his government; nay, it aggravates instead of extenuating, by showing the character of the prince, and government against which the rebels had risen up, not a ruthless tyrant and an oppressive despotism, but a paternal ruler and an administration of equity and love. The pardon is to them, therefore, as much an act of mercy as ever:—and the character of the prince stands forth to more prominent view and to more rapturous admiration, as adorned with the twofold excellence, of a gracious solicitude to show mercy, and at the same time a decided attachment to righteousness, and a determination, for the good of his subjects, that its claims shall not be trifled with, but shall be maintained inviolate. In like manner, the Divine Ruler's adopting a plan for maintaining the honour of his character and government in the dispensation of forgiveness, does not, in the least degree, render that forgiveness less a matter of pure grace to those who receive it. And, while it is pure grace, it is also rich :-rich indeed, that provided such an atonement!—and rich indeed, which, on the ground of the atonement so provided, blots out, to every sinner who partakes of it, so vast an amount of evil, and yet embraces among its favoured objects a multitude which no man can number, out of all kindreds, and peoples, and nations, and tongues !"* 4. These remarks may be deemed a sufficient reply to the objection. But, in refutation of the Socinian's favourite position, we may perhaps go farther still. It may fairly be questioned, whether there could have been seen to be grace at all in the pardon of sin, had it not been for the atonement of Christ. Had God pardoned sin without satisfaction, our opponents think he would have given some satisfactory display of his grace. We are inclined to suppose, on the contrary, that, in such a case, there would have been no proof of grace at all. Make the supposition that God had pardoned sin without an atonement, and pardoned not only some but all the family of man, and what is the inference which intelligent and moral beings should have been disposed to draw from this act? That God is gracious, and that his grace is altogether without limits? We presume not. Would it not be a much more reasonable inference that sin, the violation of his law, was no evil, no great evil * Essays on Assurance and Pardon, pp. 199, 200. at least, not such an evil as it had been supposed to be, seeing it could be so easily passed over by a Being of absolute moral perfection? This, we have no hesitation in saying, would be the more natural inference of the two. If even the awful view of sin's magnitude which the cross of Christ is fitted to give is found insufficient to prevent men from thinking lightly of it, it is not to be supposed that their sense of its turpitude would have been enhanced by the absence of an atonement. "So far then is it from being true, that the mercy of God would have been ready to forgive the sinner without atonement had justice allowed it, and that it would have been highly honoured by so doing, that the very existence of mercy can be proved only by the atonement. Remove that pro proof of it, and I may very safely challenge all the wisdom of human philosophy to prove that such a thing as mercy exists. I know not if this view of the matter be urged upon the attention of the church with sufficient frequency and minence; but if it were, I can hardly think that so strange an objection to the atonement could ever have been conceived, as that which considers the atonement,—the only fact by which the very existence of mercy, and much more its infinite extent, can be proved, as a drawback upon the fulness and freeness of that mercy." -- IV. Objection has often been made to the doctrine of atonement, on the ground that it supposes the innocent to suffer for the guilty; a thing which is regarded as inconsistent with reason, and with the goodness and justice of God. The doctrine of atonement certainly involves the principle of substitution: whether that principle be liable to the objection alleged against it, is the thing to be considered. We have no wish to get rid of the difficulty by denying the fact; but as little are we disposed to suffer the admitted fact to lie under the weight of aspersions which are thrown upon it unjustly. Let us see, then, how the matter stands as to this point. 1. It must be admitted by all, that, under the moral government of God, the innocent do sometimes suffer for the guilty. It is not pretended that cases exactly similar to that we are considering are of frequent occurrence in the providence of God. The contrary, indeed, is frankly admitted. The substitution of Christ is allowed to be altogether extraordinary— * Dods on the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, p. 120. to be without a parallel in the divine proceedings with regard to moral creatures. Nothing like it, in all respects, has yet existed or is likely ever to exist again to the end of time. Yet cases sufficiently like to neutralise the objection in question, are not of unfrequent occurrence. The innocent do often suffer for the guilty, and that too without such exalted purposes being served by it as in the case of Christ. Poverty, and pain, and disgrace, and disease are not seldom entailed on children, in consequence of the criminal indiscretions of their parents. This is what cannot be denied. It is not the same thing as the substitution of Christ; the suffering is of the nature of calamity rather than of punishment. Yet it is the innocent suffering for the guilty; and as this is the point on which the objection turns, we may call upon the objectors to explain this undeniable fact in divine providence, before we can admit their right to urge the principle of the fact against a doctrine of divine revelation. If the thing is unreasonable and unjust in the one case, it cannot be less so in the other. Will they have the hardihood to affirm, that such occurrences in providence as have been mentioned, imply injustice in the administration of the moral government of our world? If they will, we have nothing more to do with them; we leave them to one from whom they will not find it so easy to escape. "He that reproveth God, let him answer it." But if they will not venture so far with regard to providence, we have just to tell them they have no right to make any such assertions in a matter of pure revelation. The difficulty, if it be a difficulty, is one which they cannot be permitted to urge as an insuperable objection in one case, while in a parallel case they feel it to be no difficulty at all. And that the idea of the innocent suffering for the guilty is not so repugnant to the natural reason of man as the objectors allege, seems confirmed by the universal prevalence of expiatory sacrifices. Whether the practice of offering such sacrifices be of divine origin or not-a question which will come to be considered at another stage of our argument—its universal adoption cannot be denied. This, be it remarked, is not a little in our favour, as the practice in question proceeds distinctly on the principle of the innocent suffering for the guilty. Whether you suppose this practice to have originated with man, or whether, as we are persuaded was the case, the suggestion proceeded from God, the fact is alike to Our purpose. If it originated with man, the idea of substitution which it essentially involves must be any thing but re |