intercourse with material objects,' page 392.

It is true, indeed, that Védů-Vyasŭ speaks of

Brumhŭ as the charioteer, but in this character he himself is subject in his dispensations to the

merit or demerit of the governed.

Kupilǎ plainly maintains, that God has nothing to do with creatures, nor they with him." Epicurus says, 'It is not consistent with our natural notions of the gods, as happy and immortal beings, to suppose that they encumber themselves with the management of the world, or are subject to the cares and passions which must necessarily attend so great a charge. We are therefore to conceive that the gods have no intercourse with mankind, nor any concern with the affairs of the world.'

On the subject of Creation, the Hindoo philosophers were as much at variance as on that of the divine nature:

We have already seen, that by several philosophers matter itself was considered as capable of the work of creation. Kupifů, Soomůntoo, Vyagrů-Padů, and Půtůnjůlee all maintain this doctrine. Kănadu appears to maintain the same opinion, when he says, 'In creation two atoms begin to be agitated, till at length they become separated from their former union, and then unite, by which a new substance is formed, which possesses the qualities of the things from which it arose.'2 The Pythagoreans held, that motion is the effect of a power essential to matter, and that no separate cause was required or employed. It was the doctrine of Plato that there is in matter a necessary but blind and refractory force.

3

Védŭ-Vyasů, Vushisht'hu, and Vrishisputee believed that God united to himself matter, and thus formed the world. "In this union, says Vushisht'hu, the quality of darkness prevailed, and hence arose the desire of giving birth to creatures." These philosophers speak of the power or force which causes the procession and continued progress of things, as residing in this illusion. They thus argue: the yogee, abstracted from all sublunary objects, perceives no necessity for a thousand things called for in a secular state; but he is happy in himself, and seeks no human intercourse; but should this yogee fall from this elevation, and be come ensnared by worldly attachment, his mind will then become concentrated on this object of his affections, and he will feel immediate subjection to a thousand wants. This mode of reasoning they apply to God, and thus account for creation: God becomes united to illusion, and he then feels the desire of creation, and forms the world. Thus Védŭ-Vyasŭ, 'The mass 1 Page 222. 2 Page 434. 3 Page 236.

of illusion forms the inconceivable and unspeakable energy of God, which is the cause of all things. In creation, God united to himself shäktee, or energy, in which reside the three quaFities.'1 Cicero tells us, that the vis or force which was in all those things called God or In con

deified, was really no other than something of God in every thing that is good. formity with these ideas, God is spoken of by the Hindoo sages as the active power, and matter as passive in the work of creation, and hence the terms male (poorooshú) and female (prukritee) are frequently found in their writings: God, when the active and passive powers are united, possesses form.'3 The supreme cause exists in two parts like the seed of the cicer arietinum, which represent the active and passive powers of nature.'4 'In creation the active power directed the passive.'5 According to some writers, the monad [of Pythagoras] denotes the active principle in nature, or God; the duad, the passive principle or matter.'6 Empedocles says, 'The first principles of nature are of two kinds, active and passive; the active is unity or God, the passive matter." Plato seems to express a similar opinion, when he attri butes all the evils of the present state to matter; that is, union to matter. The terms shüktee, energy, ŭvidya, crude matter, and prŭkritee, illusion, all expressive of the properties of matter, are used to signify that from which material things arose; and hence says Védů-Vyasŭ, Illusion is the producing cause of consciousness, of the understanding, of intellect, of the five senses, the five organs, the five kinds of air in the body, of crude matter, and of all other material things.'7 Here we have the doctrine that matter, &c. were created; and VédŭVyasŭ adds, "The universe was formed from vacuum, air, fire, water, and earth. The first thing created was vacuum.'8 In direct opposition to this last sentence, Kupilă says, 'There are some remarks in the védŭ and smritees which lead to the conclusion, that the intellectual part [of the universe] was first created." "God,' says Plato, 'produced mind prior in time as well as excellence to the body.'-Goutŭmů, not acknowledging the opinions either of Kŭpilů or of Vedŭ-Vyasŭ, says, 'God being possessed of eight qualities or dispositions, existing eternally within himself, manifested himself in a body of light [Védů-Vyasŭ contends for his uniting to himself darkness or matter], from whence the primary atoms issued.'10 Kúpilů on the other hand, maintains, that the world was produced by the twenty-four principles of things as an assisting cause.'11 Enfield says, that the Persians, the Indians, the Egyptians, and all the celebrated Grecian philosophers held, that principles were the first of all things.

Goutůmů taught the doctrine of an archetype or pattern from which all things were creat

ed: The creator next, using the primary atoms, gave existence to the first form or pattern of things, from which, in union with merit and demerit, creation arose.' Kupilŭ also says, 'from the elements water, fire, air, and space, and the primary atoms, combined, a pattern or archetype is formed, from which the visible universe springs.2 God,' says Plato, 'that he might form

a perfect world, followed that eternal pattern,' &c.

Several philosophers taught that the world was eternal.

Hence, says Küpilă, "This uni

verse is the eternal tree Brůmhu, which sprung from an imperceptible seed [matter]." 'The world has no creator.'4 Chyvǎnǎ says, 6 Epicurus says, the universe always existed, and will always remain.' 'Aristotle acknowledged no cosmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.'5 He supposed it absurd to think, that God who is an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, should have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all; and then, after infinite ages, should have begun to move the matter, or make the world.6 Punchanjunŭ, a Hindoo sage, entertained more correct ideas, and says, 'To make any thing besides God eternal, is to make more than one God.'7

There were others who taught that matter, atoms, and the primary elements, were eternal: Vrishŭsputee says, 'From ten elements every thing arose, one of which, uvidyů [matter] was uncreated.'8 Goŭtămă maintains that atoms are eternal.'9 He is followed by Poit'heenusee, the universe is composed of uncreated atoms, incapable of entension.'10 Kunadů says, Atoms are uncreated, and are of four kinds, from which arose earth, water, light and air.'11 The idea of the Hindoo philosophers was, that crude matter and the primary elements partake of the three qualities in equal proportions; but matter, or the passive principle, in the stoical system, is destitute of all qualities. 'Matter,' according to Plato, 'is an eternal and infinite principle.'12 Democritus says, 'Whatever exists must owe its being to necessary and selfexistent principles: the principles of all things are two, atoms and vacuum.'13 Epicurus says, 'These first principles, or simple atoms, are divisible by no force, and therefore must be immutable.'14-As though self-contradiction and variety of opinion were to have no bounds, two of these philosophers appear to affirm, that atoms are not eternal: Goutůmů

says,

'From

God, as a body of light, the primary atoms issued ; and Védů-Vyasů delivers a similar opinion: The primary elements, at creation, were produced in an atomic form.'2

Yet there were some philosophers whose conceptions of God as the creator were more correct: Pŭtunjŭlee says, The universe arose from the will or the command of God, who infused into the system a power of perpetual progression ;3 and Jatookŭrnů, another sage, delivers a similar opinion: Creation arose out of the will of God, who created a power to produce and direct the universe."4 Yet here the christian reader will perceive an essential

error in the idea that the power to create was something derived from the deity. None of the ancient heathen could divest themselves of the idea, that the creation and government of the universe would be too troublesome to the Divine Being; an idea which contains the grossest reflection on the infinite wisdom, power, and benevolence of God.

Such were the ideas of the Hindoo philosophers relative to the origin of things. Respecting the world itself, both as the product of divine wisdom and as a stage of action, their opinions were equally incorrect :-Vyaghrŭkůrnů says, 'The world is false, though God is unit ed to it." Kupilă delivers a similar idea: That part of the world which is permanent is intellect all the rest is contemptible, because unsubstantial.' Again, This error-formed world is like a bubble on the water: we can never say that it does not exist, nor that it does. It is as unreal as when the thirsty deer mistakes the fog on the meadow for a pool of water.'ü Visible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting shades. Yet Küpilů speaks more rationally when he says, 'The world resembles a lodging-house; there is no union between it and the occupier' and Kŭnadă thus corrects the folly of these ascetics: Visible objects are not to be despised, seeing the most important future effects arise out of them.”8

As far as these philosophers were yogees, or advocates for the system of abstraction, they necessarily felt but little reverence for the gods, since they considered absorption, to which the gods themselves had not attained, as a felicity far greater than all their heavens could supply: hence says Kúpilů, Even the residence of Brimha is hell, for it is full of the impurity of death: among the inhabitants of that place, those who are more glorious than yourself, are

1 Page 227. have been eternally the source of matter. 2 Page 231.

Those philosophers, says Enfield, who held the system of emanation, conceived God to

3 Page 228.

4 Page 262. 5 Page 264.

miserable in consequence of their subjection to the three goonus; and being constantly terrified with the fear of transmigration, even they seek liberation.'

The Hindoo philosophers never directed their disciples to worship Brămhu, the one God, except by the forms denominated yogu, and in which we find little that can be called worship their object was not to enlarge the understanding and elevate the passions, but rather to destroy both in their attempts to attain perfect abstraction of mind. So that what Cudworth says, 'Some contend that the supreme God was not at all worshipped by the pagans,' is substantially true respecting the Hindoos.

When these ascetics condescend to notice the gods, they speak of Brümha just as Hesiod and others speak of Jupiter, that he is the father of the gods, and that to him the creation of all things is to be attributed.' They also give Brimha two associates, Vishuoo and Shivů, and in the hands of this triumvirate place the work of general creation, preservation, and destruction, thus holding up a most surprising and unaccountable union between the Hindoos, the Greeks, and Romans: Maximus Tyrius observes,' says Cudworth, that Homer shares the government of the world among the triumvirate of gods, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. The Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worshipped altogether in the capitol, were Jupiter, Minerva and Juno.'

It is inculcated in every part of the Hindoo writings that the gods were created. All the sages, though some of them made matter and even the world eternal, agree with Vrihùsputee, who certainly meant to include the gods, 'God is from everlasting: every thing else has a derived existence."2 'All beings,' says Harēētů, 'from Brimha to the smallest insect, constantly reap what they have sown in former births.'3 Cudworth says, the heathen poets, though seeming sticklers for polytheism, except one only unmade deity, asserted all the other to be generated, or created gods.'

It might be asked, If Brimha, Vishnoo, and Shivů preside over human affairs, what work is there assigned to the other gods? Most of the gods, who are not the varied forms of these three, preside over some particular part of creation or of terrene affairs: thus Kartikeya is the god of war, Lukshmee is the goddess of prosperity, &c. Cicero did not suppose,' says Cud