portions, and is inferred [from consciousness], enjoys nourishment in all worlds, in all beings, in all souls: his head is splendid, like that of this universal soul; his eye is similarly varied; his breath is equally diffused; his trunk is no less abundant; his abdomen is alike full; and his feet are the earth; his breast is the altar; his hair is the sacred grass; his heart, the houshold fire; his mind, the consecrated flame; and his mouth, the oblation." To this may be added, these prayers, as a further proof of that confusion which the védů has introduced into the devotions of the Hindoos: "May Vŭroonů grant me wisdom; may fire and Prŭjaputee confer on me sapience; may Indrŭ and air vouchsafe me knowledge; may providence give me understanding: be this oblation happily offered! May the priest and the soldier both share my prosperity; may the gods grant me supreme happiness: to thee, who art that [felicity,] be this oblation effectually presented."

The following paragraph goes pretty far to prove, that the védŭ recognizes-human sacrifices: "In the poorooshŏ-médhŭ,* a hundred and eighty-five men, of various specified tribes, characters, and professions, are bound to eleven posts: and, after the hymn, concerning the allegorical immolation of Narayŭnů, has been recited, these human victims are liberated unhurt and oblations of butter are made on the

It

sacrificial fire. This mode of performing the poorooshŭ-médhů, as emblematic
ceremonies, not as real sacrifices, is taught in the yōjoor védů: and the interpretati-
on is fully confirmed by the rituals, and by commentators on the sẵnghită and bram-
hunu; one of whom assigns as the reason, 'because the flesh of victims, which have
been actually sacrificed at a yŭgnů, must be eaten by the persons who offer the sa-
crifice but a man cannot be allowed, much less required, to eat human flesh.'
may be hence inferred, or conjectured at least, that sacrifices were not authorized
by the védă itself: but were either then abrogated, and an emblematical ceremony
substituted in their place; or they must have been introduced in later times, on the
anthority of certain pooranŭs and tůntrus fabricated by persons, who, in this as in
other matters, established many unjustifiable practices on the foundation of emblems
and allegories, which they misunderstood."

I am not disposed to contradict Mr. Colebrooke, in the remarks which he makes * From poorooshů, man, and médhů, a sacrifice.

respecting the spuriousness of the oopunishŭds relating to Ramŭ, Krishnŭ, &c.; they may be more modern than the others; but I conceive, that the mythology of the védŭs has given rise to the worship of deified heroes, and to this whole fabric of superstition: the védŭ mentions Brimha, Vishnoo, Shivă, and many of the other gods; and encourages the burning of women alive,* which is surely a far greater crime than any thing done before the images of Doorga, Ramă or Krishnă, admitting that many detestable indecencies have been recently introduced at the festivals of these deities.

Let the reader seriously weigh these quotations, and then let him recollect, that these are parts of the védŭs, the source of all the shastrus, and, if we must believe some persons, the most ancient and venerable books in the world. Mănoo says,

"A priest who shall retain in his memory the whole rig-védů, would be absolved "from guilt, even if he had slain the inhabitants of the three worlds, and had eaten "food from the foulest hands." Here again, killing the inhabitants of the three worlds, and eating food with a person of inferior cast, are esteemed crimes of similar magnitude, by Manoo, "the son or grandson of Brumha, the first of created beings, and the holiest of legislators."+

It will, perhaps, be thought, that the author has borrowed too much from a work already before the world; but he hopes the reader will consider, that it falls to the lot of very few persons to be acquainted with these ancient writings like Mr. Colebrooke; the author also was very anxious to do justice to books which have made so much noise in the world. He hopes Mr. Colebrooke's known candour will excuse his freedom of comment, which has arisen entirely from a conscientious regard to the interests of Truth.

SECTION XIII.

Of the Six Durshunus,

Or the writings of the six philosophical sects.

THE six dărshŭnus are six Systems of Philosophy, having separate founders, shastrus, and disciples. Their names are, the Voishéshikŭ, the Nyayŭ, the Meemangsa, the Sankhyŭ, the Patŭnjălă and the Védantů durshůnus.-The schools in which these systems were taught existed in different parts of India, but were held principally in forests or sacred places, where the students might not only obtain learning, but be able to practise religious austerities: Kupilŭ is said to have instructed his students at Gănga-sagŭră; Păíănjùlee at Bhagŭ-bhandară; Kňnadŭ on mount Neelă; Joiminee at Neelŭvătă-mōōlă; and Goutămŭ and Védů vyasă seem to have instructed disciples in various parts of India. We are not to suppose that the Hindoo sages taught in stately edifices, or possessed endowed colleges; they delivered their lectures under the shade of a tree or of a mountain; their books were palm-leaves, and they taught without fee or reward.

The resemblance between the mythologies of the Greeks and Hindoos has been noticed by Sir W. Jones, but in the doctrines taught by the philosophical sects of the two nations, and in the history of these sects, perhaps a far stronger resemblance may be traced :

Each of the six schools established among the Hindoos originated with a single and a different founder: thus Kinado was the founder of the voishéshiků; Goutămă of the noiyayikă; Joiminee of the Meemangsa; Kupilŭ of the sankhyй; Pătănjŭlee of that which bears his name; and Védŭ-vyasů of the védantů;-as Thales was the founder of the ionic sect, Socrates of the socratic, Aristippus of the cyrenaic, Plato of the academic, Aristotle of the peripatetic, Antisthenes of the cynic, Zeno of the stoic, &c. It is equally worthy of notice, that those who maintained the opinions of a particular durshănă were called by the name of that durshŭno: thus those who N n

followed the nyayŭ were called noiyayikus; and in the same manner a follower of Socrates was called a socratic, &c.

In the different dorshůnus various opposite opinions are taught, and these clashing sentiments appear to have given rise to much contention, and to many controversial writings. The nyayŭ durshănă especially appears to have promoted a system of wrangling and contention about names and terms,* very similar to what is related respecting the stoics: The idle quibbles, jejune reasonings, and imposing sophisms, which so justly exposed the schools of the dialectic philosophers to ridicule, found their way into the porch, where much time was wasted, and much ingenuity thrown away, upon questions of no importance. The stoics largely contributed towards the confusion, instead of the improvement, of science, by substituting vague and ill defined terms in the room of accurate conceptions.'+

It is also remarkable, that many of the subjects discussed among the Hindoos were the very subjects which excited the disputes in the Greek academies, such as the eternity of matter; the first cause; God the soul of the world; the doctrine of atoms; creation; the nature of the gods; the doctrine of fate; transmigration; successive revolutions of worlds; absorption into the divine being, &c. It is well known, that scarcely any subject excited more contention among the Greek philosophers than that respecting spirit and matter; and if we refer to the Hindoo writings, it will appear, that this is the point upon which the learned Hindoos in the dŭrshunŭs have particularly enlarged. This lies at the foundation of the dispute with the bouddhŭs; to this belongs the doctrine of the voishéshikus respecting inanimate atoms; that of the sankhyus, who taught that creation arose from unassisted nature, and that of others who held the doctrine of the mundane egg.‡ Exactly in this way, among

At present few of the Hindoos are anxious to obtain real knowledge; they content themselves with reading a book or two in order to qualify themselves as priests or teachers, or to dispute and wrangle about the most puerile and trifling conceits. + Enfield, p. 318, 319.

"An Orphic fragment is preserved by Athenagoras, in which the formation of the world is represented under the emblem of an egg, formed by the union of night, or chaos, and ether, which a length burst, and disclosed the forms of nu are. The meaning of this allegory probably is, that by the energy of the divine active principle upon the eternal mass of passive matter, the visible world was produced."-Enfield, page 116.

the Greek philosophers 'some held God and matter to be two principles which are eternally opposite, as Anaxagoras, Plato, and the whole old Academy. Others were convinced that nature consists of these two principles, but they conceived them to be united by a necessary and essential bond. To effect this, two different hypothesis were proposed, one of which was, that God was eternally united to matter in one chaos, and others conceived that God was connected with the universe as the soul with the body. The former hypothesis was that of the antient barbaric phi- · losophers, and the latter that of Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras, the followers of Heraclitus,' &c.

The Greeks, as they advanced, appeared to make considerable improvements in their philosophy: The most important improvement,' says Brucker, which Anaxa. goras made upon the doctrine of his predecessors, was that of separating, in his system, the active principle in nature from the material mass upon which it acts, and thus introducing a distinct intelligent cause of all things. The similar particles of matter, which he supposed to be the basis of nature, being without life or motion, he concluded, that there must have been, from eternity, an intelligent principle, or infinite mind, existing separately from matter, which having a power of motion within itself, first communicated motion to the material mass, and, by uniting homogeneal particles, produced the various forms of nature.' A similar progress is plainly observable among the Hindoos: the doctrine of the voishéshikă respecting atoms was greatly improved by the light which Védŭ-vyasŭ threw on the subject, in insisting on the necessity of an intelligent agent to operate upon the atoms, and on this axiom, that the knowledge of the Being in whom resides the force which gives birth to the material world, is necessary to obtain emancipation from matter.

Among the Greeks there existed the Pyrrhonic, or sceptical sect, the leading character of which was, that it called in question the truth of every system of opinions adopted by other sects, and held no other settled opinion, but that every thing is uncertain. Pyrrho, the founder of this sect, is said to have accompanied Alexander into India, and to have conversed with the bramhuns, imbibing from their doctrine whatever might seem favourable to his natural propensity to doubting. These