and the other persons who had been instrumental in his conviction. These applications being refused, he appears to have reasoned himself into a belief that the laws of the country afforded him no protection against oppression and injustice.

He then prepared a butcher knife, and a club with a knife inserted in the end, and on the night of the 12th of March last, soon after nine o'clock, approached the house of the deceased; there lay in wait till he saw a man, who had passed the evening with the family, leave for his home; and then meeting Mrs. Van Nest, who had retired to the yard, stabbed her, so that she died in a few moments; then entered the house and stabbed Van Nest to the heart, of which he instantly died; thrust the knife through the body of a child, two years old, while asleep in the bed; attacked and wounded Van Arsdale, who had retired to the chamber; and at the door and gate attacked and wounded Mrs. Wyckoff, the mother of Mrs. Van Nest, of which she died on the fourteenth day of the month ;-thus destroying the lives of four persons, with savage ferocity and cruelty, and endangering that of the fifth.

He then stole a horse from the stable, which fell with him after being rode about two miles. He then proceeded a short distance, when he stole another horse, and escaped to the town of Schroeppel, in Oswego county, where he was arrested.

In the defence of this wretched man, some of the best talent of the country has been faithfully exerted, and the attendance of medical men from Albany and Utica, procured to testify as to his insanity. A large number of respectable men, some of whom had known him from childhood, both in and out of the prison, have testified that they never had discovered or suspected any thing like insanity in his conduct before the murder. And after hearing all the proof adduced to sustain his defence of insanity, at the time of the murder, an intelligent and conscientious jury have decided that he was not insane, but a responsible man.

In this opinion the Court unanimously concur; so that the prisoner has been found to have been sane when put upon his trial, and also at the time of committing the murder. No serious question as to his guilt, in committing the murder, has been raised. His whole defence has rested upon his alleged insanity. And after twenty-four men have said upon oath he is sane, it is to be hoped that those who have heretofore doubted it, will yield to an opinion thus carefully formed and solemnly expressed.

This degraded and ignorant felon, who has consummated his wickedness by these atrocious murders, has had the benefit of two verdicts. Let it not be said that the administration of justice is partial or predjudiced by reason of his color, his social degradation, or his monstrous crimes. Slow and tedious as these proceedings have been, the Court are certain that in the minds of all reflecting men, a confidence will arise in the power of the laws

to protect the rights of our fellow citizens, and that the result will reflect honor upon the institutions and laws of the country.

.

That

A family of high respectability; of great moral worth; having numerous connections and relations; independent in circumstances, and in the full tide of life, have been cut off in a moment, at their own fireside, where they reposed in security and peace, by this degraded and malicious man. the public mind was excited and the public indignation freely expressed, was natural; and most creditable it is to the love of order which prevails in the community, that no violence was perpetrated upon his guilty head. All can now see that if the guilty are left to the laws, there is power in their provisions, and fidelity in their execution, to protect all and any interest of society.

The lessons to be drawn from this tragic event are many. The most impressive one is, that there is a duty upon society to see to the moral cultivation of the colored youth, now being educated for good or evil in the midst of us. This is so obvious that it needs no comment.

While we give full effect to the plea of insanity as an excuse for crime, we learn, with great satisfaction, that there is, in the common sense of the community, intelligence enough to discriminate between acts originating in moral depravity and ignorance, and those which proceed from the impulse of disease. The rule by which a man must be judged, is whether he had knowledge of right and wrong in regard to the act for which he is on trial. If he had, he is responsible, and is neither an idiot nor an insane man. By that rule the prisoner has been tried and convicted. And whatever theories learned men may create, there is no other which can be safely introduced into a court of justice.

We trust that the prisoner, during the term of life which remains to him, will receive the care and instruction of good men, to enlighten his darkened mind to a true sense of his condition, and to prepare him for the change that awaits him. For this purpose the sheriff will no doubt admit the visits of all such as are disposed to see him.

The judgment of the law is, that the prisoner at the bar, William Freeman, be taken from this place to the place from whence he came, there to remain until Friday, the eighteenth day of September next, and that on that day, between the hours of one and four in the afternoon, he be taken from thence to the place of execution appointed by law, anda there BE

HUNG BY THE NECK UNTIL HE SHALL BE DEAD.

Before the above sentence had been executed by the sheriff, the prisoner's counsel obtained an allowance of a Writ of Error, by which the indictment and proceedings were removed to the Supreme Court, for review upon a Bill of Exceptions. The case was argued at a Term of that Court held by Justices Bronson, Beardsley and Jewett, at the city of Rochester, in November, 1846.

The following are the Points made upon the argument of the Bill of Exceptions by the counsel for the prisoner and the people, respectively.

POINTS MADE FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

I. The proceedings on the trial of the preliminary issue are properly brought before the Court by this Bill of Exceptions. [11 Wend. 561; 15 do. 583; 3 Hill, 432; 1 Root, 551; Minor, 147; 6 Coke, 551; Co. Litt. 289; Graham, 931 to 944.]

II. The prisoner was entitled to peremptory challenges on the trial of the preliminary issue, and therefore the decision of the Court, denying such challenge of Ezra Stone, one of the jury sworn, was erroneous. [3 Ed. R. S. 507; 1 Russ. on C. 13; Bac. Abr. 264; Hale P. C. 267; 2 Hawk. P. C. 411, and authorities cited; Coke Litt. 157; 1 Black. 46; Com. Dig. 323; 2 Strange, 824.]

III. The oath administered to the triors of the challenge of Abraham Gutchess was erroneous and improper. [Bac. Abr. vol. 3; Coke Litt. 158; Trials per Pais, 199; 3 Bl. 362.]

IV. The Court erred in receiving the verdict of the triors in the case of Ezra Stone. [1 Lord Raymond, 133, 324; 5 Bac. Abr. 283, 286; 2 Binney, 514; 5 Burrows, 2669; 1 Salk. 53; 2 Strange, 1083; Trials per Pais, 314; 12 Vesey, 445; 4 Russ. 182.]

V. The Court erred in overruling the following question put by the pri soner's counsel to Simon Hawes, a juror on the preliminary issue, on the challenge for principal cause, viz: "Have you formed and expressed an opinion that the prisoner is guilty of the murders charged against him?” [6 Eng. Com. Law R. 491; Law Rep. 1846; 4 B. and A. 471; 13 State Trials, 221, 334; Trials per Pais, 200; 1 Inst. 158; 2 Hawk. P. C. 589; Burr's Trial, 370; 5 Rand. 659; 2 Tidd, 779; 7 Cranch, 295; 14 Wend. 131; 1 Denio, 282.]

VI. The charge of the Court to the triors on the qualification of Simon Hawes, that a fixed and deliberate opinion that the prisoner was guilty of the crime charged did not disqualify him from sitting as a juror, on the preliminary issue, was erroneous.

VII. The Court erred in refusing to instruct the triors of the qualifications of Henry Acker, that the oath they had taken meant absolute indifference between the parties, and not merely indifference as to the preliminary issue then on trial; and that if they should find the juror not indifferent as to the question of murder, then he was not indifferent as to that issue. [3 Bac. Abr. 259; 7 Cow. 122; 15 John. 177.]

VIII. The Court unlawfully instructed, on Sunday, the jury who had charge of the preliminary issue. [1 R. S. 275; 12 John. 178; 15 do. 119, 277; 20 do. 140; 3 Burrows, 1597; 9 Coke, 66; Cro. Jac. 80, 196; Hale, P. C. 45.]

IX. The Court erred in charging the jury on the preliminary issue. 1st, As to what is evidence of sanity; 2d, As to what constitutes sanity. [Ray, 27; Coll. on Lunacy, 475 to 636; Trial of Abner Rogers, 276; 2 Green. 301; 1 Nott and McCord, 191; 4 Hawk. 292; 19 State Trials, 947.]

X. The verdict on the preliminary issue was bad. 1st, It was not express and certain; 2d, It was argumentative; 3d, It did not cover the whole issue. [2 R. S. 697; 12 Vesey, 445; 7 Paige, 238.]

XI. The Court erred in overruling the plea that John O'Hara, a brotherin-law of Van Nest, was a Grand Juror. [Burr's Trial; 3 Wend. 324.]

XII. The Court erred in overruling the demurrer to the plea to the challenge to the array, on the ground of the discharge of Richard Searing. [1 R. L. 335; Notes of Revisers 3 R. S. 848; 13 Wend. 354; Trials per Pais, 167; 3 Wend. 434; 1 Littell, 202; Burr's Trial, 366, 422.]

XIII. An erroneous decision of the Court overruling a challenge for principal cause, is an error available to the defendant, although the juror was afterwards excluded by a peremptory challenge, [2 Virginia Cases, 297; 1 Denio, 281.]

XIV. The Court erred in disallowing the challenge for principal cause to James Amerman. [7 Cowen R. 121; 4 Wend. 229.]

XV. The Judge erred in his instructions to the triors on the challenge to Argalos Taylor.

XVI. The Court erred in overruling the objection to drawing from the jury box when there were less than twenty-four ballots in the box. [3 Hill, 432; R. S. and Notes.]

XVII. The Court erred in overruling the challenge for principal cause to Benjamin Beach, and in their charge to the triors in the case of Benjamin Beach.

XVIII. The Court erred in overruling the following question, put to the juror, Henry Chadderton, viz: "Have you any opinion upon any subject which would weigh against evidence?"

XIX. The Court erred in overruling the challenge for principal cause to Henry Chadderton.

XX. The Court erred in overruling the challenge for principal cause to Isaac S. Johnson.

XXI. The Court erred in their instructions to the triors on the challenge to Isaac S. Johnson, that an opinion on the prisoner's sanity was not a disqualification.

XXII. The Court erred in disallowing the challenge for prinicipal cause to John Jones, in their instructions to the triors in the case of John Jones, and in refusing to charge in that case as requested by the prisoner's counsel.

XXIII. The Court erred in permitting to be put to James E. Tyler the following question, viz: "When you questioned him in the jail, were his answers pertinent and appropriate?"

XXIV. The Court erred in permitting to be put to the witness, James

E. Tyler, the following question viz: "Have you seen a number of insane men in the prison, and did you have any difficulty in detecting insanity?”

XXV. The Court erred in overruling the following questions to the witness, Ethan A. Warden viz: 1st, "Did you say to yourself, then, 'What has come over Bill?" 2d, "Did you mention that to your family at the time?" 3d, "Did you then think there was a change in his appearance ?" [1 Phil. Ev. Cow. and Hill's Notes, 259, 260.

XXVI. The Court erred in overruling the following questions to Theron Green, a witness for the defendant: 1st, "Why did you not report him? Was it because you thought him irresponsible?" 2d, "Why did you not flog him?"

XXVII. The Court erred in excluding testimony by Doctor Van Epps, Doctor Hun and Doctor McNaughton, of facts showing the prisoner's insanity since the sixth day of July.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD and DAVID WRIGHT for prisoner.

POINTS MADE FOR DEFENDANTS IN ERROR.

I. The Preliminary proceeding to test the prisoner's sanity cannot be reviewed on a Bill of Exceptions. [1 Hale, 33-5-6; Trials pr. Pais, 14; 0. B. 1783, No. 4; 3 Bac. Abr. 81; Foster, 46; Kel. 13; 1 Lev. 61; 1 Sid. 72; 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 1 § 4, n. 5.]

II. The several rulings and decisions of the Court in the preliminary trial were correct, and the verdict of the jury is one of sanity, in the very language of the law. [1 Russ. on Cr., p. 8 to 12; the answers of the fifteen judges to questions suggested by the trial of McNaughton-Guy, 331.]

III. No juror was allowed to sit on the trial of the cause to whom prisoner objected, except Beach. The charge in Beach's case is correct, and there is no distinct or specific exception to any part of it.

IV. The testimony of Van Epps, Hun and McNaughton, which was offered and rejected, was irrelevant; at most, it was discretionary with the Court to receive it. That discretion was wisely exercised, and is not subject to exception. Testimony of a more dangerous character cannot well be imagined, and the reception of it would render a defence interminable. [Rex. vs. Lord Ferrers, 19 St. Trials (Howell) 947; Collison, 477; do. 673; do. 636; do. 480; Arch. Cr. Pl. 14; Dickinson vs. Barber, 9 Mass. 225; Guy, 332.]

JOHN VAN BUREN and LUMAN SHERWOOD for the people.

The arguments of counsel before the Supreme Court cannot be reported. The questions discussed and decided are fully indicated in the points herein