Greek sceptics ask, What can be certainly known concerning a being, of whose form, subsistence, and place, we know nothing? On the subject of morals, they say, there appears to be nothing really good, and nothing really evil.'-So among the Hindoos, there arose a sect of unbelievers, the bouddhus, having its founder, its colleges, and shastris. Many of the Hindoos maintain, that the dŭrshunus owe their origin to the dispute between the bramhuns and the bouddhus; but this supposition probably owes its origin to the fact, that the Hindoo philosophers of three of these schools were much employed in confuting the bouddhŭ philosophy: the following may serve as a specimen of the arguments used on both sides :-The bouddhus affirm, that the world sprung into existence of itself, and that there is no creator, since he is not discoverable by the senses.* Against this, the writers of the orthodox dŭrshŭnus insist, that proof equal to that arising from the senses may be obtained from inference, from comparison, and from sounds. The following is one of their proofs from inference: God exists; this we infer from his works. The earth is the work of some one-man has not power to create it. It must therefore be the work of the being whom we call God. When you are absent on a journey, how is it that your wife does not become a widow, since it is impossible to afford proof to the senses that you exist? According to our mode of argument, by a letter from the husband we know that he exists; but according to yours, the woman ought to be regarded as a widow. Again, where there is smoke, there is fire: smoke issues from that mountain-therefore there is fire in the mountain.It will not excite surprize, that an atheistical sect should have arisen among the Hindoos, when it is known that three of the six philosophical schools were atheistical, the Voishéshikŭ, the Meemangsa, and the Sankhyů.† The system adopted by Pythagoras, in certain particulars, approaches nearest to that of the bramhuns, as appears from his doctrine of the metempsychosis, of the active and passive principles in nature, of God as the soul of the world, from his rules of self-denial and of subduing the passions; from the mystery with which he surrounded * The bouddhŭs, say the bramhuns, disregard all the doctrines and ceremonies of religion: Respecting heaven and hell, which can only be proved to exist from inference, they say, we believe nothing. There is a heaven; Who says this-and what proof is there, that after sinning men will be punished? The worship of the gods we + From these and from the bouddhis regard not, since the promised fruit hangs only on an inference. more than twenty inferior sceptical sects are said to have sprung. himself in giving instructions to his pupils; from his abstaining from animal food,* &c. -In all these respects, the Hindoo and Pythagorian systems are so much the same, that a candid investigator can scarcely avoid subscribing to the opinion that India was visited, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, by Pythagoras, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho, and others, who afterwards became eminent philosophers in Greece.'t That which is said of Pythagoras, that he was possessed of the true idea of the solar system, revived by Copernicus, and fully established by Newton, is affirmed of the Hindoo philosophers, nor does it seem altogether without foundation. In all these, and other respects, may be traced such a close agreement between the philosophical opinions of the learned Greeks and Hindoos, that, coupled with the reports of historians respecting the Greek sages having visited India, we are led to conclude, that the Hindoo and Greek learning must have flourished at one period, or nearly so, that is about five hundred years before the Christian æra. Among those who profess to study the dărshůnus, none at present maintain all the decisions of any particular school or sect. Respecting the Divine Being, the doctrine of the védantă seems chiefly to prevail among the best informed of the Hindoo pundits; on the subject of abstract ideas and logic, the nyayŭ is in the highest esteem. On creation, three opinions, derived from the dŭrshůnus, are current: the one is that of the atomic philosophy; another that of matter possessing in itself the power of assuming all manner of forms, and the other, that spirit operates upon matter, and produces the universe in all its various appearances. The first opinion is that of the voisheshika and nyayŭ schools; the second is that of the sankhyŭ, and the last that of the védantă. The Patunjălă, respecting creation, maintains that the universe arose from the reflection of spirit upon matter in a visible form. The Meemangsa describes creation as arising at the command of God, joining to himself dhurmŭ and ùdhărmă, or merit and demerit. Most of the dorshunus agree, that matter and spirit are eter*Not only man, but brute animals are allied to the divinity; for that one spirit which pervades the universe ainites all animated beings to itself, and to one another. It is therefore unlawful to kill or eat animals, which are allied to us in their principle of life.-Enfield, page 405. + Ibid. nal. These works point out three ways of obtaining emancipation, the knowledge of spirit; devotion; and works. Some idea of the doctrines taught in each of these six schools, may be formed by perusing several of the following sections. SECTION XIV. Of the Sankhyu Dŭrshŭnü.* Kopilă is supposed to have been the founder of this sect: he is honoured by the Hindoos as an incarnation of Vishnoo. Mr. Colebrooke, however, denies that the sentences known by the name of Kapilă's soōtrus are his : he says, 'The text of the sankhyŭ philosophy, from which the Bouddha sect seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kupilă himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by Eeshwuru-Krishnň; and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kupilo, through successive teachers, after its publication by Pánchŭshikhŭ, who had been himself instructed by Ŭsooree, the pupil of Kăpilă.' Kopilă has been charged, and perhaps justly, with favouring atheism in his philosophical sentiments; nor is it wonderful, that men so swallowed up in pride, and so rash as to subject the nature of an infinite and invisible Being to the contemptible rules of so many ants, should be given up to pronounce an opinion from which nature herself revolts, "No GOD!!"-However, the reader will be able to form a correct idea of these opinions from the translation of the sankhyu-sară, and other works which follow. * It is uncertain which of the dŭrshůnus is the most ancient: it is however conjectured, that this is the order of their rise: the Voisheshikŭ, the Noiyayiků, the Mēēmangsa, the Sankhyŭ, the Patŭnjŭlů, and then the Védantů; and the author would have placed them in this order, but being confined to time in issuing this volume, he was obliged to place the account of that first which was most ready for the press. SECTION XV. Treatises still extant belonging to this school of philosophy. Sankhyu-soutrů, or the original sentences of Kupilă. Sankhyu-průvuchunů-bhashyй, a comment on ditto. Sankhyu-tuttw -koumoodee, a view of the Sankhyŭ philosophy. Sankhya-chundrika, ditto. Ditto by Vachispǎtee-mishră. Sankhyŭ-sară, the essence of the sankhyŭ doctrines. A comment on this work. Kupilŭ-bhashyň, a comment by Vishwéshwŭree. SECTION XVI. Translation of the Sankhyu-saru, written by Vignanů-bhikshooků. "Salutation to God, the self-existent, the seed of the world, the universal spirit, the all-pervading, the all-conquering, whose name is Măhăt.* In "The nature of spirit was examined by me briefly in the Sankhyu-karika; according to my ability, I now publish the Sankhyă-sară-vivékŭ, in which I have collected the essence of the Sankhyŭ doctrines, which may all be found in the karikas.+ the Sankhyŭ-bhashyŭ, I treated of nature at large; in this work, the subject is but slightly touched. "It is the doctrine of the védă and the smritees, that emancipation is procured by the wisdom which discriminates between matter and spirit. This discrimination + Deliverance from a bodily state, The Great, or Excellent. + Explanatory remarks in verse. er, from subjection to transmigrations. will destroy the pride of imaginary separate existence;* as well as passion, malevolence, works of merit and demerit, which arise from this pride; and also those works of former births which were produced by ignorance, passion, &c.; and thus the fruit of actions will cease; for the works connected with human birth being discarded, transmigration is at an end, and the three evilst being utterly extinguished, the person obtains emancipation. Thus say the védus, smritees, &c. "He who desires God, as well as he who desires nothing, though not freed from the body, in the body becomes God. If a person well understands spirit, he [knows himself to be] that spirit. What should a man desire, what should he seek, tormenting his body? When all the desires of the heart are dismissed, a mortal becomes immortal, and here obtains Brůmhŭ. He who anxiously desires to obtain an object, is re-produced with these desires in the place on which his mind was fixed. worldly attachment is destroyed, whose desires are confined to spirit. All his "The smritees, and the koormŭ and other pooranus, declare, that passion, hatred, &c. arise from ignorance, and that ignorance gives birth to works of merit and demerit; all which are faults, since they invariably perpetuate transmigrations. The Mokshǎ-Dhurmu‡ thus speaks, The organs of the man who is free from desire, do not go after their objects; therefore he who is freed from the exercise of his members, will not receive a body, for it is the thirst-producing seed of desire which gives birth to creatures. "Some say, hell is the fruit of works; but if so, why is desire made an impelling cause, for no one desires hell? The answer to this is, that if no one really desires hell, there is however a degree of desire. We hear, that there is a hell, which is composed of a red-hot iron female, on which adulterers are thrown: notwithstanding the knowledge of this, however, the love to women still remains. The five sources of misery, that is, ignorance, selfishness, passion, hatred, and terror, which spring from the actions of former births, at the moment of a person's birth become assistants to actions; as the existence of pride, passion, or envy, infallibly secures a birth connected That is, that the human spirit is separate from the divine. others, and accidents. A part of the Muhabharŭtů. + These are, bodily pains, sorrow from |