Chintamǎnee, on the evidence of the senses, on that arising from inference, from comparison, and from oral testimony.-A comment on ditto, by Roochee-dăttă. Koosoomanjǎlee, by Oodŭyunacharyů, on the divine nature. Nyayŭ-leelavŭtee, by Shree-Büllübhu.-Leelavǎtee-vivéků, Leelavŭtee-vrittee, and Leelavătee-oopayŭ, on the opinions of the Noiyayikŭs.--A comment on the last work, by Vurdhŭmanů.-Leelavõtee, by Shiromunee.-Leelavŭtee-teeka, a comment on ditto. Deedhitee, the celebrated work of Shiromŭnee.-A comment on the work of Shiromůnee, by Jŭyů-Ramă.—Another called vyakhya.-Others by Jugudeeshŭ, Gŭdadhŭră, and Mŭhadévů.—A comment by Krishnů-bhuttů on the comment of Gŭdadhŭrů. Sungshǎyanoomitee, and Sungshūyanoomitee-vadart'hu, on conjecture.-A comment on the Nyayi-müküründă.-Vyootpüttee, a work by Gŭdadhŭră.-Kütŭkoddharů.--A comment on Türkŭ-bhasha, by Gouree-Kantů.-Nyayŭ-koustoobhü, an explanation of the Nyayă doctrines.-Nyayŭ-tŭtwŏ-chintamŏnee-průkashů, thoughts on the essence of the Nyayŭ philosophy.—-A comment on the Siddhantŭ-tŭtwů, by Gokoolŭ-nať hŭ-oopadhyayů. —Průtyasŭttee-vichară, on the evidence arising from comparison.-Năvyů-mŭtŭ-vadart'hu, on new opinions.—Badhŭ-bŭddhee, on certain knowledge.-Vishŏyňta-vichară, on evidence arising from visible objects.-Pŏkshŏta-vadharthů, syllogisms on cause and effect.—Türkü-bhasha-sară-mănjŭree, a compilation.—Măngălă-vadart'hŭ, a work on the invocations prefixed to Hindoo writings.-Samŏgree-vadart'hō, on the means of obtaining philosophical knowledge.-A comment on the Năng-vadů, on negatives, by Jŭgŭdeeshŭturkalŭnkarů.—Mooktavпlee-deepika, a comment on the Mooktavulee.-Another work bearing this title by Pakshŭdhărŭ-mishrŭ.—Ŭlănkară-pŭriskarů, a work on the meaning of terms.—Půdart'hă-tŭtwavŭloků, a similar work.—Voishéshiku-sōōtropŭskară, the meaning of the Voisheshikă sōotrus.-Nyayŭ-siddhantu-můnjüree, a nosegay of proofs respecting the Nyayŭ.--Türkă-bhashă-průkashŭ, a similar work.—-Alokŭ, (light) a name like that of the Star or the Sun news-papers.-Shǎktee-vichară, on the meaning of sounds.—Drivyŭkirǎnavǎlee, on the nature of substances.-Nyayǎ-pramanyŭ-munjŭree-teeka, on proofs from evidence, by Narayănă.-Pădŭ-vyakhya-rutnakuru, on the meaning of words.-Vishishtu-voishishtyǎ-bodhů, a similar work.-Samanyŭ-lükshŭna-vadart'hů, ditto.--Pramanyŭvadu, on the four proofs of things.--Koosoomanjülee-măküründŭ, on the divine nature.--A comment on ditto.-Vivrittee-koosoomanjŭlee-karika-vyakhya, a similar work. Vyapteevadhй-ruhůsyй, on the causes of things.-Karuku-chukru, on the six parts of speech. Nyayŭ-siddhantu-munjŭree-shăbdă-půrichédů, an abridgment of the terms used in the Nyayŭ.-Tatpůryŭ-sündŭrbhŭ-nyayŭ, on the meaning of words.-Vurdhŭmanŭ-kirŭnavălēe-průkashă, on different philosophical opinions.-Nyayŭ-sŭnkshépů, a short abridgment of the Nyayŭ philosophy.-Oopŭkrůmŭ-vadă, on the grounds of dispute.---Pŭrătŭtwŭ-průkashika, on the essence of the Nyayŭ.-Půdart'hŭ-chăndrika, on the meaning of terms.--Nyayŭ-pŭdart'hŭ-deepika, an abridgment.-Nyayŭ-mookta-vălee, a similar work.-Mookta-vulee-prŭkashi, ditto.-Půdart'ha-deepika, a similar work.-Siddhantămůnjurée-tēēka, a comment on the Siddhantă-mănjérée.—Nyayŭ-sară, an abridgment.— Tatpŭryŭ-deepika, a comment on ditto.-Goonŭ-kirŭna-vălee, on the 24 goonŭs.-Nyayŭsǎngrühŭ, by Roghoo-nat'hŭ.-Nyayŭ-tŭtwalokŭ, an abridgment.-Tătwă-vivékŭ-mōōlă, ditto. A comment on ditto.-Nükshūtrů-vada-vălee, on astronomical terms.-Nyayăvarttiku-teeka, a short comment.-Sănnec-kurshă-vadă, on the union of visible objects with the senses. Nyayŭ-mookta-vůlee-teeka, by Mŏha-dévŏ.-Gnană-vadă, on the knowledge of realities.—Ŭvůyŭvů-răhŭsyŭ, on conducting disputes syllogistically.—Nyayă-pŭnchăpŭdika-sŭtēēků, a similar work with a commentary.—Siddhantă-rühŭsyŭ.—Průť’hŭmavyootpǎttee-vichară, on the nature of sounds.-The second part of ditto.--Nyayu-varttikǎtatpuryй-teeka, by Vachŭsputee-mishrŭ.—Loukikă-nyayŭ-rŭtnakŭrů, by Rughoo-nať❜hă. -Săngskară-vicharů, the arrangement of sounds.-Sütyŭpădart'hu, the arrangement of things.--Prushůstă-padă-bhashyă, a comment on the Prăshăstă-vadă.-Nyayŭ-vadhart'hŭ, on the doctrines of the Nyayǎ.-Kŭnadă-bhasharŭtně, a work on terms, by Kănadů.— Bhasha-pŭrichédů, by Vishwů-Nat'hŭ-Pŏnchanŭnă, on the names of things.-Nyayumōōlŭ-põribhasha, a comment on the Nyayă-mōōlů, by Seerŭ-dévă. SECTION XXIV. Translation of the sootrus of Goutumů in an abridged form, as explained by VishwuNat'hu-Siddhantů. There are sixteen parts [pŭdart'hus] connected with the discussion of a proposition, viz. 1. prămanů, 2. průméyă, 3. săngshŭyŭ, 4. průyojănă, 5. drishtantă, 6. siddhantŭ, 7. ăvŭyăvă, 8. türkkŭ, 9. nirnůyů, 10. vadů, 11. jŏlpů, 12. vitănda, 13. hétwa-bhasů, 14. chulo, 15. jatee, and 16. nigrăhă-st'hanů. He who obtains the true knowledge of these things will secure liberation [that is, he will be able by them to establish from inference the undoubted existence of God.] Vishwă-Nat'hŭ first explains the reason why Goutumă, in his sōōtrus, places the proofs [průmanu] of things before he describes the object [proméyo] respecting which proof is sought, by urging, that every thing is in a state of uncertainty until its existence is proved; but that after its existence is clearly ascertained, the desire to be acquainted with it, is formed in the mind. Still it is necessary that the proofs of the existence of an object should admit of no contradiction, but be clear and perfect. In order to establish these proofs, all doubts [sǎngshйyй] should be cleared up, and the necessity [průyojunŭ] of the existence of the object be made manifest, especially by proofs from comparison [drishtantă]. The argument will then amount to certainty [siddhantă]. Still, two opponents discuss the matter in dispute through five points, [ŭvŭyŭvů] of argument [tŭrkkŏ], and from this arises decision [nirnŏyů]. The dispute [vadŭ] is again resumed [julpŭ], and continued by the opponent, who still urges vain objections [vitunda] against the offered reasons [hétwa-bhasŏ], and uses various deceptions [chůlu], alledging, that the cause in hand belongs not to the thing [jatee] to which it is assigned. The whole ends in putting to silence [nigrõhu-st'hanŭ] the opponent. After the acquisition of the knowledge above-mentioned [of the existence of God, by inference, through these půdart'hus], the person under its influence constantly meditates on spirit, and thus destroys all false ideas, though he still continues subject to the fruits of birth, and obtains liberation only by degrees. In the progress of obtaining liberaZ z tion, first, false ideas from which desires arise, and passion also, being destroyed, merit and demerit, springing from passion, are also destroyed, and with them the cause of birth, as well as the body and all its sorrows: then follows liberation. There are four kinds of evidence [prümanŭ]: that of the senses, that arising from inference, from comparison, and from testimony. The evidence denominated průtŭkshŭ, or that derived from the senses, or from the perception of an object known before, does not admit of mistake or uncertainty. The evidence termed ŭnoomană, [inference] is of three kinds, viz. Poorvăvăt, or the inference of the effect from the cause; 2. Shéshůvŏt, or the inference of the cause from the effect; and 3. Samanyoto-drishtung. The first kind is thus illustrated: from the sight of a dark cloud, an inference is drawn that there will be rain. The second is illustrated by inferring from the swell of a river, that rain has descended. The other kind of inference, which has no immediate connection with cause and effect, happens when a person sees something, and, having ascertained it to be composed of earth, denominates it a thing (drivyů). The capacity possessed by things of receiving a denomination, forms another ground of inference, as does the essential difference subsisting between things, as, such an animal cannot be a sheep, it therefore must be a deer, for it has large horns. The evidence denominated oopămană, arises from comparison or similarity. The words (testimony) of a faithful person are termed shŭbdu, of which there are two kinds, one capable of present proof, and the other that which awaits completion from the events of a future state. 2. How many things [prümeya] are there respecting which evidence is sought? The answer is, spirit, body, the senses, the objects of the senses, intellect, mină or mind, excitation, error, transmigration, the consequences of works, sorrow, and liberation. Spirit is that which is distinguished by desire, envy, anxiety, joy, sorrow, and knowledge. The body is that in which are found pursuit, the senses, joy, and sorrow.* The separate capacity of smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing, belong to the senses. The senses are derived from, and employed upon, the five primary elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air, and vacuum, the qualities of which are scent, taste, form, touch, and sound. Intellect * The commentators observe here, that joy and sorrow do not properly belong to body, for they are not found in a dead body; but that Goutŭmů's meaning must have been, that joy and sorrow belong to spirit as clothed with a body. is the same as knowledge. The faculty that receives ideas separately, is called mănă. The excitation which a person feels when about to speak, or to act, or to form ideas, is called prăvrittee. Desire, envy, fascination, &c. which also excite to action, are called faults. A perpetual succession of birth and death till the person obtains liberation, is called prétyŭbhavů, or transmigration. He who is properly sensible of the evils of this perpetual subjection to birth and death, will seek liberation. Some affirm, that death is to be identified with the completion of those enjoyments or sufferings which result from accountability for the actions performed in preceding births; others call the dissolution of the union between the animal soul and the body, death; and others contend, that death is merely the dissolution of the body. Birth is that which forms the tie between the animal soul and the body. The fruits of actions are, those present acts of religion and irreligion which arise out of desire and error. Some say, that the very body, the senses, and the faculties also, are the fruits of actions. Sorrow is identified with pain. Pleasure arises out of pain; and hence pleasure itself is in fact pain. The liberation of the animal soul consists in its entire emancipation from sorrow, and from birth. 3. Doubt which arises respecting the real identity of an object, is denominated sungshuyu, as when a person, seeing a cloud, is uncertain whether it is composed of dust or of smoke. This may arise from there being in the object before us both common and extraordinary properties, or from difference in testimony respecting it, or from doubts whether the judgment we form of the thing be correct or not. This sungshuyǎ is removed, when, of two contradictory ideas, one is preferred. 4. That object which desire of enjoyment has made necessary, is denominated prudhanů-průyojunů. That which is secondary, or an assisting cause in obtaining a good, is denominated uprudhanu-prùyojunй. 5. An example or simile which at once proves a fact and satisfies an objector, is called drishtantă. 6. An undoubted decision respecting the meaning of the shastră, is called siddhantă, as is likewise the decision where two opponents come to an agreement, as well as when a |