worth, the supreme god to do all things immediately and by himself, but he assigned some certain parts and provinces to other inferior gods.' 'Amongst the pagans,' adds the same writer, there was nothing without a god: one presided over the rocking of the cradle, another over the sweeping of the house, another over the ears of corn, another over the husk, and another over the knots of straw and grass.'

Exactly the same idea prevailed among the Hindoo philosophers as is attributed to Scævola and Varro, who, says Cudworth, agreed that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws, was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; that there was another called the theology of wise men and of truth.' Still we must remind the reader, that it was not the grossness or absurdity of image worship that offended the Hindoo sages; they aspired to a state of abstraction from earthly things which was beyond the reach of the vulgar, and which they proudly expected would elevate them to a perfect union with the deity, leaving the gods and their worshippers in a state of subjection to death, and to transmigration through every reptile form.

Respecting the state of man in this world the Hindoo philosophers appear to have taught, that all men are born under the influence of the merit or demerit of actions performed in some prior state ;1 and that the preponderance of merit or demerit in these actions regulates the quantity of each of the three qualities (goonus) in each individual, viz. of the quality leading to truth and consequent emancipation, of that to activity, and of that to darkness, respectively termed the sŭtwů, rujú, and tùmă goonus; which qualities have an overwhelming influence on the actions and effects of the present birth. Kupilu thus describes these qualities: The quality leading to truth, produces happiness; that giving rise to activity, inclines the person to seck his happiness. among the objects of sense; and that leading to darkness, produces insensibility. The first quality leads to liberation; the second to temporary happiness in the heavens of the gods, and the last to misery.'2

6

According to this system, therefore, men are not born as candidates for a celestial prize, or as probationers having life and death set before them, every thing depending on their chaChyvůnŭ says,

1 Poit'been see says, ' Merit and demerit, as well as the universe, are eternal.' p. 255. The fates of men arise out of works having no beginning.' p. 257.

2 Pages 223, 221.

racters and conduct in the present state; but they are placed under the effects of actions which are said to have had no beginning, and which regulate the qualities or complexion of the character so entirely as to remind us of what is said of the doctrine of fate according to Zeno and Chrysippus, that it implies an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects to which the deity himself is subject.' On this point, take the following authorities: Men are born subject to time, place, merit and demerit.' 'God formed creatures according to the eternal destiny connected with their meritorious or evil conduct."2 God created every thing in an inseparable connection with the merit and demerit of actions.'3 'God himself is subject in his government to the merit and demerit of works.'4 Some say, that the very bo dy, the senses, and the faculties also, are the fruits of actions.'5 merit in one birth, naturally give rise to virtue or vice in the next.’6 ed periods of passing through the effects of meritorious and evil actions are expired, the soul will obtain emancipation."7 'Birth is an evil, for with birth all manner of evils are con

nected.'8

• Works of merit or deWhen the appoint

Seneca says, 'Divine and human affairs are alike borne along in an irresistible current; cause depends upon cause; effects arise in a long succession.'

Respecting the human body, the opinions of three distinguished philosophers may suffice: Kŭnadů says, 'The body is composed of one element, earth : water, light, air, and ether are only assistants,' page 436. Kupilă, respecting the origin of bodies, delivers this opinion; 'In the midst of that universe surrounding egg,9 which is ten times larger than the fourteen spheres, by the will of the self-existent was produced the st’hōolu-shŭrēērŭ10,' page 335.'Causing the rare or subtle parts of his own lingu-shŭreerŭll to fall as clothing upon the souls proceeding from himself, God created all animals' page 334. Vushisht'hu says, 'From the quality leading to truth in space, arose the power of hearing; from the same in air, arose feeling; in fire, the sight; in water, taste; in matter, smell. From the quality leading to activity united to space, arose speech; from the same in air, arose the power of the hands; in light, that of the feet; in water, that of production; and in earth, that of expulsion; and from this quality in the whole of the five elements, arose the power of the five breaths, or air received into or emitted from the body. The five senses, the five organs of action, the five breaths, with the mind and the understanding, form the embryo body: a particular combina

1 Goutămă, page 227.

4 Ushira, page 256.

8 Goutůmě, page 423.

the world is represented 11 From lingo, atomic.

2 Bhrigoo, page 238.

6 Dévůlů, page 213.

5 Goŭtŭmů, page 407.

3 Dukshu, page 242. 7 Dükshů, page 242.

9 An orphic fragment is preserved by Athenagoras, in which the formation of under the emblem of an egg. 10 From st'hōōlü, gross, and shūrēēră, body,

tion of these forms the body in its perfect state.'1 Plato says, When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and those forms are produced from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe.'

The soul was considered by all these philosophers as God. The védantees were of opinion, that there existed no distinction between spirit and the soul, while Kúpilŭ and Pǎtǎnjülee maintained, that besides the soul there was no such thing as spirit, preserving a distinction at. the same time between the soul as liberated from birth, and as confined in a bodily state. Those who made a distinction between the soul and spirit contended, that spirit as connected with the body was there in an unmixed and intangible state, as simple light or energy, and not as in any respect polluted by evil actions, the painful consequences of which, in a sense of misery, they contended were confined to the soul; and if in any part of this work an idea should have been given, that the Great Spirit, in an individuated state, enjoys or endures the fruits of actions, except by its confinement to a bodily state, the reader is entreated to substitute, in any such passage, the term soul. By the term jēēvă, or soul, the Hindoos understand an uncreated being or power, separate from spirit, the subject or worshipper of spirit, which though individuated has one source common to all souls. Kupilů says, some maintain the doctrine of the individuality of souls ; but this is false; for all souls have the same vitality."2 Jēēvu signifies life, and the author knows no term by which to identify it, but that of soul in a lower sense. The soul thus, according to some of these sages, is dependent on spirit for all its power, and under spirit regulates all the motions of the body: to the soul is also ascribed all the merit and demerit of actions. The seat of spirit is said to be in the brain, and of the soul in the heart. Strato taught, that the seat of the soul was in the middle of the brain.' The soul is also said to be subject, in its powers and actions, to the bodily state in which it is placed.

These philosophers further taught, that mună, the mind, and booddhee, the understanding, were assistants to the soul, and not faculties of the spirit. They considered all living creatures as possessed of souls; the soul of a beast being the same as that in rational creatures, that in beasts being only more confined than that in man. All life is Brümhů,' says VédüVyasă. Archelaus of Miletus taught, that animals have souls which differ in their powers according to the structure of the bodies in which they reside. The Hindoo sages distinguished, however, between the soul and animal life, the latter of which they spoke of as being mere vital breath. The following opinions on the intellectual part of man are found in the Hindoo

writings: Mind cannot be the source of life and motion, for if this had been the case, when this power had been pursuing something else, the body would have become inanimate.' The understanding, though not the cause of light, in consequence of its nearness to spirit, possesses a degree of radiance superior to every other part of ature." The understanding receives the forms of things, and they are reflected upon spirit. It is through the operations of the understanding that things are perceived."3 The understanding is without beginning, for as a seed is said to contain the future tree, so the understanding contains the habits produced by fate.' 4 Empedocles, maintained that not only man but brute animals are allied to the divinity, for that one spirit which pervades the universe unites all animated beings to itself and to one another. It is therefore unlawful to kill or eat animals which are allied to us in their principle of life.'

Having thus brought man on the stage of action, the Hindoo sages point out three modes of religion, the lowest of which relates to the popular ceremonies, and the fruit of which will be a religious mind, and a portion of merit and happiness. If these religious works are splendid, a residence with the gods is promised. The next mode is that of devotion, the blessings promised to which are comprised in a dwelling near God in a future state. But that which these sages most exalted was the pursuit of divine wisdom, either in connection with ceremonies or without them, by discrimination, subjection of the passions, and abstraction of mind. The fruit promised to this abstraction is liberation or absorption. On these subjects we have the following opinions: Future happiness is to be obtained by devotion, assisted by a sight of the image, by touching it, by meditation on its form, worshipping its feet or in its presence, bowing to it, serving it from affection,'&c.5 Those ceremonies by which the knowledge of the divine nature is obtained, and by which all evil is for ever removed, we call religion.' 'Perform the appointed ceremonies for subduing the passions; listen to discourses on the divine nature, fix the mind unwaveringly on God, purify the body by incantations and other ceremonies, and pursuade thyself that thou and the deity are one.” 'The inferior fruit following works is happiness with the gods.'8 Ashwǎlayǎnǎ and Védŭ-Vyasů, however, pro

test against the performance of works for the sake of reward: the former says, 'It is improper to seek for a recompense for works ;' and the latter says, 'Works are not to be considered as a bargain.' Other philosophers, and among them Shunkŭracharyŏ, are opposed to all works:

1 Goutümă, page 399. page 337. 5 Jamudugnee, page 254. 8 Védů-Vyasů, page 360.

2 Pǎtǎnjülee, page 394.

3 Kupilŭ, page 341. 6 Kŭnadů, page 428.

4 Kǎpilă,

7 Ugůstyŭ, page 246.

the latter says, 'Works are wholly excluded, and knowledge alone, realizing every thing as Brumhu, procures liberation.'-In direct opposition to this, Gurgŭ says, "The man who is animated by an ardent devotion, whatever opinions he embraces, will obtain final emancipation.'2 Naridů suggests another way to beatitude : Reliance on a religious guide, singing the praises of God, and abstraction, lead to future blessedness.'3 All these philosophers agreed with Shutatйpă, that 'The candidate for future bliss must renounce the indulgence of the passions.'

Although many things are found in the philosophical writings of the Hindoos favourable to the practice of religious ceremonies and to devotion, yet the ancient system, it is evident, strongly recommended abstraction and the practice of those austerities which were intended to annihilate the passions. In this work, wisdom, or rather discrimination, was considered as-the most effective agent, united to bodily austerities. On this subject Kŭpilŭ thus speaks: We call that discriminating wisdom which distinguishes spirit from matter according to their different natures: the immateriality of the one from the materiality of the other, the good of the one from the evil of the other, the value of the one from the worthlessness of the other.' 'Nothing destroys false ideas so much as discrimination.' 'Every one through visible objects knows something of God, but abstract ideas of God none possess, except as discrimination is acquired.' 'Discrimination, seeing it prevents false ideas, is the cause of liberation.'5 The reader will perceive that this discrimination was to be connected with yogu, which is thus described: "The restraining of the mind, and confining it to internal motions, is called yogu.’ "Of the eight parts of yogi, the first five serve the purpose of subduing the passions. When the yogee renounces all assistance from the understanding, and remains without the exercise of thought, he is identified with Brumhu, and remains as the pure glass when the shadow has left it." The exalted powers possessed by the yogee are thus mentioned by Půtůnjōlee: "The yogee will hear celestial sounds, the songs and conversation of celestial choirs. He will have the preception of their touch in their passage through the air.' The yogee is able to trace the progress of intellect through the senses, and the path of the animal spirit through the nerves. He is able to enter a dead or a living body by the path of the senses, and in this body to act as though it were his own.' The happy state of stoicism to which he is raised is thus described by Kúpilů: To a yogee, in whose mind all things are identified as spirit,

1 Page, 362.

2 Page 252.

4 Page 242. 5 Kopilă, p. 321, 323 and 342. 6 Pătŭnjulee, page 384. `7 Vélŭ-Vyasů, page 371. 8 Pythagoras is said to have been permitted to hear the celestial music of the sphere. 9 Pages 388, 289.

3 Page 233.