her in the contest. Till the Congress was finally adjusted, it was obvious that the only safety for the parties interested was in their keeping up armies, not indeed to their original standard, but such, at least, as should place them in a respectable position, in reference to their situation in regard to the affairs of Europe. It grew out of the nature of the circumstances of the case, that all the parties should keep up something like an army till every thing was adjusted. Was there any body, he asked, who would have recommended it to England to withdraw from this wise line of policy? Would the noble marquis himself have recommended such a line of conduct to Great Britain? Would he have told her, that while other nations were providing for their immediate and prospective safety, by maintaining a respect able position till the final adjustment of differences, she ought to look only to the husbanding of her resources; and, on that principle, should withdraw her army, previously to a final convention? He was satisfied, that not the noble marquis merely, but that no other person would recommend to any government such a mode of proceeding. The mode of conduct, however, to be observed by the government of this country, in the present instance, rested not on the same principles as those which ought to govern, or might be supposed to govern, the conduct of other states. There were interests, in the importance of which all parties were agreed. There had been, and always would be, shades of difference as to the degrees of interest which this country had, and ought to feel, in the concerns of the continent. There probably, however, never was a great statesman who disputed that it was wise policy in this country to support Holland. He remembered that the late Mr. Fox had declared it to be his opinion, not only that great sacrifices should be made by this country for the accommodation of Holland, but even that a war should be persevered in on her account. He had never, indeed, heard any statesman dispute, that this would be a reason for carrying on a war once com. menced. Whether there was or was not a treaty, was, he contended, in such circumstances, of little consequence; and therefore, whether there was or was not a treaty, so ought we to have acted. The question with him was not, whether this was a line of conduct on the part of this government growing out of a treaty, but

whether it was not one growing out of the peculiar circumstances of the case? It was, he submitted, a wise course to adopt on its own merits, without reference to any treaty or agreement; but, in addition to this, it was founded on a treaty signed at a period when the principal powers of Europe had agreed, for a stated period, and for their joint and common security, to keep up a stated force; and, if ever there was a time in which every thing was open, fair, and explicit on the continent, this was the time. Not only were the circumstances of this treaty known in this country, but most important proceedings followed in consequence in this country, particularly on the consideration of his Majesty's Message, on the 20th of June. Not only were the circumstances of the transaction then alluded to, but they were even stated with great particularity. Though the continuance of the American war would then have justified some vote of credit, yet it would not have warranted a vote to the extent demanded and granted; the vote being not on account of the continuance of the war with America, but for the support of the British troops on the continent, till the state of Europe should be adjusted and tranquillized. That vote did not pass without observation from the noble baron opposite; but still it was adopted, and passed nem. dis. He agreed that, as to the sums, and the manner in which they were expended, the most ample information should be laid before parliament; at present, in his opinion, the matter was not regularly brought before parliament. There would be a time for discussing the business, and when that time arrived, he trusted he should not be wanting.

Lord Grenville said: I confess, my lords, I am by no means satisfied with the concluding observations of the noble earl as to the form in which he proposes that the treaty shall be laid before the House. In fact, he has made no objection that I heard to the motion requiring that we should be put in possession of copies of all engagements with foreign powers, by virtue of which a large body of British troops have been retained upon the continent. Parliament has never received any notification from the crown of this intention; and if to the Address the Prince Regent shall reply, that the treaty has not yet been ratified, and that the substance only can be given, then it will be early enough so to frame the motion, I doubt

the first time, to night stated some of the circumstances that led to this arrangement: on former occasions little has been remarked upon the deviation from the ordinary course by the immediate signature of a definitive treaty with France, while the arrangement of the interests of the rest of Europe was left to discussion at the projected Congress. I, however, did express great doubt as to the wisdom of such a determination, because it necessarily involved that which, in my judgment, was more calculated than any thing else to lessen, if not almost to annihilate, the influence of this country at the Congress. The consequence of a separate definitive treaty with France was to limit completely and finally the claims of that kingdom, while the possessions and demands of all the other sovereigns were left undetermined; and the effect with regard to Great Britain was, that by the cession to France of all that was to be yielded, we lost the only remaining hold we had upon her, namely, the colonies, of which we had during the war deprived her. It might, perhaps, be deemed an expedient of political wisdom that both England and France should be excluded from all share in the future continental arrangements: as to ourselves it might be. completely effectual, but France, from her local situation, could not be wholly prevented from retaining an influence. From the position of England, the only mode she had of securing by her influence the success of the plans she had in view, was by retaining the colonies obtained by her maritime superiority, which she might be supposed to have a right to hold until her just claims were allowed, and until France was reduced within those limits that would maintain the security of points where we had the deepest interests staked. To instance the case of the Netherlands; no statesman, or no man who assumed to himself the title of a statesman, could have calculated upon the future situation of the Low Countries: it was a point that deeply concerned Great Britain, and it would of course demand our earliest attention. What have we done? The other powers of Europe, it seems, have, or pretend to have, no interest in the Netherlands. Austria rejects them, Prussia does not require them, and the burthen of retaining them was thrown upon Great Britain; whereas, if we had signed only preliminaries of peace, instead of a definitive treaty, we should have kept them until it was

whether the mere production of the substance would answer the purpose in view; it may be laid upon the table, not as a treaty regularly entered into, but as an engagement signed and acted upon in contemplation of being ratified: it seems to me a little out of the usual practice for the House to move for the substance. I am not aware, under these circumstances, if it be a regular mode of proceeding, and my noble friend is satisfied with such an amendment, that there is any thing left to be debated; but I trust that I shall be allowed the liberty of saying a few words on some important points connected with this subject, upon which the noble earl has just touched. With regard to the constitutional part of the question, I must be permitted to say, that whatever respect and deference I may privately feel for the explanations given by any noble lord in his place, it appears to me that the constitution of the country requires that in no case of a measure of such momentous importance, of such a stupendous deviation from the ordinary practice in military affairs, where a body of 40,000 men (I believe I much under-rate the number) is maintained in a foreign land during peace, shall the parliament be kept in ignorance, but that a distinct communication shall be made upon the subject. However exalted may be the character of the noble earl, any verbal communication from him can never have the weight that belongs to a formal measure from the throne, which this House has a right to expect under circumstances of such striking deviation from precedent and principle. On a former occasion, the noble earl stated, that the notoriety of the necessity in this case would remove the danger of its being converted into a precedent; but he must allow me to say, that it is from that very circumstance that I entertain the most apprehension of the consequences: it is the very ground on which all bad precedents are established-they are adopted from necessity, often most notorious necessity, and the pursuance of the system is justified by the previous practice. I beg also to observe, that the noble earl assumes a great deal too much, if he imagines that there is any thing like a general concurrence of opinion in the country as to the propriety of this measure: much more must be known than the noble earl has stated, or perhaps could state, before I can acquiesce in its justice and propriety. The noble earl has, for

necessary to exert all the powerful influence we possessed at the moment of the signature of these preliminaries. Above all, we should have been able to prevent that which has worked the deepest injury to this country-the delay that has taken place in the settlement of the affairs of the continent. I cannot admit that the silence of any noble lord is to be construed into an assent; and if no remark was made on this side of the House upon what passed on the 20th of June, it was not to be imagined that concurrence was given in a measure like that which we now see exposed. Let the noble earl, however, remember, that at that time it was stated that the Congress was to be immediately assembled. When two of the sovereigns of Europe were on a visit to this metropolis, it was even said that their stay would necessarily be restricted by the great arrangements immediately to take place, in which they were so deeply involved. Had I even been in my place at that time, and had remained silent upon the subject, had I even given my assent to the speech of the noble earl, I should still be entitled now to say that I dissent, because then I knew that some short period must necessarily elapse before Europe was restored to perfect tranquillity. I should have acquiesced in the vote of credit perhaps, because some of our troops were, I believe, actually then in France, and some short period must be allowed for their return. But, undoubtedly, a different view of the subject presented itself the moment it was known that the arrangements, in which this empire ought to have borne so great a share, and which were expected to be made immediately after the signature of the treaty of Paris, was to be adjourned indefinitely; so that to the moment I am now speaking, we have had no intelligence that the Congress has yet proceeded to a single discussion. During this interval we have been employed in diminishing our influence, in surrendering the power that we naturally possessed, and we are now endeavouring to re-establish it, to regain the ground we have lost by the adoption of the course which the noble earl insists was the wisest plan that could be conceived. In consequence, however, of this wise plan, in my opinion, we are now enduring the burthen of the maintenance of this immense force on the continent. Some persons might have thought that the old modes of concluding peace, established by the

united experience of mankind for ages, would have been preferable to these newfangled schemes with which the noble earl is so much delighted; by the former we should not now have felt the weight under which the country groans in a time of peace; and the arrangements, in the speedy termination of which we were so much interested, would long ago have been concluded. Into the precise nature of these engagements, when they come before us, there may or may not be occasion to enter more at large; but at present it appears that the reciprocity of the contract is somewhat extraordinary; it compels this government, at an immense expense, to maintain an army upon the continent. It is true, that the other powers are to do the same; but Austria, without any such treaty, would, as a matter of course, maintain a force in her territories. Prussia would likewise have an army, especially if Saxony were placed in her hands. Upon this country only is there a disproportionate pressure, since we should have no interest to retain any part of our forces on the continent. We have had the wisdom, upon this new-fashioned scheme, first to throw out of our hands all the advantages that our influence gave, and then we are to regain them by means of a large force, at an immense charge to the subjects of this country. But some additional inducements are held out to reconcile us to the change of system. We are told that the effect of this large military power will be to settle the minds of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. Whether such will be the consequence, I know not, but I must say, that to me such a settlement of the minds of the people as is produced by the over-awing presence of a strong military force, is not so consoling as to the noble earl. With regard to the effect in other quarters, however grievous may be the expense, however large the force in proportion to our narrow means, and however alarming the precedent, I believe that it will give us no advantage over Austria, Prussia, or France: the quality of the force needs no eulogium, since it forms a part of the British army; but the quantity is most inadequate to accomplish any such purpose as ministers seem to expect.-I have said thus much at present; a question of such magnitude is by no means exhausted; but it will remain to be considered more fully when we have had the experience of the result of these happy and wise measures in supporting

the influence of Great Britain in the final settlement of continental Europe: the effects, up to the present time, have been only the annihilation of our influence, and the addition of an enormous burthen to the heavy weight which the nation has already to sustain. I wish it to be understood, that I do not state that there was no necessity for these measures; but I maintain, that as yet no such necessity has been proved, since a distinct, precise, and formal explanation can alone be satisfactory to parliament. With regard to the operation of such plans upon the general pacification of Europe, I can only say, that it will be a dreadful moment when it does arrive when a treaty is laid upon the table, in which the name of any British negociator shall be found sanctioning in any way that system of aggrandizement, extension, and partition, which is to be the basis of a final establishment, and of which my noble friend truly said, that it had been the origin of all the calamities of Europe. What line of conduct we are pursuing upon that subject I know not: what means remain to us of influencing the final decision of affairs, I venture not to pronounce; few and insignificant I fear they are. Whatever may be the issue, this consolation I sincerely trust we shall possess; that if instead of hailing the reestablishment of legitimate authorities and of national independence (as with grateful hearts we did last year, when a triumph was gained in favour of those rights for which we boasted that we fought and conquered) we are doomed to witness the signature of a treaty, by which it shall be for ever registered in the page of history, and handed down to posterity, that no nation has a right to her independence, that the power of the strong is the only law, that the rapacity of ambition is to be the only rule of justice, that such is the lesson, confirmed and sanctioned by the united voices of assembled sovereigns, and that such is the result of the long, arduous, and eventful contest, in which we have shed our blood and exhausted our revenue, -this consolation, I say, I trust we shall enjoy, that when the noble earl lays such a treaty upon the table, he will accompany it with a sincere lamentation that all our efforts had been unavailing to avert the evil, with a firm protest against it, and with a strenuous declaration, that it is an insult to the common sense, and a violation of the rights of the civilized world, and a

breach of the sacred principle recognised in that solemn instrument quoted by my noble friend. I cannot consent by entering into separate and particular cases, to imply a doubt upon the subject. I cannot allow myself to argue whether it would or would not be an act of injustice to transfer the people of Saxony, hitherto the happiest people of Germany, to whose army you were indebted for the victory of Leipsic, and for many of the consequences of that success, from the authority of their ancient and venerable sovereign, to place them under the dominion of a family, of whom they know nothing, and for whom they can feel no attachment. I cannot persuade myself, notwithstanding what passed last year in this House, to argue the question, whether men are to be treated like herds of cattle, like beasts who are to be sold, and not like men, who have a right to make a choice, and for whom the government is only administered in trust for their benefit. It would, I confess, have been high gratification to me, if the noble lord had told us that in these principles his Majesty's ministers concurred: small as our influence might be, yet in the maintenance of the principle of the independence of nations, that influence would have been well employed, and the fair character of this country would never have been stained with the guilt of being a party to the recognition or confirmation of any establishment, founded on a system so destructive as that for which the government of this nation now is contending.

The Marquis of Lansdowne had no objection to the addition of the word "substance," so as to make the request for "the copy or substance" of any arrangement. In alluding to the expenditure incurred by the maintenance of an army abroad, his lordship did not mean to object to it if that army were necessary. As yet, no such necessity had been established, and it would be a question for future discussion.

The motion having been altered accordingly, it was agreed to nem. con.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, November 14.

ESTIMATE OF THE NAVY DEBT.] Mr. Croker presented to the House, pursuant to their Address to the Prince Regent, the following