Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing the Mind

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W. Blackwood and sons, 1854 - 530 pàgines
 

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It complies more closely with definition of philosophy than the other
9
Eighth Counterproposition
10
The grounds on which it rests are false
11
Shortcoming of the Platonic ideas
12
It embodies the result of ordinary thinking and of popular psychology
13
The main result of the agnoiology shortly stated
14
No good can be expected so long as philosophy is not reasoned
15
The tenth contradiction which it corrects
16
The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects
17
The remaining contradictions which it corrects Page 522
18
Anticipations of Prop I by the philosophers of Germany
19
PROPOSITION IX
20
Illustration from logic
21
The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of Being
22
How ill the necessary truths have fared in Germany and in our
23
Exposure and refutation of these contradictions
24
illustra
25
The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects
26
What necessary truth
27
By the correction of these contradictions the system has redeemed its pledge
28
The utility of philosophical study
29
As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth
30
A remedial system uniting truth and reason not impossible
33
PROPOSITION XI
36
contrast
40
Further explanations as to how philosophy goes to work
48
The section called ontology naturally comes first but is truly last
54
Now we can settle the problem of ontologyand how
60
PROPOSITION VI
70
All other systems make game of the laws of thought
71
How the startingpoint is reached
77
That philosophy has a startingpoint is proved by the fact that its start
83
PROPOSITION II
93
PROPOSITION IV
117
This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter per
131
PROPOSITION V
140
Psychological conception of idealism
148
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN COGNITION
152
Plato appeared during the second crisis His aim
159
His merits The question respecting the particular and the universal
165
It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds
171
Review of our position
177
vii
191
Psychology adopts Counterproposition VII
201
Page
213
Eighth counterproposition the common property of materialist
223
The mind must always know itself in but not as some determinate
236
The antisensual psychology merely restricts the counterproposition
256
In attempting to think it we must leave out an element essential to
296
PROPOSITION XIII
303
67
309
PROPOSITION XV
317
The counterproposition considered in so far as it is the product of natu ral thinking
333
The exact point in the counter proposition which natural thinking opposes to the proposition
334
Psychological opinion as to existing substance
335
Secondly It places before us the mere phenomenal
336
The Institutional conception of known substance
337
History of distinction between substance and phenomenonits terms have been reversed
338
Errors caused by this reversal
339
Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here
340
The known phenomenal according to the older systems ib 16 The known substantial according to the older systems
341
A word upon existing substance and phenomenon ib 18 Two main ambiguities in the old systems
342
These ambiguities accounted for
344
And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine ib 21 Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes
346
An objection obviated
347
Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance
348
A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses
349
The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses
350
What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma
351
Contrast between speculation and psychology in their views of substance and phenomenon
352
Speculation proved to be right even by a reference to experience
354
PROPOSITION XVIII
355
PROPOSITION XIX
359
PROPOSITION XXI
365
Continuation of these remarks
367
Confusion might have been obviated had it been shown that all men
371
Its answer is the absolute startingpoint and forms the first proposition
391
PROPOSITION I
397
PROPOSITION III
404
Fifth Counterproposition
415
PROPOSITION VII
421
425
425
0 7
432
THE ONTOLOGY OR THEORY OF BEING
441
PROPOSITION I
443
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 The problem of ontology stated 2 Its three alternatives are exhaustive
444
The third alternative has to be eliminated 4 First Counterproposition
445
In what respect this counterproposition is right 6 In what respect it is wrong 443 ib 444 ib ib 445 ib
446
The law of excluded middle stated
447
Origin of the mistake in regard to this law
448
The want of a clear doctrine of the contradictory has been the cause of much error in philosophy
449
DEMONSTRATION
451
PROPOSITION IV
457
PROPOSITION VII
465
His fundamental defect
480
Kant Innate ideas
486
it finds that all cognition consists of two elements
494
PROPOSITION X
500
Illustration of restrictionWhat the ontology gives out as alone Abso
506
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
514
526
526
527
527
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