The injury to the public was much in the same ratio. The Government borrowed, during the war, eighty-eight millions of dollars, at an average discount of 15 per cent.-giving stock for eighty-eight millions, and receiving sixty-eight millions, in such Bank paper as could be obtained. In this statement Treasury notes are considered as stock, at 20 per cent. discount. There was, here, obviously, a loss of twelve millions. But, the sum of sixty-eight millions was paid in depreciated currency, not more than half as valuable as that in which the stock has been redeemed. Hence, another loss of thirty-four millions, resulting, incontestibly, and exclusively, from the depreciation of the currency, and making, with the sum lost by discount, forty-six millions. The only persons who profited by this state of things, were the brokers, money changers or bankers, who obtained a gain equal to the loss of the Government. To this sum, we must add the loss sustained by the United States from broken Banks, alone; amounting, between 1816 and 1819, to a million and a half of dollars.

A great loss, however, resulted from the relative depreciation of paper, at different places; which, with loss of general credit, was sustained by the community in commercial exchanges. During the years 1915 and 1816, the exchange between our different cities varied from 5 to 25 per cent.; the ordinary premium for specie being from 10 to 20 per cent. The amount of our domestic exchanges might even then be estimated at not less than two hundred millions of dollars per annum. If we estimate the difference of exchange paid on these, at only per cent., on an average, the industrious classes were taxed, annually, ten millions, for the benefit of the Banks and brokers.

These effects, and especially their great cause, the suspension of specie payments, would not have happened, at the time, had the Bank of the United States been preserved. The exaggerated increase of the State Banks would not have occurred. That Bank would, as before, have restrained them within proper bounds, and checked their issues; and would have had the earliest notice of the approaching danger. It would have put the Treasury Department upon its guard; acting in concert, they would have retarded the event; and as the treaty of peace was ratified, within less than six months after the suspension took place, the catastrophe would have been altogether avoided.

387. And now to the contrast.

And first, of the soundness and permanency of the currency.

It is notorious, that specie payments were restored, and have been maintained, through the instrumentality of the Bank. It has, wherever its operations have been extended, effectually, checked excessive issues on the part of the State Banks. These issues, it had caused to be reduced, before the year 1820, from sixty-six to less than forty millions; and since that period has so confined them, that every where the paper of solvent State Banks is convertible into specie, within the local sphere of its circulation.

The manner of this restraint, is in receiving the notes of all solvent Banks, and requiring payment, from time to time, without suffering the balance, due by any, to become too large. On this operation, which requires particular attention and vigilance, great firmness, with due forbearance, depends, almost exclusively, the stability and the permanency of the currency of the country.

And, now, as to the uniformity of the currency produced and sustained by the Bank. It is more uniform than any specie currency can be made. In this respect, it has been productive of results more salutary than were anticipated by its most sanguine advocates. No one contemplated, that, the Bank would redeem its bills at any of its offices, other than those by which they should be respectively issued. The inevitable effect of such a requirement, would have been to compel the Bank to perform the whole commercial exchanges of the country, without compensation. And yet, the Bank has done, and continues to do, this. The bills of the Bank and of all its branches are invariably and promptly paid, in specie, whenever presented at the offices at which they are payable; consequently, within their respective spheres of circulation, they are equivalent to specie. If the Philadelphia merchant have silver, instead of Bank bills, and desires to purchase cotton at New Orleans, he must transport it thither, paying the expense of carriage, including the insurance. This expense constitutes the natural rate of exchange, between the cities, and is the sum the merchant must give as a premium for a bill of exchange, to avoid the trouble and delay of transporting his specie. But the bills of the Bank would purchase such bill of exchange at the same price as specie. What we have said of the Philadelphia merchant is true of every other merchant in any place of the Union. Therefore, if the Bank had not reduced the rate of exchange, its bills would be of equal value with silver, at every point, and for every purpose, whether local or general.

But, the Bank has reduced the rate of exchange to a mere fraction of one per cent., and has equalized the currency throughout the Union. If the whole circulation were specie, the average cost of transporting it from one point to another, would be one per cent., and such would be the price of a bill of exchange transferring the value. But the Bank, for less than one-half per ct., will give a draft, at, and on, the remotest points where it has offices. Or if the merchant prefers to transinit to his correspondent the bills of the office where he resides, although they be not strictly redeemable, at the residence of his correspondent, yet as they are receivable in payment of all dues to the Government, they are negotiable, at par, and are so received by the Bank. In 1832, the exchange operations of the Bank amounted to 241 millions of dollars, transferred at a premium of one-eleventh of one per cent.

For all the purposes of revenue, the reception of the Bank bills at the Treasury, gives to the national currency, that perfect uniformity, that ideal perfection which, in a country so extensive as ours, a metallic currency cannot attain. A bill issued at Missouri, is equivalent to specie at Boston, and wherever the Bank issues bills, and the Government collects its funds. When, therefore, it is considered, that, the Bank transfers, with scrupulous punctuality, the funds of the Government, wherever required, free of expense, it is obvious that it has furnished to the Government and the people, a currency of absolutely uniform value, in all places, for all the purposes of paying the public contributions, and disbursing the public revenue. And when the great amount, more than twenty-five millions of dollars, is considered, it will be perceived that a currency absolutely uniform for this operation, must be so for the general purposes of commerce.

Upon the whole, it may be confidently asserted, that no country in the world has a circulating medium of greater uniformity, than the United States, and that, no country of any thing like the same geographical extent, has a currency at all comparable with it, in that respect.

388. Such, then, were the condition and sources of the reviled Bank of the United States, when assailed by the first Magistrate of the country, and his administration. It had scrupulously fulfilled all the objects of its creation-had raised the currency from a deranged and unsound state, to uniformity and purity; transmitting the public monies from one point of the Union to another, whenever desired, promptly, and without charge; serving its financial operations, as no Gov

ernment was ever before served; collecting and disbursing, in the space of thirteen years, more than three hundred and fifty millions of dollars, without the loss of a cent; reducing the exchange, on the most distant commercial operations, to a charge almost nominal, only; in a word, spreading around it, all the blessings which security and judicious aid to the Government and people could give. All which was acknowledged and, gratefully, proclaimed, by every officer connected with our fiscal concerns, by the Committees of both Houses of Congress, and by the millions of citizens engaged in prosperous commerce; and all which, the Executive proposed to jeopard in the maintenance of an abstract opinion, which had, for years, been repudiated by a large majority of the people. Can men who would thus sacrifice the substantial realities of life to speculative notions, be qualified to guide the destinies of a nation? Or, rather, can it be credited, that such notions form the true motives of any statesman?

389. There is a power incident to banking institutions, which is susceptible of great abuse. They may control their debtors and their customers, and may be used for political ef fect. But, in the ordinary, isolated and independent state of these institutions, their number and adverse interests almost annihilate this power. Their stock and their business are distributed throughout the community; and as no one, singly, can affect public opinion, attempts for that purpose have been, consequently, never made. But, a moment's consideration will show, a case wholly different, where many of these institutions in a State, or in the Union, combine, and are directed by the will of an individual or of a party. The restraint upon the dangerous power of each Bank is removed; the dependant upon bank favour cannot seek relief from oppression, by shifting his account; he has but one mean of obtaining, perhaps, indispensable pecuniary aid; he must conciliate the bank directors, and their favour is to be purchased, only, by his vote and influence in political contests. The possible abuse of this power, by individual Banks, has, by many sound political economists, been objected against their creation; but, their great use overpowered the objection from possible abuse, until their very number became protection. But, when the Banks combine, the power to pervert their faculties is increased, and the restraint wholly taken away. Amid all the excitements of party, for forty years, no one had conceived the design of combining the Banks, to control the popular voice. No bold and designing politician had ventured upon

this expedient, until the subtle genius of Mr. Van Buren seized it, in the project of the Safety Bank system of New York.

390. This system, we understand, is not the offspring of Mr. Van Buren's scheming and prolific brain. It was begotten, probably, in the purlieus of Wall street, in the com. merce of money changers, who looked to it, only, so far as it regarded themselves, as a pecuniary speculation, but who were fully aware, that the political power it might give would be its best recommendation to.Governor Van Buren When first submitted to him, it was received coldly. His attention, as he lay upon his couch, whilst the details were read, was divided between the reader and a newspaper; but when the suggestion was made, that the combined Banks would furnish a power which might, not only check the operations of the Bank of the United States, but might so control that institution as to render it a serviceable engine throughout the Union, instantly, all the energies of the careless listener were roused. No ear of love-sick girl ever drank with more intense delight the long desired, but unexpected, love tale. What a prospect was here opened! The Banks of the State of New York, weak and useless for party effect, in their individual existence, were hooped together, and became, like the fasces, the bundle of banded rods, borne by the lictors before the Roman Consuls, the representative of irresistible power; whilst the Bank of the United States, like a serpent, wrapt all opposing interests in its folds and crushed them beneath his feet. The project was instantly adopted, cherished, matured, and is now, in New York, in full tide of successful experiment. The State, overwhelmed by a monied aristocracy, is bound to the car of Mr. Van Buren's ambition. But the beatific vision, which enraptured his sight, could not, be immediately and wholly realized. The Bank of the United States could not be seduced or coerced to minister to his unhallowed ends. The attempt to influence it was not omitted, and the war upon that institution, which has ensued, so disastrous to the country, but so beneficent to the dominant party, is to be ascribed to Mr. Van Buren.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not aver that Mr. Van Buren openly recommended this safety fund system to the Legislature. On the contrary, with his characteristic caution, he refrained from this; submitting it as the offspring of a man of talents, worthy of the consideration of the Legislature. It was at first not favourably received. But, when