sole purpose of revenue, and is, in its nature, essentially different from a power to impose restrictive duties:-That, the two are incompatible, as the prohibitory system tends to destroy the revenue from imposts:-That, the power being granted for revenue only, is abused when converted into a mean for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another :-That, it is a case of the violation of the Constitution by perversion; a case of the greatest danger, because the most insidious and difficult to resist. 59. A modification of this view has assumed the following form: Congress may impose such duties as they deem necessary for revenue, and so arrange them, as, incidentally, and to that extent, to protect the manufacturer; but may not convert this incidental, into the principal, power, and impose a duty substantially, and exclusively, for such protection: Congress may countervail regulations of a foreign power, hostile to our commerce; but may not, permanently, prohibit importation for securing the home market, exclusively, to the domestic manufacturers; destroying a power they were entrusted to regulate, and fostering an interest, with which they had no right to interfere. The admission, here, of a power to, tax for other purposes than revenue, seems an abandonment of the question.. That 60. It has been admitted, also, that under the power to regulate commerce, Congress is not limited to the imposition of duties for the sole purpose of revenue; that it may impose retaliatory duties on foreign powers; but they must be for the regulation of commerce, not for the protection of manufactures. But this argument rests upon the assumption, that the power to lay imposts was given for the purpose of revenue. is the very point in controversy, and must be proved, not assumed. The language of the Constitution is, " Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." If the clause had rested here, as it did when first reported to the Convention, there could not have been a doubt upon the subject, for the power would have been unrestricted; and would have been applicable to all purposes in which nations have been accustomed to use it. Those pur poses embrace, unquestionably, among a vast variety of others, the protection of domestic produce and industry. If then, it is asked, the power of taxation be general, how can it properly be restricted to one object? But is the power general, or is it limited? If the latter, what is the limitation? 61. Upon this subject there have been three opinions: 1. That, the power is unlimited; that the subsequent clause, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare, giving a substantive, independent power, cannot be restricted to purposes of revenue, merely; 2nd. That, the power is restrained by the subsequent clause, and is given, in order, to pay debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare; and 3d. That, the power is further restrained, to such specific objects as are contained in the other enumerated powers of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the first two opinions. Either gives all that the advocates of the American System require. Since, by no rational construction, can the power for laying taxes for the public welfare, be restricted to the purpose of revenue, as the public welfare may, unquestionably, be promoted by taxes other than for revenue. 62. But with regard to the third opinion, we may remark, that, if revenue be not the sole and exclusive mean of giving effect to the enumerated powers of the Constitution, the advocates of this doctrine must maintain, with those of the second opinion, that the power of taxation is not limited to purposes of revenue. Now, it is perfectly clear, that such enumerated powers have other means to effectuate them than revenue. Thus, the power "to regulate commerce" is rendered effective by taxes which countervail foreign monopolies, and adverse commercial restrictions;-the power to coin money and regulate its value may be operative by a tax on foreign coin;—the power to provide for organizing, arming and discipling the militia, by a tax upon foreign arms, to encourage the domestic manufacture;-and the power to declare war, with its auxiliaries, may be effectuated by a taxprohibiting foreign, in order to secure a permanent domestic, supply of the munitions of war. If taxes may be laid in these, and like cases, then the enumerated powers require the power to lay taxes, to be more extensively construed than for purposes of revenue. It is no answer to this argument to say, that the power of taxation, though in its nature only a power to raise revenue, may be resorted to, as an implied power to give effect to the enumerated powers. That would be to aver, that an express, is not co-extensive with an implied, power to lay taxes, that when the power is expressed, it means a power to raise revenue, only; but when implied, it has no regard to this object. How then, is a case of mixed nature, where, in the law, revenue is blended with other objects, to be dealt with? 63. If, then, the power to lay taxes be restricted to cases within the enumerated powers, still it is not confined to revenue, but extends to all other objects within the scope of such powers. Where the power is expressly given, we are not at liberty to say it is implied. Being given, it may certainly be used to effectuate all the powers to which it is appropriate; not because it may be implied in the grant of such powers, but because it is expressly granted as a substantive power, and may be used, of course, as auxiliary to them. Thus, whatever construction be given to the power of laying taxes, we attain the conclusion, that such power is not confined to purposes of revenue, but that it is, at the discretion of Congress, to be exercised for promoting the common defence and general welfare.. 64. The expediency of exercising this power, depends upon many and various considerations. Whilst all must admit the wisdom of its exercise in the protection of the general interests of the country, as commerce and agriculture, and such branches of manufacture as are indispensable in war; all must recognize the impolicy of its use, when it subserves the interests of the few, but oppresses the many. In the case of manufactures, there seems to exist a tolerable safe rule. If the manufacturer can now, or at a proximate time, supply the demand of the country in competent quantity and quality, and at a price as advantageous as the foreigner, there can be no substantial reason opposed to protecting him, by discriminating duties, against the foreign artist. In such case, domestic competition will soon remove the evil of monopoly. But if the manufacturer cannot comply with these requisites, it would be an act of oppression upon the community, to tax them for his benefit. He would have a monopoly as odious as unjust. In the application of the foregoing rule, some latitude may be allowable in determining what proximation to the qualities above stated as pre-requisite, may warrant the protection. This is a case solely for the wisdom of Congress; and if it were the only one, the subject would possess little difficulty. 65. But a small minority of the Union have, or think they have, interests in relation to it, irreconcilable with those of the majority; and taking the ground, that, the power claimed by the majority is not only inexpedient, but is unconstitutionally and unwarrantably assumed, they refuse, or may refuse, obedience to the general law. When such a case is seriously made and resolutely prosecuted, our citizens must calculate the value of the Union. If it be worth preserving, we must, in the spirit of compromise, ever essential to our safety, yield a portion of the general advantages, or, in other words, submit to the evil of insufficient restriction, or we must enforce obedience to the law. If the Union be not worth preserving, the refractory State must fall from our brilliant galaxy, and be converted, like other fallen stars, into a loathsome mass; and its citizens, as the citizens of every other foreign State, be enemies in war, in peace, friends. But Cain was not so accursed, as will he be, who shall consummate this work. The brand of infamy burnt not so brightly upon the brow of him who mocked his Saviour, as it will upon the front of him who shall thus impair a Union, in which centres the world's hope of political happiness. 66. III. The right of the General Government to appropriate monies raised by taxation or otherwise, would seem to be as clear as the right to levy taxes for the common defence and general welfare. Both depend upon the same clause of the Constitution; the second part giving the right to appropriate the public money. If it be not given by it, it is not given at all; there being no other grant in the Contitution which gives it directly, or which bears upon the subject, even by implication, unless it be the prohibition to appropriate money for the support of armies for a longer term than two years, or the prohibition to draw inoney from the treasury, without an appropriation made by law. This part of the grant gives no distinct and original power. It is manifestly incidental to the objects of the first part, giving the power to lay taxes. If both parts be taken together, it seems impossible to give to the latter any other construction than that contended for; inasmuch as that enumerates the objects to which the public money may be appropriated. 67. If such be not the true construction of the words, to provide for the common defence and general welfare, they have either no import, or one much greater, in extent, than the first words of the clause. Either presumption is unwarranted; the first, because no part of the Constitution can be deemed useless or unmeaning; the second, because such construction makes the second part of the clause an original grant, embracing the same objects with the first, but with greater power; which is absurd. The order observed in the grants made by the Constitution, is to give the power in the fullest manner, and then to qualify it, when necessary. Again, if the clause be not an authority to appropriate the public money, it conveys indefinite and unlimited power; dispensing with the special powers to raise and support armies and a navy; to call forth the militia, or even to lay and collect taxes. An unqualified power "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare," if a distinct and separate grant, would extend to every object of public interest. The power to provide for the common defence would give to Congress the command of the whole force, with all the resources of the Union; but an unqualified right to provide for the general welfare would go much further; would break down the barriers between the States and the General Government, and consolidate the whole under the latter. 63. But, if the clause be construed to mean nothing more than a grant of power to appropriate the public money, every word has an important meaning and effect; and all grants of power by the Constitution have full operation. The great scheme is consistent in all its parts. We have a government instituted for national purposes, vested with adequate powers, commencing with the inost important, that of revenue, and proceeding in order to all the others-all formed with the utmost care and circumspection. How much more consistent is this inference with the great objects of the institution, and with the wisdom of those who framed and those who ratified it, than one which subverts every sound principle of construction, and throws all things into confusion! 69. The power being settled, as in the General Government, it becomes necessary to determine what is its extent. It is contended, on one side, that the National Government, being one of limited powers, has no right to expend money, except in cases authorized by specific grants, according to a strict construction of them. That the clause relied on does not, in either of its branches, give to Congress discretionary power of any kind; but is merely an auxiliary to effect the other grants. But the power to raise, and the power to appropriate monies, flowing from the clause, is alike general and unqualified. Each branch was, obviously, drawn with a view to the other; the import of each illustrates that of the other: and all the powers given by the Constitution without qualification, must be exercised without other check than the responsibility of the representative to his constituents. 70. So intimately connected with, and dependent upon, each other are the two branches of this clause, that the limitation of one would have been a limitation of the other. Had the power to raise money been restricted to special purposes, so would have been the power of appropriation. So, if the power of appropriation had been restricted to definite objects, |