A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND RELIGION OF THE HINDOOS. THE Hindoos attribute their ancient writings to the gods; and, for the origin of the védŭs, they go still higher, and declare them to have been from everlasting. Though it would be unjust to withhold the palm of distinguished merit from many of their learned men, especially when we consider the early period in which they lived, yet, when compared with the writers of modern times, we are ready to pity the weakness of unassisted reason, even in individuals in whom it shone with the highest splendour. The period when the most eminent of the Hindoo philosophers* flourished, is still involved in much obscurity; but, the apparent agreement, in many striking particulars, between the Hindoo and the Greek systems of philosophy, not only suggests the idea of some union in their origin, but strongly pleads for their belonging to one age, notwithstanding the unfathomable antiquity claimed by the Hindoos: and, after the reader shall have compared the two systems, the author is persuaded he will not consider the conjecture as improbable, that Pythagoras and others did really visit India, or, that Goutămă and Pythagoras were contemporaries, or nearly so. If this be admitted, it will follow, that the dorshunos were written about five hundred years before the Christian æra. The védčs, we may suppose, were not written many years before the durshůnus, for Kopilů, the founder of the Sankhyŭ sect, was the grandson of Munoo, the preserver, and promulgator of the first aphorisms of the vidus; Gouti mu, the founder of the Noiyayikň sect, married the daughter of Brimha, the first male: and Kinadů and Půtěnjòlee, These persons were called Moonees, from munŭ, to know; and often, Gnance, or, The Wise: thus, even in the very names by which they were designated, we find the closest union between the Greek and Hindoo philosophers. "What is now called philosophy, was," says Brucker, "in the infancy of human society, called Wisdom: the title of Wise Men was, at that time, frequently conferred upon persons who had little claim to such a distinction." B b the founders of two other of these schools, belonged to the same, or nearly the same period. We are thus enabled to fix upon an epoch, in the most interesting period of Hindoo history, which is not only rendered probable by the accordance of two philosophical systems, but by all the chronological data to be gathered from the scattered fragments of history found in the pooranus. We shall now proceed to offer to the reader some account of the Hindoo Philosophers, and a summary of their Opinions; and, in the succeeding chapter, to give Translations from their most important works, or Abridgments of their contents. . SECTION II. Of the Hindoo Philosophers; and their Opinions. It is to be lamented, that the Hindoo writers afford us no particulars of the domes tic history of their sages; though they give us their philosophical opinions, the names of their wives and children, and of the places where their hermitages were situated. It is true, the lives of men so secluded from the world could not have supplied many materials for history; but there must have been various interesting occurrences, even in the forests or convents where they resided, and in their occasional intercourse with each other, and with the kings, their patrons, which would have given a peculiar interest to such memoirs: but here, as in their political history, we meet with nothing that can throw light on the periods in which they lived, nor on those learned disputations in which we know they were engaged.* We are, however, under great obligations to these historians, for pointing out so clearly the subjects which engaged the enquiries of these philosophers—that is, the divine nature, the evidences of truth, the origin of things, the nature of the different forms of matter, and the methods of obtaining re-union to the soul of the world. It will not escape the recollection of the reader, that these were the very subjects so constantly discussed in the Grecian schools; and he will no doubt be still more struck with these coincidences, when he reads the Introductory Remarks, and goes over the notes at the bottom of the succeeding pages. These subjects of enquiry, * These disputes, as described by the pouranic writers, were equally violent with those of the dialectic philosophers, and were maintained by" idle quibbles, jejune reasonings, and imposing sophisms," like those of the Greeks. it must be confessed, lay at the foundation of all that was interesting to them in those dark ages, but by the Hindoo ascetics they were discussed in a manner so metaphysical, that only minds equally abstracted with theirs could be interested in them; and this was very much the case with some of the Greeks, especially on points which related to the divine nature, and the origin of the universe.* A modern writer has given the following concise summary of the Greek philosophy, as taught by its most celebrated sages, and the author here inserts it, to assist his readers in a comparison of the two systems. "Like Socrates, Plato believed in the unity of the Supreme Being, without beginning or end, but asserted at the same time the eternity of matter. He taught, that the elements being mixed together in chaos, were, by the will of God, separated, reduced into order, and that thus the world was formed; that God infused into matter a portion of his divine spirit, which animates and moves it; and that he committed the care of this world, and the creation of mankind, to beings who are constantly subject to his will. It was further his opinion, that mankind have two souls, of separate and different natures, the one corruptible, the other immortal; that the latter is a portion of the divine spirit, resides in the brain, and is the source of reason; that the former, the mortal soul, is divided into two portions, one of which, residing in the heart, produces passion and desires; the other, between the diaphragm and navel, governs the animal functions of life; that the mortal soul ceases to exist with the life of the body, but that the divine soul, no longer clogged by its union with matter, continues its existence, either in a state of happiness or of punishment. That the souls of the virtuous, of those whose actions are guided by their reason, return after death into the source from whence they flowed; while the souls of those who submitted to the government of the passions, after being for a certain time confined to a place destined for their reception, are sent back to earth, to animate other bodies. "Aristotle has by some been charged with atheism, but I am at a loss upon what * "Nature and its origin was the highest object of study of the Pythagorean schools." The author is indebted to Dr. Epfield's Abridgment of Brucker for this and most of the notes in this chapter, grounds, as a firm belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, is clearly asserted by him, and not any where contradicted. He taught, that the universe and motion are eternal, having for ever existed, and being without end; and although this world may have undergone, and be still subject to, convulsions arising from extraordinary causes, yet motion, being regular in its operation, brings back the elements into their proper relative situations, and preserves the whole; that even these convulsions have their source in nature that the idea of a chaos, or the existence of the elements without form or order, is contrary to her laws, which we every where see established, and which, constantly guiding the principle of motion, must from eternity have produced, and to eternity preserve, the present harmony of the world. In every thing, we are able to discover a train of motive principles, an uninterrupted chain of causes and effects: and that as nothing can happen without a cause, the word accident is an unmeaning expression, employed in speaking of effects, of whose causes we are ignorant. That in following this chain we are led up to the primitive cause, the Supreme Being, the universal soul, who, as the will moves the body, moves the whole system of the universe. Upon these principles, it was natural for him to suppose the souls of mankind to be portions or emanations of the divine spirit, which at death quit the body, and, like a drop of water, falling into the ocean, are absorbed in the divinity. Though he therefore taught the immortality of human souls, yet, as he did not suppose them to exist individually, he consequently denied a future state of rewards and punishments. Of all things,' says he, 'the most terrible is death, after which, we have neither to hope for good, nor to dread evil.' "Zeno, of Cyprus, taught, that throughout nature there are two eternal qualities; the one active, the other passive. That the former is a pure and subtle æther, the divine spirit, and that the latter is in itself entirely inert, until united with the active principle; that the divine spirit, acting upon matter, produced fire, air, wa ter, and earth; or separated the elements from each other; that it cannot however be said, that God created the world by a voluntary determination, but by the effect of established principles, which have ever existed and will for ever continue. Yet, as the divine Spirit is the efficient principle, the world could neither have been formed nor preserved without him, all nature being moved and conducted by him, while |